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Abstract 
The distinct processing characteristics of proper names have been characterised 
in various ways. Proper names have been considered unique, meaningless 
labels, and pure referencing expressions. A recent model by Valentine, Brennen 
and Bredart (1996) attributes the processing characteristics of people's names to 
processing via a token marker in memory. This thesis attempts to ascertain which 
of these explanations most adequately captures the processing characteristics of 
proper names. 
The first two experiments address evidence reported by Durso and O'Sullivan 
(1983) that would undermine the Valentine et al. (1996) model. The experiments 
indicate that Durso and O'Sul/ivan's data occurred as an artefact of their 
experimental design. Chapters 4 and 5 use a repetition priming technique to 
explore different classes of proper names: people's names, landmark names, 
country names and city names. Only names of people and landmark names 
produced cross modal and cross domain facilitation. 
The organisation of the output lexicon was addressed with five experiments 
reported in Chapter 6 using variants of the picture-word interference paradigm. 
It was found that common name distracters interfered with the production of 
proper name targets when a conceptual relationship existed between the target 
and the distracter. These data indicated that the lemma stage is highly influenced 
by semantic status and questioned the nature of organisation within the lemma. 
This thesis provides support for Valentine et al. (1996) indicating that the 
processing characteristics of people's names are determined by the nature of 
connectivity between the lemma and the token marker. The experiments 
reported in this thesis extend the role of the token marker to some classes of 
proper name other than people's names (i.e. landmarks). The data also 
demonstrate that the role of a token marker is not universal for aI/ categories of 
proper name (i.e. not country names or city names). Differences between 
categories of proper name indicate that the theoretical views of uniqueness and 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to Proper Name Processing 
What are proper names? 
A proper name is one or more words that function as a single unit of grammar. 
Linguists have described the properties and characteristics of proper names in 
many different ways. Nevertheless, these definitions share a number of features; 
proper names designate a particular entity and are used in a different way to 
common nouns. Some classes of words are most typically thought of as proper 
names, such as names of people and geographical locations. Linguists have 
also categorised temporal names (such as Easter, Christmas, days of the week, 
etc.) titles of books and musical pieces as types of proper name. In addition, 
some authors have suggested that other words, such as brand names should be 
considered to be classes of proper names (Cohen & Faulkner 1986). 
It is clear that the use of names in everyday language and the entities to which 
they refer cover a wide diversity of use. Whilst the definition of what is a proper 
name appears relatively specific for typical exemplars, such as people's names 
and geographical locations, the definition for other labels remains unclear. 
Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996) adopt the linguists' definition of proper 
names as labels that pertain to unique entities. These would include: People's 
names, geographical locations, landmarks and buildings, names of unique 
objects and animals, names of magazines, titles of books, and names of single 
events. The notion of a label being a unique referent has been adopted by a 
large number of theorists who attempt to explain the dissociation between 
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common names and proper names. For this reason, the theme throughout this 
thesis considers the notion of unique reference and how this may relate to and 
determine, the cognitive architecture that represents proper names. 
Reference and Semantics 
The notion of reference refers to a word's semantic status. Theories of semantics 
need to separate knowledge about language from knowledge of the world; people 
can know what a word means without knowing what the word refers to. This 
difference has been captured with the distinction between what is known as 
sense and reference. The sense or 'intension' of a word is the concept 
associated with it. The reference or 'extension' of a word is the thing or things 
that the word applies to. The sense of dog is a concept of what it is to be a dog. 
There are a number of possible referents in the world that fit this concept. 
However, there is also a possibility that the utterance refers to a particular unique 
individual. Proper names are the labels that we attach to specific instances to 
provide a unique referent. 
Theorists differ in their use of reference. Traditionally, theorists who attempt to 
differentiate between sense and reference were concerned with both intensional 
and extensional relations. Early theories were based on logic and hence the 
notion of truth became an important issue in theories of semantics. For Frege 
(1892) reference of a sentence was its truth value and sense was the conditions 
that the sentence must hold in order to be true. In other words Frege was 
concerned with intension. This notion of reference is rather non-specific; there 
are any number of situations in which the truth value may hold, without the 
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sentence ever specifying a particular event or individual. Later theorists 
acknowledged that meaning is often constrained by the situational context. This 
led to theories such as those proposed by Barwise and Perry (1983) who suggest 
that reference is constrained by the context in which an expression is made. 
More recent theories of semantics have focused on the everyday use of language 
and the contextual constraints that encompass knowledge and communication. 
A closer examination of the meaning of reference in the real world illustrates that 
knowing the specific situation or entity that an expression refers to in the world is 
a crucial ingredient of meaning. In this way more recent theories of semantics 
see reference in terms of extension, that is the specific situation or entity that is 
being referred to. Johnson-Laird (1983) attempts to address this with the theory 
known as "mental models". "Mental models" differ from earlier theories of 
representation as it uses reference as the crucial ingredient of semantics. 
It is not clear how these approaches to meaning (and reference) can be directly 
related to the kind of reference that a proper name conveys. Searle (1958) and 
Strawson (1959) claimed that a particular selection of descriptions define an 
individual; the meaning of a proper name is given by a particular conjunction of 
descriptions that define a particular entity. However, the notion that definite 
descriptions specify proper names has been challenged by theorists who 
advocate direct reference (e.g. Kripke, 1980). According to such theory, proper 
names are meaningless. Although the notion of direct reference challenges other 
theories, these alternatives shall not be discussed further, as they do not address 
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the issue of representation and so offer little to inform us about the cognitive 
architecture involved in the processing of proper names. 
Neuropsychological Studies of Proper Name Processing 
The study of neuropsychological functioning and deficits has also identified 
variations in the processing of proper names and common names. There are a 
number of case studies reporting intriguing dissociation in naming ability 
suggesting that not all lexical categories are equally compromised following 
neuropsychological damage. 
Object, face and word naming are aspects of cognitive ability that are particularly 
sensitive to neuropsychological impairment as each stage of processing elicits 
the potential for damage. However, one problem for the interpretation of 
neuropsychological evidence is the potential for confounding. Anatomical areas 
do not operate in isolation and experimental tasks cannot activate isolated 
processes. Nevertheless, with care, a wealth of information can be sought from 
the study of both normal and impaired function. Evidence from a variety of 
sources indicates that the processing of proper names and common names may 
depend on different neural structures. Furthermore, evidence indicates apparent 
dissociation between proper names and common names may be due to 
differences in access (the mapping between conceptual representations and the 
corresponding lexical entries), or due to differences in availability and 
organisation within the output lexicon itself. This review will initially discuss 
evidence for the anatomical locus of proper name processing and then continue 
with a discussion of neuropsychological studies of cases where there appears to 
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be a sparing of function or an impairment that is considered specific to proper 
names. Finally the discussion attempts to determine whether category specific 
deficits can be considered distinct from more general impairments. 
The Anatomical Correlates of Proper Name Processing 
There is evidence that the anatomical areas associated with the processing of 
proper names are distinct from those involved with the processing of common 
names. The anterior temporal lobe is often thought to be involved in the 
processing of proper names. This assumption has been derived from theories 
regarding the neuronal organisation of knowledge and naming within the left 
hemisphere, however evidence is inconclusive (Semenza, Mondini & Zettin, 
1995). A large variety of neuropsychological information has been collected. 
Within the last few years, neuro-imaging (such as Positron Emission Tomography 
(PET), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) using techniques that were primarily 
designed for diagnostic investigation have received much interest. This is 
currently a popular method used to view the anatomical areas that are activated 
when the brain is required to process certain forms of the experimental stimuli. 
Sergent, Macdonald, and Zuck (1994) used a functional imaging paradigm to 
examine the neuroanatomy associated with proper names and common names. 
This study used the same task to directly compare faces and names. Face 
processing tasks such as gender categorisation, familiarity decision, and 
semantic categorisation activated an area between the ventro-medial and 
posterio-anterior cortex of the right hemisphere. On the other hand proper 
names activated the lateral temporal cortex of the left hemisphere. There was an 
1-+ 
asymmetric activation for processing of information about individuals and no 
overlap for activation associated with the face and name processing tasks. 
Sergent et al. interpret this finding as an indication that information is stored in 
distinct regions and formats. However, when these findings were compared to 
earlier PET research, it was found that the rate of presentation significantly 
influenced the activation that was observed. Furthermore, although the right 
hemisphere is implicated in face recognition, it is the left hemisphere that is 
associated with language. 
Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa and Damasio (1996) investigated the 
neural structures involved in lexical retrieval and naming for proper names and 
common names, comparing unique peoples names, non-unique animal names 
and non-unique names of tools. Their study involved the comparison of two 
neuro-imaging techniques with volumetric analyses. One investigation involved a 
large group of neurologically impaired people with focal lesions. A strong 
correlation was found between the category related deficit and specific 
neurological areas of the temporal lobe. Deficits involving impairments to 
people's names were related to damage in the left temporal pole. In contrast, 
impaired production of animal names involved lesions of the left inferotemporal 
(mainly anterior) area. Impairments in the processing of tool names involved the 
posteriolateral inferotemporal cortex and the junction of the temporo-occipito-
parietal cortices. According to these data, word retrieval was associated with 
damage outside the classic language areas. An additional study by Damasio et 
al. used Positron Emission Tomography (PET) to look at the regional cerebral 
blood flow (rCBF) associated with producing names for the categories of people, 
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animals and tools. Word retrieval of people's names produced greatest 
changes in rCBF in the left and right ventro-Iateral temporal poles, but not in the 
infero-temporal areas. In contrast, animals and tools produced greatest changes 
in rCBF in the left posterior inferotemporal area. A small region of the left 
temporal pole was active for the naming of all categories of stimuli. Damasio et 
al. interpret this as evidence that these areas are involved in lexical retrieval. 
The intermediary stages of lexical retrieval involve different anatomical regions. 
They suggest that these regions do not contain explicit word forms, but carry 
knowledge of how to reconstruct a particular pattern, such as a phonological 
sequencing. 
Other sources of evidence also suggest that a specific anatomical locus for 
proper name processing exists. Muller and Kutas (1996) provide evidence from 
a study using an electrophysiological measure (Event Related Potentials). When 
participants listen to sentences that commence with proper nouns (people's 
names) a different anatomical area is activated compared to when sentences 
commence with common nouns. In summary, it would seem that a number of 
different sources, indicate that proper names may be processed by distinct 
anatomical locations to the processing of common names. Specific areas of the 
left temporal lobe may be implicated in proper name processing. 
Another means of investigation is to study what happens when damage occurs to 
these specific brain regions. A much greater range of evidence of this nature 
has been compiled, which may help to identify which aspects of processing are 
likely to be affected by impairment. 
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Neuropsychology of Impaired Function 
Linguistic deficits due to neuropsychological impairments are known as aphasia 
(the term given to any impairment in the ability to understand or produce 
language). There are a number of various syndromes into which neurologists 
categorise the various forms of aphasia, categorised as a Fluent or Non Fluent 
form. Two of the most general labels for these syndromes are Broca's aphasia 
and Wernicke's aphasia; both of these deficits usually occur due to damage of 
the respective regions of the left hemisphere. Broca's aphasia has been 
characterised as a syndrome which results from damage to Broca's area - the 
anatomical region associated with the motor control involved specifically in 
language production. People with Broca's aphasia present with non-fluent 
agrammatic speech which is sometimes accompanied by dyspraxia and or 
dysarthria. In contrast, people with Wernicke's aphasia are usually fluent in their 
speech production, however their utterance is nonsense. They tend to omit 
content words, often remaining unaware of semantic errors and neologisms in 
their speech. 
Although it may appear that a clear distinction exists between these very general 
forms of aphasia, there are many other subtypes of the syndrome. This is further 
complicated by the fact that there are no standardised systems for classification 
of aphasia; neurologists do not always agree with diagnostic criteria or on what 
basis a diagnosis should be made. Variations in the specificity of diagnosis, rely 
on the consultant's knowledge and expertise in recognising and categorising 
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language disorders. There is also a large variation among the aetiology and 
location of damage associated with neurological impairment. Furthermore, 
patients do not fall completely into one category alone. It is often difficult to 
isolate patient groups where deficits arise exclusively from impairment to 
processes associated with speech production or the semantic system alone. 
Diffuse damage often affects more than isolated aspects of the cognitive process 
and examination at post-mortem disagree over the precise neuroanatomical 
lesions that produce the different types of aphasia. Therefore, an understanding 
of the neuroanatomical correlates of cognitive processes cannot be achieved 
solely on the basis of neuropsychological assessment alone. Nevertheless, a 
large number and variety of neuropsychological cases are consistent with the 
view that conceptual information for person based knowledge and object based 
knowledge are represented, and processed using different neural areas. It 
follows that access to the corresponding linguistic information would be 
influenced and organised in a similar way. 
A primary focus of interest has been category specific and modality specific 
impairments. These phenomena have been used to infer the nature of both 
semantic and linguistic representation. A number of sources indicate that there 
is a dissociation between what are considered common names and proper 
names. As deficits can arise as a result of impairment to any part of the 
identification or name production process, the locus of the impairment will be 




Anomia is a general term used to portray a particular class of aphasia where 
there is a word finding difficulty. According to simple models of word retrieval, 
speech production involves distinct cognitive components. The nature of the 
patient's impairment is dependent on the locus of the neurological damage. 
Consequently, the following review will be organised as follows: firstly, studies 
are described where impairments arise due to deficits at a semantic level of 
processing. These cases primarily present as impairments in comprehension of 
proper names. Later cases, where speech production is impaired, but semantic 
processing remains intact, are then discussed. 
Anomia arising at the Semantic Level 
There are many cases where semantic impairments have consequences for the 
activation of phonology and the production of speech. A large number of studies 
have indicated that word finding difficulties can occur due to impairments in 
semantic processing, such as semantic comprehension difficulties and post 
semantic impairments (for example, Saffran, Schwartz & Marin,1976; Wapner & 
Gardiner, 1979; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Howard & Orchard-Lisle, 1984; 
McNeil, Van Lancker & Klein,1990; Ellis, Kay, & Franklin, 1992; Cipolotti & 
Warrington,1993; Brennen,1996; Van der Linden, Bredart & Schweich,1995; 
Leplow, Dierks, Lehnung, Kenkel, Behrens, Frank, & Mehdorn, 1997). The 
precise nature of the deficit, and the category of word that has deficient 
processing is dependent on the location and nature of the neurological damage. 
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One issue of particular importance for this thesis concerns whether there is 
evidence of a double dissociation in the processing of proper names and 
common names. Goodglass and Butters (1988) and Goodglass and Wingfield 
(1993) claim to have identified a patient group where there is evidence of a 
double dissociation between proper names (places) and common names (body 
parts). A spoken word-picture matching task was used to assess 
comprehension. They found that Wernicke's aphasics and global aphasics had 
better comprehension of proper names compared to common names. In 
contrast, anomic aphasics were found to have the reverse pattern; better 
comprehension for common names relative to proper names. However, Valentine 
et al. (1996) argues that there are a number of methodological concerns 
regarding this study. Firstly, only a limited range of stimuli were used for testing 
and matching using a visual word probe was not performed. In addition, the data 
suggest that the patients are reported selectively. In respect of matching 
performance for the verbal presentations of proper names, performance was 
quite poor and similar for all patients. However, performance for proper names 
was better if the task involved finding a location on a map. In contrast, anomic 
aphasics performed better in object identification than in verbal discrimination and 
were poor on tests that involved finding a location on a map. Valentine suggests 
that the design of this experiment does not allow an evaluation of the existence of 
a modality specific double dissociation between participants. 
More generally there are other factors that reduce one's ability to accurately 
interpret neuropsychological case studies. Valentine et al. (1996) suggest that 
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repeated testing may confound interpretations, due to the patients' repeated 
exposure to the experimental stimuli. It is also clear that patients suffering from 
degenerative disorders such as semantic dementia or dementia of Alzheimer's 
type are tested whilst they are in an unstable condition; performance on their 
tests rapidly diminishes leading to death. During this period a patient's diagnosis 
is often inaccurate. Evidence from patients with degenerative disorders may not 
be regarded as a suitable source of evidence regarding categories of knowledg·e. 
In these dementia patients processing through the semantic system is 
inconsistent. 
A number of issues exist regarding the neuropsychological assessment of proper 
name comprehension. Tests of comprehension given to aphasic patients 
assume that word picture matching tasks demonstrate comprehension. 
However, word-picture matching does not necessarily involve access through 
the semantic system. The design and nature of neuropsychological tests requires 
careful consideration before large scale interpretations can be considered valid. 
Reports where category specific deficits occur in the absence of any semantic 
impairment are particularly useful in attempts to characterise the output lexicon. 
Anomia without Semantic Impairment 
There is evidence that forms of anomia exist that are not a result of semantic 
impairment. One such example is Patient EST (Kay & Ellis, 1987). EST 
experienced difficulty in accessing words whose meanings were available. EST's 
speech was fluent but often omitted object names. He was able to sort pictures 
into semantic categories, and accurately perform other semantic tasks such as 
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the "palm trees and pyramids" matching task. In picture naming his ability to 
produce names appeared to be related to name frequency. The names that EST 
had problems with were low frequency names. EST often used descriptor words 
to show that he recognised the items that he could not name. Hence the word 
finding difficulty did not arise from a semantic deficit. Kay and Ellis concluded 
that word finding difficulty occurred due to insufficient activation reaching the 
output lexicon. In the case of low frequency names, this reduced activation was 
not powerful enough to allow all of the necessary phonological representations to 
become active. 
Category specific anomias without semantic impairment are also reported. 
However, they as not as common as those caused by an underlying semantic 
impairment, such as the cases discussed previously. In the realm of proper 
names, one such example is patient GBL documented by McKenna and 
Warrington (1980). Patient GBL was found to be suffering from a small lesion in 
the left posterior temporal region. Spontaneous speech remained intact together 
with normal results on tests of semantic memory, comprehension and verbal 
fluency. This patient was reported as having a proper name anomia that was 
specific to peoples names; performance on geographical locations was 
considered normal whereas performance on people's names was severely 
impaired. 
Other cases with selective anomia for proper names have also been reported. 
Reinkemeier, Markowitsch, Rauch and Kessler (1997) describe a patient with a 
left medial lateral temporal lobe lesion. The patient revealed a higher than 
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average I. Q. with no normal memory problems. The patient was severely anomic 
for people's names - the impairment had persisted for 10 years and for all post-
infact experiences of names. In contrast learning face-name pairs was preserved 
and the deficit was not associated to the ability to generate semantic or context 
specific knowledge for the names required. 
Lucchelli and Renzi (1992) describe patient TL who presented with a selective 
anomia for people's names due to a left thalamic lesion. Spontaneous speech 
was considered normal, whereas TL appeared to have considerable difficulty in 
retrieving people's names, whilst naming common object pictures and naming 
common objects to definition achieved a near perfect performance. This was also 
true of naming geographical locations. Although TL was able to generate 
biographical details from photographs of people, his ability to name people from 
pictures or definitions was showed a marked impairment. This pattern of 
impairment has also been found for other aphasic patients such as Patient MH 
(Carney & Temple,1993) and a patient reported by Fery, Vincent and Bredart 
(1995). 
Semenza and Zettin (1988, 1989) describe detailed case studies of patients with 
selective anomia. Semenza and Zettin (1988) describe patient PC who suffered 
damage to the parieto-occipital area of the left hemisphere. PC was diagnosed 
as a fluent aphasic; spontaneous speech was reported to be normal, but PC 
remained unable to retrieve proper names. One of the striking features about this 
patient was the perfect scores on tests of object naming. In contrast, he 
remained unable to name famous people and geographical locations, although 
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he was able to generate semantic knowledge and perform name-picture 
matching for these items. This dissociation between common names and proper 
names extended to tests of naming to definition and category fluency. It would 
appear then, that p.e's deficit occurs primarily due to the process of speech 
production, as semantic tasks that did not require speech were performed within 
the normal range. Later, Semenza and Zettin (1989) describe another patient 
LS who suffered damage to the fronto-temporal region. LS was reported as a 
fluent aphasic producing spontaneous speech without difficulty but with a 
profound anomia for proper names. This time the deficit was reported to affect 
oral and written production of proper names whilst comprehension remained 
intact. LS was assessed using a series of tests providing data from a number of 
different categories using tests of confrontation naming, word-picture matching 
naming to description and attribute listing. 
The work by Semenza and Zettin is particularly important, as the existence of a 
double dissociation has implications for the organisation of the output lexicon. 
Bredart, Brennen and Valentine (1997) argue that one needs to distinguish 
between impairments that involve language production and comprehension when 
attempting to evaluate the notion of a double dissociation between anomia for 
proper names and selective sparing of proper name production. Bredart, 
Brennen and Valentine (1997) argue that there have been no reports of patients 
with common name anomia and proper name preservation. They suggest that 
whilst a number of theories provide accounts of the single dissociation of proper 
names being more difficult to recall than common names, none of the studies 
provides conclusive evidence to suggest that proper name and common name 
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production are served by different routes. Evidence for a double dissociation in 
terms of production has not been demonstrated. Although the evidence in favour 
of a double dissociation for proper name comprehension is stronger, even this 
evidence is limited. 
How specific are proper name anomias? 
One problem in the comparison of different case studies is that studies all employ 
different forms of testing using different categories of stimuli. Many of the cases 
are not tested with all categories of proper name. For example, McKenna and 
Warrington (1978) perfromed tesing only with names of countries. In contrast, 
Semenza and Zettin (1988,1989) performed tests of people's names, names of 
countries and names of towns. However, these names were cued with map 
outlines, or picture postcards (presumably pictures of famous landmarks). 
Therefore it is difficult to determine whether the proper name anomia is truly 
specific to people names. The most striking variations are differences in the 
proper name anomia that affects people's names in isolation or together with 
geographic locations. Lucchelli and De Renzi (1992) suggest that this may 
simply reflect a severity factor. If this is the case, they predict that there should 
be a correlation between the severity of face naming impairment and deficits in 
processing other types of proper name. Hanley and Kay (1998) performed a 
meta-analysis on the performance of ten previously reported patients who have 
been reported as having impaired function in recalling the names of people, but 
who show a preserved ability for the recall of common names. They excluded 
patients who revealed impairments with comprehension, semantic knowledge, or 
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general word finding difficulties. Hanley and Kay (1998) organised the series of 
patients by their ability to name famous faces. Patients who had a general 
problem with proper names (i.e. who were impaired with more than just the 
category of people's names) were found to have the lowest scores for face 
naming. Their analysis therefore indicates that there is a relationship between 
selectivity and the severity of proper name impairment. Hanley and Kay (1998) 
suggest that there is no support for the notion that anomia for people's names is 
dissociable from other types of proper name. Differences that have been reported 
in the literature occur as a function of the severity of naming impairment rather 
than different types of naming impairments. 
In summary, a variety of evidence suggests that specific areas of the temporal 
lobe are involved in the processing of proper names. A large number of studies 
indicate that semantic deficits occur frequently. In the absence of semantic 
problems, proper name processing appears particularly vulnerable to 
impairments involving speech production. Proper names of people appear 
particularly vulnerable. However, the neuropsychological studies need to be 
interpreted with caution. There has been an almost total disregard for the nature 
of anatomical infarct when selecting patients for study and this has resulting in a 
large volume of data that has produced often conflicting data. Furthermore, 
there has often been an inadequate assessment of naming. Evidence for names 
other than those belonging to people, from other categories (such as 
geographical locations, towns, landmarks) is limited, and testing of patients with 
these items has been particularly inconsistent. 
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Theoretical Accounts of Proper Name Processing 
Theoretical accounts of proper name processing all relate to the pathways 
between conceptual and lexical representations. The following review will now 
consider some of the different attempts to characterise proper name processing. 
Views that the processing characteristics of proper names occur due to them 
being unique and meaningless labels will be addressed. The notion of proper 
names as pure referencing expressions, will also be considered. Finally, the 
recent model of proper name processing by Valentine, Brennen and Bredart 
(1996) will be introduced. It may be argued that there is a problem of 
differentiating between each theoretical position. This problem is inherited from 
publications which make large and unsupported generalisations from studies of 
people's names. However, direct quotations will be used to disambiguate each 
theoretical position in turn. 
Theoretical claims about proper names have been based almost exclusively on 
the processing of people's names. In all of the recent theoretical frameworks, the 
specificity of links between the lexical representations of peoples' names and the 
conceptual representations have been emphasised. However, the nature of this 
specificity has been characterised in qualitatively different ways. One early 
attempt to characterise specificity was presented by Durso and O'Sullivan (1983) 
who focussed on conceptual differences. Durso and O'Sullivan presented a 
generic-specific hypothesis and claimed that proper names may differ from 
common names in terms of their semantic representations. Proper names had 
specific semantic features, compared to common names that had more general 
semantic features. Evidence in favour of this proposal was presented with series 
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of experiments. It is clear that differences between proper names and common 
names cannot be attributed to such a simple explanation and a critique of Durso 
and O'Sullivan's evidence can be found in Chapter 3. 
Proper Names are Unique Labels 
Research has suggested that proper names are just highly specific labels. One 
explanation based on this premise has been developed derived from Burton, 
Bruce and Johnston's (1990) Interactive Activation and Competition Model (lAC) 
that simulates the identification pathway of the Bruce and Young (1986) model of 
face recognition. In this model, separate modules exist of the processing of facial 
images and semantic information. In the lAC architecture each module is 
represented by pools of units that correspond to face recognition units (FRU's), 
person identity nodes (PIN's) and semantic information (SIU's). In models such 
as lAC, the PIN acts as a modality free gateway to the semantic system. Each 
PIN is used to specify the identity of one particular individual. Only one PIN is 
connected to each name whilst nodes representing semantic information receive 
activation from multiple PIN's. Compared to other biographical (semantic) 
information, people's names are difficult to retrieve because they are lexical items 
that have lower levels of connectivity than other types of concepts. 
Other names have diffuse semantic connections and their access is mediated by 
the semantic system and not via a single PIN. Accordingly, Burton and Bruce 
(1992) presented what they termed a simple explanation based on the premise 
of specificity: people's names are more difficult to recall than biographical 
properties because names are unique. There is only one Bill Clinton, but most 
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people know of many American Presidents. So, according to Burton and Bruce, 
specificity is directly attributed to uniqueness. 
Proper Names are Meaningless Labels 
A similar explanation has been provided by Cohen's Representational Model 
(Cohen,1990; Cohen & Burke,1993) that describes people's names as 
meaningless labels that lack multiple connections to semantic associates. Thus, 
the processing of people's names is often problematic as names in the lexicon 
receive insufficient activation to produce recall. Although people have many 
semantic attributes, their names are simply arbitrary labels with no meaning. Few 
semantic associations can be formed with a meaningless name. This contrasts 
with the representation of meaningful names, such as those belonging to 
everyday objects. Although object names are also arbitrary they are linked to 
many semantic associates. The representational model predicts a gradient of 
difficulty between different categories of name. 
Bredart (1993) has also suggested that specificity in respect of the 
meaninglessness of names may be a critical factor. One study involving the 
production of cartoon character names, indicates that names with a meaningful 
component, such as Daffy Duck, are produced more accurately than those with 
an arbitrary name, such as Peter Pan (Bredart & Valentine, 1998). However, the 
use of cartoon character pictures may be problematic for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it is difficult to control for recency of exposure. Secondly, the image of the 
character can be meaningful in different ways. For example the name Daffy 
Duck is meaningful as the character is physically a duck. This applies to many 
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characters (Bugs Bunny, Mickey Mouse etc). In such cases the image can 
directly cue at least part of the name. There are other cartoon characters whose 
names could also be considered meaningful (Road Runner, Dick Dastardly, 
Mutley, Hong Kong Phooey). However, in these examples, the names are 
meaningful in terms of the personality characteristics of the character. In the 
case of people's names labels do not carry meaning in either of these ways. 
Uniqueness and meaningfulness are difficult to define and quantify. Indeed, both 
of these factors have the potential to vary at both a semantic and lexical level and 
depend on the sub-category of the proper name in question. For example, the 
country name Italy is unique (there is only one place called Italy). However, 
country names can be adjectivised and so there are also a host of Italian 
attributes). Country names are therefore quite different from other forms of 
proper name (such as the White House, the Eiffel Tower, which refer to a unique 
entity). Although linguistically and grammatically both landmark names and 
country names are considered to be proper names, landmark names offer 
meaning in a more direct way than country names ("The Eiffel Tower" is a tower, 
"Ayers Rock is a rock", "Buckingham Palace" is a palace etc.). Unlike country 
names, landmark names cannot be used as adjectives. 
Proper Names are mediated by a Token Address in Memory 
Rather than considering different categories of proper names, one might consider 
that all names differ in terms of the aspect of meaning that we know as reference, 
a specific entity that is being referred to (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 1983). The notion of 
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reference has been directly incorporated into alternative models of processing 
people's names. For example, Semenza and Zettin (1988) have suggested that 
people's names are difficult to recall because they are pure referencing 
expressions. Retrieving a person's name requires access via a token marker (an 
individual address in memory). Once again, people's names appear distinct from 
common names due to their connectivity between the semantic representation 
and the linguistic representations. The idea of pure reference can also be related 
back to models of face recognition, where a single node in the semantic network 
acts as a modality free gateway providing a mediation between identity specific 
semantics and linguistic knowledge. This point has been generally termed, the 
person identity node (see Valentine, Brennen & Bredart 1996; Burton & Bruce 
1992) and the token marker by Burke, MacKay, Worthley and Wade (1991). 
The term "pure referencing expression" may be considered to reflect names 
where there is reference, but no sense. The differences between what is meant 
by sense and reference were depicted in an earlier part of this chapter. 
Nevertheless it is easy to see that the name ROY CASTLE is a pure referent; the 
name has an identity but the word castle does not have sense in this compound. 
However, it is important to note that this distinction may be problematic, when 
one considers classes of proper name other than names of people. Consider 
proper names of places that are lexical compounds. The county name CASTLE 
MORPETH has no sense as MORPETH is a town without a castle. Furthermore, 
the compound WARWICK CASTLE, does provide a limited amount of sense, as 
the building in question is a castle. 
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Recently, Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996) have produced a theoretical 
model which incorporates the notion of uniqueness and token reference. This 
model is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, being based on previous 
models of face naming, it maintains the notion of uniqueness, in terms of retrieval 
being difficult due to the indirect access of the linguistic information via the 
semantic system. Secondly, it also specifies separate routes for the processing 
of objects and faces. This allows an account of similarities and differences in the 
processing of common names and proper names. In this respect, empirical 
evidence and connectionist simulation provide support for Valentine at al.'s model 
where other models would fail to provide a comprehensive explanation 
(Valentine, Hollis & Moore, 1998; Bredart, Valentine, Calder & Gassi, 1995, 
Valentine, Hollis, & Moore, 1999). 
The key feature of the model is the way that the representation of conceptual 
knowledge is separate from lexical representation. This allows the architecture to 
comply with models of speech production (e.g. Levelt, 1989) The first stage of 
lexical access, the semantic lexicon, or lemma is common to input and output. 
The lemma is considered to be an abstract representation that codes both 
semantic and syntactic properties of the lexical entry. Note that phonological 
representation is provided by a separate representation termed the lexeme. 
Levelt (1989) suggests that lemmas are organised in terms of grammatical class, 
with noun lemmas falling into two main types: proper name and common name 
lemmas. 
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Proper noun lemmas specify a particular token or address in memory. In terms 
of models of face recognition, this is captured by a 'person identity node' (PIN). 
The PIN plays the role of a 'token marker' and serves as an amodal gateway to 
the semantic system, allowing access to identity-specific semantic information for 
each known person. The PIN can therefore be viewed as the point of access to 
the semantic system for the unique referent that it represents. 
For people's names access to a person's name is only achieved via a single link 
from the PIN to the 'lemma' which represents their name. In contrast, access to 
common names from the semantic system occurs via multiple connections from 
units that represent the semantic features of a concept, directly to the relevant 
'lemma'. Hence the connectivity between the semantic system and the lexical 
representations are different for proper names and common names. Figure 1 
depicts the model by Valentine et al. (1996). The architecture remains largely 
as per the original publication. The original architecture can be found in 
Appendix 13. However, as this thesis portrays the processing of a number of 
different categories of proper name, it is considered appropriate to use the term 
"token marker" in place of person identity node and "type and token recognition 
units" in place of face recognition units/object recognition units. The insert details 
excitatory connections between the token marker, the semantic system and the 
lemma stage of processing, to illustrate how pure reference is captured by the 
token marker to lemma link. 
The model is able to explain differences in the processing of proper names and 
common names. With respect to empirical investigation, one recent finding is 
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that people's names evince a different pattern of long term repetition priming 
phenomena compared to common names (Valentine, Hollis & Moore, 1998). A 
series of experiments indicated that people's names produced cross modal 
facilitation from an auditory name familiarity decision to a visual name familiarity 
decision. The magnitude of this cross-modal facilitation was similar to within-
modality priming. Cross modality priming did not occur when common names 
were presented in a lexical decision task. A further experiment investigated 
facilitation of a name familiarity decision when a face naming task served as a 
prime task. Participants who had produced the names of famous people showed 
facilitation of a subsequent name familiarity decision task. The degree of 
facilitation was as great as that found when a visual name familiarity decision to 
people's names was repeated during the prime and test phase of the experiment. 
Changing the nature of the task or the modality of presentation between training 
and test is usually considered to reduce or eliminate facilitation (Scarborough, 
Gerard & Cortese,1979). 
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Figure 1: The Model of Proper Name Processing, adapted from 
Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996). For clarity, only excitatory links 
between pools of units are shown. Inhibitory links also exist within each 
pool of units. The insert portrays the differences in connectivity between the 
conceptual system and the lemma for people's names and common names. 
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However, these findings are perfectly in keeping with the model proposed by 
Valentine et al. (1998). Repetition priming is considered to reflect an increase in 
a connection weight between different representational levels following prior 
processing. The weight on each link is bi-directional. Processing via the highly 
specific token marker-lemma linkage is required for tasks involving person 
identity (such as the name familiarity or face naming decision task). During the 
face naming task, activation must flow from the relevant token recognition unit via 
the token marker to the lemma. During the name familiarity decision, activation 
must flow from the word recognition unit via the lemma to the token marker. Both 
face naming and name familiarity decision tasks require access to the token 
marker during the prime phase and the test phase in order to successfully make 
the decision, and consequently the model predicts facilitation in an abstractionist 
(item-specific) fashion for people's names. In contrast, for common names a 
lexical decision is made at the level of the lemma and does not require access to 
token marker. The processing during the prime and test phase does not involve 
the same processing route and so no facilitation occurs for common names 
during lexical decision. 
These hypotheses and the demonstration of cross-domain and cross-modality 
priming found by Valentine, Hollis and Moore (1998) is central to this thesis. If 
processing via a token address in memory is the crucial element that determines 
the characteristics of proper name processing then similar processing would be 
expected when one considers categories of proper name, other than people's 
names. 
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It is possible that repetition priming can occur due the retrieval of a prior 
processing episode, found in the perceptual fluency and transfer-appropriate 
processing accounts of priming (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Roediger & Blaxton, 
1987). However, experiments can be designed to minimise the influence of 
episodic retrieval so that patterns of data cannot be accounted for in terms of an 





The aim of this thesis was to test the theories of reference, meaning, and 
uniqueness in the domain of proper names and to determine whether the 
previous findings of Valentine et al. (1998) would generalise to other classes of 
proper name. Variations in the processing of sub-categories of proper name may 
indicate that differences in their representation exist. Variations in processing 
may also provide a basis for choosing between theories of uniqueness, 
meaninglessness, and token reference. To commence, Chapter 2 will introduce 
background material to priming and competition as methodologies that may be 
used to further our understanding of cognitive processing. Following the outline 
on methodology, the organisation of this thesis will be described together with an 
overview of the Experimental Chapters 3-6. 
Methodology 
The influence of past experience on a subsequent task can be observed as a 
facilitation and/or inhibition in processing of a stimulus. These changes are 
usually measured in terms of response time or accuracy. Facilitation is often 
considered a benefit of past experience, identified by faster or more accurate 
responses, whereas inhibition or competition is considered a cost, identified by 
slower, more erroneous responses. These differences in response time provide 
a useful way to enhance one's understanding of cognitive processing. This 
review will outline relevant empirical and theoretical work relating to the two 
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principal methodologies. Firstly, repetition priming will be considered. Repetition 
priming is concerned with facilitation over extended intervals. The discussion 
commences with an account of priming in visual word recognition. Studies 
involving pictorial and auditory stimuli will then be introduced. Secondly, the 
study of competition and inhibitory mechanisms will be considered as an 
alternative means to identify relationships between stimuli. 
Priming 
Priming is a general term applied to the phenomena of implicit or unconscious 
(indirect) memory. It is the influence of past experience on a subsequent task. 
Usually priming is portrayed as the facilitation in processing due to a previous 
encounter with that same item. However, the term negative priming has been 
also been coined to characterise occasions when prior experience results in 
inhibition rather than facilitation. Priming effects have been demonstrated using a 
variety of stimuli having a distinctive specificity and duration. As the theoretical 
models that will be discussed in following chapters have been based on word 
recognition, this review will first consider priming in the domain of visual word 
recognition. 
Repetition Priming 
Repetition priming (also known as identity priming or long lag priming) can be 
defined as the facilitation in processing due to a previous encounter with that 
same item. A prevailing methodology requires participants to perform two 
consecutive tasks. An initial task, often termed the prime phase or training 
phase, is conducted as a means of introducing the experimental (primed) stimuli. 
The experimental stimuli are often accompanied with a large number of filler 
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items so that the participant remains minimally aware of their presence. The 
prime phase is followed by another task, in which the experimental stimuli are 
experienced for a second time together with a series of matched control 
(unprimed) items. The facilitation to respond or identify the primed and unprimed 
target stimuli is determined in terms of response accuracy and/or response time; 
the primed target items usually elicit quicker and more accurate responses than 
the unprimed controls. The effect of repetition has been demonstrated using a 
variety of stimuli. The facilitation produced by repetition priming is usually 
considered to be long lived. Significant priming effects have been found for 
perceptual identification tasks for periods of one day (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) 
and with reading tasks of up to one year (Kolers, 1976) These durations 
contrast to the facilitation produced from semantic priming which only lasts for a 
few seconds (Bruce & Valentine, 1985). Repetition priming has traditionally been 
considered to be domain-specific, and it has been suggested that facilitation does 
not readily cross stimulus domain (Ellis, Young, Flude & Hay, 1987) whereas 
semantic priming crosses from one domain to another (Young, Hellawell & de 
Haan, 1988). However, these distinctions may be too simplistic, and a 
discussion of the empirical evidence and theories regarding these phenomena 
follows later. 
Initial investigations of priming phenomena were concerned with word 
identification, and demonstrated that word identification was facilitated by prior 
experience of the same word. Many studies have employed the lexical decision 
task as a method to study repetition priming (Scarborough, Cortese, & 
Scarborough ,1977). An alternative to the study of reaction times is to use a 
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method that requires participants to complete word-stems following a previous 
presentation (McClelland & Pring, 1991). Many other tasks have been utilised as 
a method of investigating the effect of repetition; for example, the act of speech 
production has been found to produce facilitation on subsequent tasks. The 
naming of objects is facilitated by a prior word naming or naming-to-definition 
task (Durso & Johnson, 1979; Lachman & Lachman, 1980; Wheeldon & 
Monsell, 1992; Kolers & Ostry, 1976; Kolers, 1976). Facilitation also occurs for 
picture naming and word naming tasks that immediately follow masked 
presentations of written stimuli (Ferrand,Grainger & Segui,1994). 
Non verbal material also produces various forms of facilitation on subsequent 
encounter. For example, naming tasks have been found to prime familiarity 
decisions to faces and names (Bruce, 1986; Bruce & Valentine, 1985; Valentine, 
Hollis & Moore, 1998). Naming tasks have also been used to prime object 
stimuli; for example, in familiarity decisions to line drawings of real or unreal 
(novel) objects (Kroll & Potter 1984) and for identification of object pictures from 
brief presentation (Warren & Morton, 1982). 
Facilitation has also been found when stimuli are presented in the auditory 
modality. Auditory stimuli range from spoken words (Gipson, 1986; Jackson & 
Morton,1984) to human voices (Schweinberger et a/., 1997; Ellis et al., 1997). 
Although an abundance of evidence demonstrates repetition priming, debate 
continues about the nature and loci of the facilitation. Early theories claimed that 
central to this issue was the distinction between general and specific knowledge. 
A number of different theories have attempted to account for the phenomena of 
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long term repetition priming. They can largely be categorised as abstractionist 
(item specific) or episodic accounts (Tenpenny, 1995). 
Episodic Accounts of Repetition Priming 
Episodic accounts of repetition priming are related to memory phenomena. 
According to these perspectives facilitation of the performance of any task is a 
direct result of retrieving the previous processing episode from memory. This 
memory trace includes information about the perceptual experience, the task 
itself (such as the response decision or the cognitive strategy used to perform the 
task) and the response required. Performance on a subsequent encounter with 
the same task is advantaged, as the memory trace provides a cue to the 
response required (Hintzman, 1986; Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Brooks, 1984). 
Similarly, Tenpenny (1995) describes the similarity between two presentations as 
"overlap" suggesting that this is the main determinant of facilitation. Where 
repetition occurs in the absence of interference from other items, recognition is 
enhanced. Facilitation is thought to occur due to the use of specific episodes; 
newly acquired episodes are more accessible than older ones. Specific memories 
of previous encounters are used to perform the most recent task. 
Two distinct forms of episodic explanation have been formulated. The first, 
known as transfer appropriate processing, claims that the experience of 
performing a particular task (i.e. including the response) benefits a subsequent 
encounter. Another episodic account known as perceptual fluency is more 
concerned with the characteristics of the experimental stimulus itself. Both of 
these accounts maintain that facilitation occurs as a function of previous 
experience. The nature of the episode is distinct for each account. 
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Perceptual Fluency 
Perceptual fluency is concerned with episodes of the stimulus characteristics. 
Jacoby (1983) forms a distinction between data driven and conceptually driven 
processing. These two types of processing differ in terms of the information that 
is required to perform the task. This distinction has been used to explain the 
dissociation between direct and indirect tests of memory. Hence, the episodic 
account of repetition priming does not differ from explicit memory phenomena. 
Data driven processing only requires information about the physical features of a 
stimulus whereas conceptually driven tasks require semantic processing. This 
allows some tasks to benefit from previous experience of the physical features of 
a stimulus alone. One example of perceptual fluency is provided by Roediger 
and Blaxton (1987) who found less priming of typed words in a fragment 
completion task if the experimental stimuli had previously been presented in 
handwritten form rather than typed. In other words, a proportion of the facilitation 
occurred due to the physical characteristics of the visual stimulUS. 
Transfer Appropriate Processing 
A slightly different perspective is taken by the transfer appropriate processing 
account. Here it is the episode of performing the task that benefits a subsequent 
repetition, particularly in terms of the processing required in performing the 
experimental task following a stimulus presentation. As both the perceptual 
fluency and the transfer appropriate processing perspectives assume that the 
benefit of repetition is due to episodic intervention, the degree with which the 
stimuli or task remain constant between the two presentations should reflect the 
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amount of facilitation that is observed. Accordingly, these perspectives predict 
that facilitation should be strongest when the stimuli and the task remain exactly 
the same, whereas large changes to the stimuli, task and response, should 
reduce or eliminate facilitation (Blaxton, 1989; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; 
Roediger, Weldon & Challis, 1989). Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) claim that 
stimulus-response/decision mappings significantly add to facilitation when 
responding to stimuli that are presented over many repetitions, but this is less 
likely to affect facilitation after a single trial. Logan (1990) found swapping 
response keys lefUright hand between prime and test had no effect on priming 
during lexical decision. Information regarding the response was not utilised in the 
priming phenomena. Ellis et al. (1990) found that making a gender decision to 
faces at prime facilitated subsequent experience when a familiarity decision was 
given at test. However, when a gender decision at prime was followed by an 
expression decision at test no priming was found. These studies indicate that 
changes to the stimulus form, or the experimental task do not always reduce or 
eliminate priming; the nature of the decision, and the type of stimulus is also an 
important consideration. 
Tenpenny (1995) claims that the episodic account is suited to the explanation of 
repetition priming over extended periods. However, there are cases which 
indicate that purely episodic accounts are no more viable that those Tenpenny 
(1995) would like to reject. Cross-domain and cross-modal repetition priming 
make a purely episodic account untenable as "overlap" of the stimulus is limited. 
These experiments use different forms of the same stimuli. As a result, 
facilitation that is produced is unlikely to be due to the retrieval of specific stimuli. 
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An alternative to the episodic account of priming is that of the abstractionist 
approach. This perspective is particularly useful at explaining priming on 
occasions where the episodic account would not provide a tenable solution. 
Studies which are particularly relevant to this thesis will be discussed at the start 
of each experimental chapter. The abstractionist approach has been validated 
by Dean (1995) and Dean and Young (1996) who contrast the abstractionist and 
episodic explanations of long term priming. In their experimental presentations 
pairs of picture-word stimuli were presented for semantic (same/different) 
decision. The stimuli pairs were re-combined in a variety of ways, so that both 
episodic and item-specific (abstractionist) effects could be identified. Data 
supported an abstractionist account of repetition priming only. The abstractionist 
account will now be detailed. 
Abstractionist Accounts of Repetition Priming 
The abstractionist (or item specific) account of repetition priming is an alternative 
to episodic theories. Pure abstractionist accounts suggest that there are distinct 
differences between episodic representations and the representation of item 
specific entries, such as lexical items. These accounts explain repetition priming 
in terms of perceptual experience activating a specific representation, as 
processing progresses through the recognition and identification process. The 
weak abstraction perspective maintains that recognition occurs mainly through 
the activation of lexical representations but acknowledges that specific episodes 
have the potential to take part in the recognition process under appropriate 
conditions. The abstractionist perspective draws heavily on the literature of word 
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recognition, in particular Morton's (1969, 1979) logogen model of word 
recognition, for this reason this perspective will be detailed in these terms. 
However, models of object and face recognition (such as those by Bruce & 
Young 1983; Burton & Bruce, 1983; Humphreys, 1988; Valentine, Brennen & 
Bredart, 1996) have been based on the logogen model and so the abstractionist 
perspectives can be easily applied to models that involve non-verbal processing. 
According to Morton's (1969,1979) Logogen Model of word recognition, 
experiencing a visual presentation of a word results in the activation of a specific 
entry in the lexicon, or word recognition unit, otherwise known as a logogen. 
These may be considered to be like recognition units for specific instances that 
are required for identification purposes. Each type of sensory information that 
has been experienced has an individual representation. Dean (1995) describes 
logogens as abstract representations of identity, that describe generic features 
from past experience. When a particular item (such as a word) is experienced, 
logogens that have a close correspondence to the sensory input fire; the 
specific logogen for the exact perceptual representation exceeds a threshold of 
activation. Once this initial recognition has occurred, identification and further 
processing such as the retrieval of semantic information can be accessed. The 
firing of a logogen is relatively long lasting with the activation decaying slowly. If a 
subsequent presentation of the same sensory experience occurs before the 
recognition unit has returned to its resting level repetition priming occurs. This 
facilitation is observed as activation lowers the logogen threshold. Therefore 
recognition appears facilitated on a subsequent encounter. The most recent 
version of the logogen model suggests that there are modality specific 
subsystems associated with the visual and auditory systems. Each logogen 
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codes generic information, as a summation of all experiences with each particular 
exemplar. Any encounter with a word is mediated by the same logogen. 
Furthermore, the logogens may represent the root morpheme of a word rather 
than the whole words themselves. Murrell and Morton (1974) found that 
identification of a word was facilitated by a prior exposure to a morphological 
related word but not a visually or acoustically similar word. According to the 
abstractionist account, the locus of priming occurs in the representations that a're 
specific to the task in question and not as a function of episodic memory or the 
processing operations. 
Models of object and face recognition have been based on the logogen model. 
These models claim that abstract representations of object or face identity 
mediate the recognition process. Repetition priming in these models has been 
accounted for in the same way as that of word stimuli. However, one problem 
for the abstractionist approach is that non-words and novel (unreal) objects have 
also been found to produce repetition priming. (Feustel, Shiffrin & Salasoo, 1983; 
Kroll & Potter, 1984). To explain this kind of priming in terms of the abstractionist 
paradigm sub-lexical or sub-object representations are necessary; just as a word 
fragment can be priming, so component features or parts of objects would be 
primed. This is not an unlikely proposal. Dorfman (1994) reported priming for non 
words but only when the words were constructed from a familiar structure. 
Similarly, a study by Schacter (1990) found priming only for structurally possible 
but not impossible images. This is in keeping with the notion that the novel 
stimuli are represented in terms of pre-existing sUb-components. Novel stimuli 
may then be regarded as novel combinations. A new representation may be 
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formed after a single encounter, or alternatively, facilitation could be due to the 
activation of sUb-components. There is some difference of opinion as to the exact 
nature of priming in an abstractionist perspective. Morton's (1969) model asserts 
that firing of a logogen results in identification, which is accompanied by a 
change in threshold level. However, each logogen requires a separate threshold 
which leaves many free parameters to account for. Alternatively, McClelland and 
Rumelhart (1981) suggested facilitation occurs due to an increase in resting level 
rather than a change in threshold level. Monsell (1991) asserts that repetition 
priming occurs due to changes in weights (connections) between units rather 
than within the units themselves. This position is particularly desirable as it can 
be applied to parallel distributed processing where weights of connections are 
changed and determined by the network's prior experience. This is also in 
keeping with many computer models such as the interactive activation model 
proposed by Burton, Bruce and Johnston (1990) and Bredart, Valentine et a/. 
(1995). 
Changes in Modality and Domain 
The abstractionist paradigm is desirable as an account for priming phenomena 
as it can explain data that remain difficult to explain with a purely episodic 
account. For example, when priming occurs following changes to the form or 
context of the experimental stimuli. In such cases, the episodic accounts of 
priming are less viable. Traditionally it has been suggested that changing the 
format in which a particular stimulus is presented reduces the facilitation 
produced by repetition the item. Maximal priming is expected when the stimulus 
and the task remain constant in both the prime and the test phase of the 
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experimental presentation. less facilitation (but significant priming) has been 
found for visually presented words in a variety of tasks such as word fragment, 
stem completion, lexical decision, degraded word identification, and if the prime 
phase has been conducted in the auditory modality (Graf, Shimmura & Squire, 
1985; Hashtroudi, Ferguson, Rappold & Chronsniak, 1988; Roediger & Blaxton, 
1987; Scarborough et a/., 1979). However, there is some disagreement about 
the degree with which facilitation can transfer from one modality or domain to 
another. A number of studies have found little or no benefit to subsequent 
processing if the modality or domain is changed between prime and test. For 
example, Jacoby and Dallas (1981) report no significant cross modal priming 
from an identification task for brief presentations following an auditory prime 
compared to a visual prime. 
A number of other studies have also failed to find cross modal priming in word 
recognition, (Morton, 1979) and in word identification in noise (Ellis, 1983; Clarke 
& Morton, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). A total absence of cross-domain and 
cross modal facilitation is supportive of the episodic account of priming. 
However, other studies show that facilitation can transfer between stimulus 
modality, and domain. In contrast to a control condition in which maximal priming 
is expected, most studies indicate the magnitude of this priming is reduced 
following changes in modality or task (Jackson & Morton, 1984; Bassili, Smith, & 
Macleod, 1989; Weldon, 1991; Kirsner & Smith, 1974; Kirsner, Milech & 
Standen, 1983; Hunt & Toth, 1990; Weldon, 1991). 
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Changes in prime domain have also been studied. In these manipulations, the 
item is presented in contrasting forms, such as a verbal (written) name followed 
by a picture of the same item. In general, changes in domain produce priming 
phenomena similar to those found with changes to modality. Long term 
facilitation is usually reduced or eliminated (Winnick & Daniel, 1970; Scarborough 
et al. ,1979; Durso & Johnson,1979; Warren & Morton, 1982; Weldon & 
Roediger, 1987; Bruce & Valentine,1985). The presence of cross-domain 
facilitation can be explained with both the episodic and abstractionist 
perspectives. According to the episodic account, the closer the processing 
demands at prime and test the greater the benefit of previous encounter. 
Changes in domain or modality result in changes to the operations required to 
perform the task at test. Thus, changes are thought to reduce or eliminate 
facilitatory effects. However, whilst priming has been shown to remain in some 
tasks such as word fragment completion (Hirshman, Snodgrass, Mindes & 
Feenan, 1990) it is eliminated in others such as perceptual identification (Jacoby 
& Dallas, 1981). Episodic accounts explain these differences in terms of the 
data-driven/conceptually driven hypothesis: changes in modality or domain affect 
perceptual or data driven tasks but do not alter conceptually driven tasks. 
Roediger et al. (1989) claim that priming is more affected by conceptually driven 
tasks such as word-fragment completion compared to perceptual identification 
tasks. In other words, it is semantic (conceptual) processing that is contributing 
to the priming phenomena. 
Abstractionist accounts explain the reduction in cross-modal and cross-domain 
priming due to different representations being activated for the recognition of 
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auditory and visual information. If the task can be performed with a structural 
analysis alone, performance at test can only benefit from prior experience if the 
same recognition unit (i.e. within the same domain/modality) is used in the 
second task. However, is also evident that some tasks require more than 
structural analysis, and it is this kind of task that may show facilitation that 
crosses modality or domain. Cross modal or domain priming at a significant 
level can also be explained with the abstractionist paradigm by suggesting that if 
the task activates a modality independent connection, facilitation is observed to 
cross modality. For example, Bruce and Valentine (1985) and also Wheeldon 
and Monsell (1992) found that speech production tasks facilitate the naming of 
stimuli on subsequent tasks. Bruce and Valentine (1985) found that cross modal 
effects are reduced in tasks that only require identification compared to tasks that 
require speech production. 
Evidence suggests that it is the connections between conceptual representations 
and the semantic lexicon rather than activation at the semantic lexicon alone that 
are important. A series of experiments were conducted by Valentine and 
colleagues, who used words such as Bush that could be classified as both a 
common name and also a surname of a famous person. Valentine, Moore, 
Flude, Young and Ellis (1993) found that a familiarity decision to a familiar full 
name, produced a repetition effect on a subsequent lexical decision to words that 
had been previously seen as surnames. The converse was also found. These 
findings were interpreted as support that facilitation occurred due to the repeated 
activation of representations accessed by both common names and proper 
names. A later study involved similar stimuli, but required participants to overtly 
51 
produce the names during the test rather than make a familiarity decision. 
Valentine, Moore and Bredart (1995) presented participants with a series of 
words (such as Major) and asked to produce the names. This activity did not 
facilitate a later task of producing the same name when participants were 
instructed that these items were celebrity surnames (e.g. Major as in John Major). 
This finding was interpreted as evidence that the semantic lexicon was organised 
into different areas, depending upon the classification of the words themselves. 
The results of these studies suggest that leading up to lexicalisation, proper 
names and common names prime one another. This assumes that links are 
automatically activated for all entries of a word when it can be processed in both 
a common name and proper name form. This would also imply that conceptual 
representations for common names are also activated when a proper name is 
encountered. This is consistent with work that has been carried out with 
homophones, where both meanings of a homophone are available for a limited 
period. Wheeldon and Monsell (1992) found that producing a homophone did not 
prime picture naming at test. They suggested that the locus of priming cannot 
be at the phonological level of processing, but occurs between the 
representation of meaning and spoken word form. In tasks that require naming 
the locus of priming may be in the production system rather than those involved 
in identification Durso and Johnson (1979) found that when object names were 
read out loud, a subsequent picture naming task was facilitated. However, more 
facilitation occurred when the same task was repeated. In other words 
changing the task may reduce the number of loci for the facilitation to occur. The 
results of these experiments indicate that the locus of priming that occurs for 
tasks involving speech production is quite specific. Valentine and Bruce (1985) 
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found that reading a name facilitated a subsequent face naming task, whereas 
reading a name did not facilitate a face familiarity decision. These data show 
that the locus of priming is at a relatively late stage in processing, that requires 
naming during the test phase. Similar findings have been reported by Ellis and 
Young (1987). Other evidence has shown that facilitation is unlikely to be due to 
semantic influences alone. For the naming and reading of common names a 
direct, non-semantic route has been identified by different authors (Morton & 
Patterson, 1980; Ellis & Young, 1988) However, this route is not apparent in 
early models of object or face naming (e.g. Bruce & Young, 1986). Therefore, as 
naming a visually presented name does not facilitate a face classification task it 
would appear that facilitation such as that reported by Valentine ef al. occurs due 
to a stage in lexicalisation rather than semantic influence alone. 
Summary of Repetition Priming 
The effect of repetition over extended periods has been demonstrated using a 
wide variety of stimuli. Repetition priming has been shown to have distinctive 
domain specificity and duration. Two accounts of repetition priming have been 
presented, the episodic account based primarily on literature from explicit 
memory phenomena and the abstractionist account based on models of word 
recognition, such as the logogen model. Both accounts provide alternative 
explanations for priming phenomena. Although both perspectives have utility, 
designs that involve cross-modal and cross-domain presentations or changes to 
the experimental task and stimuli are most adequately captured by the 
abstractionist perspective. The literature regarding these changes is varied. 
However it would appear that repeating the same task or presenting the 
experimental stimulus in the same form during both phases of the experiment 
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produces greater facilitation than when the task or stimulus form is altered 
between the prime phase and the test phase. The episodic account reveals that 
episodic intervention may occur should task demands make it necessary. This 
perspective yields many indications for experimental design. Tasks that require 
high processing demands without constraints on the participants' response time 
(such as stem completion and fragment completion or designs where the test 
phase is conducted as a tachistoscopic presentation or word identification in 
background noise) are the tasks that are most likely to be influenced by episodes. 
Ideally these tasks are avoided in an abstractionist methodology. Accuracy alone 
may not be an appropriate indicator and a measure of reaction time is desirable. 
Tasks such as speeded familiarity decision, and masked priming in which the 
participants remain unaware of the prime cannot readily be explained in terms of 
an episodic account. These tasks can be designed to be conceptually driven and 
do not involve the participants having to deeply encode or make great efforts to 
analyse the stimuli (compared to tasks such as word identification in noise). 
They can also be designed to minimise episodic intervention by incorporating 
design features such as the inclusion of a high proportion of filler items 
compared to the numbers of experimental stimuli. Finally, priming may not 
always be a pure process and the recall of episodes may contribute to facilitation 
to a greater or lesser degree. 
Interference, Inhibition and Competition 
An alternative way to explore the connectivity is to observe interference between 
two different representations. Interference is related to spreading activation. In 
particular, it indicates how the activation in one representation may compete with 
or inhibit the processing of other representations that share semantic 
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connections. Interference, a reduction in accuracy or responses time to process 
stimuli is a consequence of competition or inhibition and once again these 
processing differences can provide a useful means of assessing the strength of 
connectivity between two item specific representations. The term inhibition has 
been used in a variety of ways. Generally, it refers to an increase in response 
time compared to a baseline. Theoretically this can be explained in a number of 
different ways. Increases in response time can be attributed to competition 
between a number of representations (e.g. Glaser & Glaser, 1989). For the 
purposes of this thesis, and in line with lAC style architectures, I will use the term 
inhibition to indicate this type of mechanism. However, it is important to 
distinguish a different account which can be found in studies of picture naming 
and speech production. Here, inhibition is considered to arise when the 
activation of a stimulus falls below its usual baseline. For example, Wheeldon 
and Monsell (1994) have shown that picture naming is slower when a competing 
word had been recently produced to a definition. This inhibitory effect occurred 
when there was a lag of two picture items between the definition and the target 
picture. However, when the definition was given immediately prior to the picture 
or in excess of several minutes the effect disappeared. Wheeldon et aJ. 
concluded that an increase in the availability of a competing candidate appears to 
retard word selection during lexicalisation. Other studies have also provided this 
explanation of inhibitory mechanisms. Vitkovitch, Kirby and Tyrell (1996) have 
shown that when participants name a series of animal pictures, errors match 
names that had been produced several trials earlier, but never match the name 
which was produced in the immediately preceding trial. These findings indicated 
that access to a representation was subject to a brief inhibitory period. When 
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participants are required to name a series of pictures, and responses have to be 
made within a 600ms deadline, more naming errors occur when the series of 
pictures are structurally similar (Vitkovitch, Humphreys & Lloyd-Jones 1993). 
Response times are also slower when a series of semantically related pictures 
are presented for naming (Humphreys, Riddoch & Quinlan 1988). 
Picture-word Interference 
Picture-word interference is well established as a methodology. It involves the 
simultaneous presentation of a picture and a word for tasks such as 
categorisation and naming. The methodology differs from interference in the 
speeded picture naming experiments, as interference is measured between the 
picture-word pairs that are presented within the same trial, rather than over 
longer periods. Although many studies have contrasted data from categorisation 
tasks with that of name production, the following discussion will focus on 
research that requires the participant to make an overt naming response, as the 
process that is of particular interest is the mapping from the conceptual 
(semantic) system onto the lexical representations. In the picture-word 
interference paradigm the participant is presented with a target picture and a 
distracter name and told to respond (name) only to the picture. When the picture 
and word are from the same semantic category, picture naming is slower than 
when the picture and word are not related (Underwood,1976; Lupker,1979; La 
Heij & Vermeij,1987, Lupker & Katz, 1981; Rosinski,1977; Golinkoff & Rosinski, 
1976; Roelofs, 1992). The interference effect seems to depend on two principal 
factors. Firstly the nature of the semantic relation between the distracter word 
and the target picture, and the timing of the presentation. The basic premise is 
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that semantic-related distracters produce more interference than unrelated 
distracters (Underwood, 1976; Rosinski, 1977) However, if the distracter words 
share an association with the target picture, rather than a categorical relation, 
interference is reduced or eliminated (Lupker, 1979; La Heij et al. ,1990). Glaser 
and Dungelhoff (1984) manipulated the presentation of the distracter and target, 
in terms of the time between the onset of the distracter word and the onset of the 
target picture (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony-SOA). Greatest interference was 
found when the distracter and the target picture were presented simultaneously. 
There was a smaller effect when the distracter appeared 100 ms before picture, 
whilst no interference was found when word preceded target by 200 ms or more. 
As the SOA increased, facilitation rather than interference is often produced. La 
Heij, Dirkx, and Kramer (1990) found that highly associated pairings produced 
facilitation when the distracter was presented 400 ms before the picture target. 
No facilitation was found for highly associated pairs with a simultaneous 
presentation of the distracter and target. For weaker associates categorical 
interference occurred from simultaneous presentation for up to 150 ms after the 
picture. They argued for two separate effects: facilitation from associated items 
and interference from categorically related items. The time course of the picture-
word presentation determine which effect is dominant and observed. 
Facilitation occurs for strong associates and for weak associates when pictures 
follow words. Interference occurs when there is a an overlap in access to the 
name codes for the distracter and target, however strong associations cancel out 
interference. Briefly, other factors such as the orthographic and phonological 
properties of words, have also been found to influence the interference effects 
(Briggs & Underwood, 1982; Posnasky & Rayner, 1977; Rayner & Posnasky, 
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1978). For example, simultaneous presentation of non-words that share 
orthographic features with the target facilitate naming, whereas if the SOA is 
reduced to 35 ms interference was found. A similar finding was produced when 
phonological similarity was manipulated. 
The locus of interference 
As I have discussed previously, the locus of interference has been interpreted in 
terms of competition between related representations. In other words, the 
tendency to name the distracter must be suppressed (Oyer,1972; Posner & 
Synder,1975). Seymour (1979) claims that the locus is at the semantic stage of 
processing. Smith and Magee (1980) performed a series of studies with picture 
and word stimuli. Picture naming was hampered by the presence of a 
semantically related word. This contrasted with word categorisation which was 
hindered by the presence of a semantically related picture. Smith and Magee 
argued that these differences reflected the speed of response generation. Word 
naming is faster than picture naming, and so words interfere with picture naming. 
In contrast, picture categorisation is faster than word categorisation so pictures 
interfere with words when the task is changed to categorisation. 
Two alternative accounts provide further conflicting ideas regarding the locus of 
the interference effect. Rayner and Springer (1986) argue that semantic 
evaluation causes the bulk of interference, whereas La Heij (1988) and La Heij et 
al. (1990) assert interference occurs at the level of name retrieval. A problem for 
the semantic decision account is why pictures interfere with word categorisation. 
Placing the locus of interference at the stage of name retrieval hypothesis 
58 
allows an explanation of how orthographic similarity facilitates name retrieval. It 
can also account for the asymmetry for interference on picture naming and word 
categorisation. The locus of interference during picture naming can be placed 
at the level of name retrieval, whereas effects on word categorisation can be 
placed at the semantic level. As pictures have privileged access to semantic 
information they can generate semantic interference on word categorisation. 
Words may have privileged access to lexical representations and so interfere with 
semantically mediated tasks such as picture naming. This account can also 
explain why Stroop like interference is eliminated when the task does not require 
name production (Flowers & Dutch, 1976). 
Recent research provides continued support that the locus of interference occurs 
at the level of name retrieval. Shriefers, Meyer and Levelt (experiment 2, 1990) 
used a picture-word interference paradigm to investigate name production. This 
study provided a detailed analysis of name retrieval by assuming that lexical 
access involves two distinct stages. First the lemma stage provides access to an 
abstract code that is predominantly influenced by semantic and syntactic 
properties. This is followed by the lexeme stage when phonological information 
is retrieved. Shriefers et al. used a picture-word paradigm with the distracter 
words (related, neutral and unrelated) presented in the auditory modality. An 
initial experiment (Shriefers et aI., experiment 1) was used to determine what 
kind of item should be used to provide an appropriate "neutral". They compared 
silence, white noise and the non word "blank". Results indicated that white noise 
did not produce any difference in responses compared to silence. In contrast the 
word "blank" produced interference but this was significantly less than that found 
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in the unrelated presentations. They concluded that the word "blank" would act as 
the most appropriate neutral stimulus. 
In line with previous studies, a second experiment established that picture-word 
interference was dependent on the time course of the presentation. With an 
SOA of -150 ms (distracter word commenced presentation 150 ms before 
picture) words that had a semantic relationship with the target picture interfered 
with naming. In contrast, distracter words that were phonologically related to the 
target picture were found to produce facilitation when the SOA was extended to 
+150 ms. They concluded that there was a stage of lexical access (the lemma) 
where only meaning was activated, following by a stage that was influenced by 
phonology. These results supported the two-stage lexical access accounts of 
speech production. They also indicate further support for the locus of 
interference in the picture-name paradigm being at the level of the name retrieval. 
One important difference between the study by Shriefers et a/. and the other 
studies that have been described, is that Shriefers et al. presented the distracter 
word in the auditory modality. One might argue that auditory presentation is 
problematic due to timing. However, visual presentations of picture-word pairs 
are also subject to criticism; words have to superimposed over the picture, or the 
placement of the words needs to be carefully randomised. Participants may try 
to use strategies such as a shift in visual attention in order to try to avoid reading 
the words. Although potential problems exist for each type of presentation, there 
appears to be a consensus in empirical findings. Semantic relationships effect 
processing. 
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The picture word interference paradigm has also been extended to the study 
face recognition. Young, Ellis, Flude, McWeeny and Hay (1986) performed a 
series of experiments based on the picture-word paradigm using people's faces 
with related and unrelated people's names. Printed names interfered with 
naming photographs of a related face. For a name categorisation task, faces 
interfered with printed names. These findings are comparable to picture-word 
studies with objects. No interference was found from categorical relations 
between faces and names but associative relationships between faces and 
names produced significant interference. 
More recently, Humphreys, Lloyd-Jones and Fias (1995) have developed a 
variation of the picture-word paradigm, that has been termed post-cued picture 
naming. In this paradigm, participants see two object pictures and later they are 
provided with a cue to name only one of them. Naming is slower when the two 
stimuli are semantically related. The effect is robust for picture-picture pairs and 
is also found for pairings that are both pictorial and verbal (i.e. picture-word 
pairs), as this induces semantic processing. The interference effect is eliminated 
when the pairing occurs with two words alone, and also when the experimental 
task involves categorisation rather than name production. These results were 
analogous to the those found in the classic picture word interference paradigm, 
and the locus of interference is attributed to the process of mapping semantic 
information onto names. 
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Summary of the Picture-word Interference Paradigm 
The picture word interference paradigm has been used to study the processes 
involved in object and face naming. Studies identify a number of possible loci for 
the interference effect, the most likely explanation being that interference occurs 
at the stage of name retrieval. Humphreys et al. (1995) provide a succinct 
summary of empirical research involving various interference type experiments. 
Humphreys et al. (1995) assert that interference effects are likely to be influenced 
by several factors: the nature of the relationship between target and distracter, 
the format of target and distracter, and the timing of the stimulus presentation 
(SOA). 
General Summary of Methodology 
The discussion has shown how studies involving priming and interference have 
been used to elucidate our understanding of word and object and face 
recognition. All of these accounts assume the basic premise that there is an 
automatic spread of activation between item specific representations. Priming is 
usually considered a benefit of this activation passing from one representation to 
another, being seen as facilitated processing. Although this "abstractionist" 
account is preferred, the role of episodic strategies in the form of expectancy is 
acknowledged. Indications to help eliminate or control for these effects were 
discussed. An alternative method of investigation is to view interference, a cost 
of activating item specific representations. Competition between two related 
stimuli can be observed as inhibited processing. 
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Unresolved Issues 
A number of issues remain unresolved. Firstly, what underlies the differences 
between the categories of proper name? Why are geographical locations easier 
to name than people? Are geographical locations easier to name because they 
can be adjectivized (Hittman-Delazer et al.,1994)? Alternatively can these 
differences be simply related to uniqueness or meaninglessness? If the ability to 
use nouns in different forms (e.g. country names which can be used as a noun 
and adjective) is central to differences in the sub-categories of proper names, 
one would expect differences between items whose name cannot be adjectivised, 
compared to items whose name can be readily produced as an adjective. If 
these findings are not artefacts of the neuropsychological condition or testing, 
one would expect differences in the processing attributes for both impaired and in 
normal function. 
Secondly, can we attribute the differences between common names and proper 
names to the respective mappings between conceptual knowledge and the 
output lexicon? The issue concerns whether the collection of knowledge that 
describes an entity is linked directly to its label in the semantic lexicon or whether 
processing is mediated by another module before the retrieval of a name. This is 
particularly valid for the study of proper names as the idea that proper names 
may be attached to semantic knowledge in a different way to common names has 
been suggested by a number of researchers. 
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Organisation of this Thesis 
This thesis begins with two experiments that test the utility of the model of proper 
name processing proposed by Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996). Durso and 
O'Sullivan (1983, Experiment 1) reported that the time taken to read proper 
names aloud was reduced by prior experience of naming the same item's picture. 
In contrast no facilitation in reading common names was found. These data are 
inconsistent with a framework of face, word and object processing proposed by 
Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996). 
Two replications of Durso and O'Sullivan's experiment are reported, which 
incorporate additional control of the attributes of proper names. In the first 
experiment, participants were required to name pictures of famous people, 
famous landmarks and everyday objects. In a subsequent task they read aloud a 
series of words which included the names of some items encountered in the 
previous task. A second experiment was conducted with landmark names only. 
The results show that for the word naming task, no proper name specific 
facilitation occurs. The data in Chapter 3 are therefore consistent with the 
Valentine et al. (1996) model. 
Once the utility of the model by Valentine et al. (1996) has been addressed, the 
remaining experimental chapters consider different categories of proper names. 
Chapters 4 and 5 report a series of experiments using a repetition priming 
technique to explore the cognitive phenomena associated with proper names. 
Chapter 4 deals exclusively with cross modal repetition priming. It was found that 
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for people's names and landmark names making a familiarity decision to an 
auditory presentation of a name primed a familiarity decision to the same item's 
written name. No comparable facilitation was found for country names or city 
names. Further experimentation indicated that the lack of cross modal facilitation 
found with the country names and city names was unlikely to relate with 
conceptual specificity, or to name frequency or familiarity. 
Chapter 5 reports two experiments concerned with prime tasks that require name 
production. It was found that for pictures of people and landmarks, production of 
a name in response to seeing a picture primed a subsequent familiarity decision 
to the same item's written name. No such priming was found when country 
names were produced to map outlines (Experiment 5.1) or pictures of landmarks 
(Experiment 5.2). 
Chapter 6 presents experiments that address the organisation of the semantic 
lexicon using an interference paradigm. Using a post-cued naming procedure, 
common name distracters were found to interfere with the naming of people's 
faces, when a categorical relation existed between the common name distracter 
and the proper name target. These findings were replicated with a more 
conventional picture word interference methodology. The results indicate that 
connectivity at the lemma stage is highly influenced by semantics rather than 
syntactic class. 
General discussion of all of the experimental studies is presented in Chapter 7. 
Implications for the generality of proper name processing are considered 





















































Validating the model of proper name 
processing 
According to the model by Valentine et a/. (1996) the representation of 
conceptual knowledge is separate from lexical representations, and the first stage 
of lexical access, the semantic lexicon, is common to input and output (See 
Figure 1 on page 35). Separate processing routes are specified for visual and 
auditory word recognition, object recognition and face recognition. Each token 
marker (PIN) serves as an amodal gateway to the semantic system, allowing 
access to identity-specific semantic information for each known person. Retrieval 
of proper names is difficult because access to a person's name is only achieved 
via a single link from the token marker (PIN) to the 'lemma' which represents their 
name. In contrast, access to common names from the semantic system occurs 
via multiple connections from units that represent the semantic features of a 
concept, directly to the relevant 'lemma'. 
The Generic versus Specific Hypothesis 
Durso and O'Sullivan (1983) suggested that differences between common names 
and proper names occur as a function of the specificity of knowledge evoked by 
these types of items. Durso and O'Sullivan also reported that proper names 
yielded superior recognition and recall compared to common names. These 
claims do not correspond to more recent research, which suggests that proper 
names are often more difficult to recall than other forms of noun. For example, it 
has been found that recall of a famous person's occupation is superior to recall of 
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their name (McWeeny, Young, Hay & Ellis, 1987; Cohen, 1990). Furthermore, 
Durso and O'Sullivan (experiment 1) reported that proper nouns produced cross-
domain facilitation from a picture naming task to a word naming task. They 
interpreted this result in terms of the generic-specific hypothesis. Durso and 
O'Sullivan claimed that facilitation occurred as a function of the relationship 
between representations activated by visual and verbal stimuli. They argued that 
there will be much overlap between the semantic representations activated by a 
picture and the representations activated by the name of an entity that takes a 
proper name, because the referent of a proper name is highly specific. In 
contrast, the representations activated by a common name will be less specific, 
and therefore overlap less, with the semantic representations activated by a 
picture of the concept. The greater similarity in the verbal and visual 
representations of the referents of proper names was assumed to produce a 
facilitation from naming a picture to reading a word that is restricted to proper 
names. 
In contrast to Durso and O'Sullivan's predictions, the Valentine et al. (1996) 
model does not predict any greater facilitation of naming written proper names 
from a prior picture naming task, than would be found for common names. The 
model predicts facilitation when a word naming task is conducted on two 
consecutive occasions because the same processing pathway is used on each 
occasion. However, when a picture naming task is followed with a word naming 
task the only link that is activated during both tasks is that between the semantic 
(lemma) and phonological (lexeme) levels of lexical access. This is true for 
production of both common names and proper names. Therefore, the model 
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predicts that facilitation should be equivalent for both classes of noun. Previous 
research suggests that a common pathway between the lemma and lexeme may 
not be sufficient to produce a significant effect of repetition priming in the typical 
experimental paradigm used for such studies (Valentine, Moore & Bredart, 1995). 
Data indicates that the effects of repetition from seeing a full name on a 
subsequent face naming task, occurs prior to lexical access. The effects cannot 
be attributed to articulation or phonological access as no effects of repetition 
occur when the same phonology is produced in response to reading a common 
name (Valentine et al 1996). 
Durso and O'Sullivan's (1983) design is subject to a number of criticisms. First, 
a small number of stimuli were used in a within-participants design. The critical 
primed items consisted of only a small number of stimuli. Twelve items were 
presented as pictures, three exemplars from four different sub-categories 
(people, states, foods, animals). An error rate of 11 % was reported for the proper 
name stimuli. Therefore some cell means were calculated from only two items. 
Second, no filler items were included during the prime phase or the test phase of 
the experiment. Filler items are usually considered necessary to discourage the 
strategy of using episodic recall to facilitate the processing of the primed items. 
Durso and O'Sullivan showed that the proper name stimuli were more easily 
recognised and remembered compared to the common name stimuli (Durso & 
O'Sullivan, experiments 2 and 3). This finding may indicate that the nature of the 
proper name stimuli may have encouraged the use of episodic recall strategies. 
Third, the different categories of stimuli were not matched in terms of word length 
or numbers of phonemes. An examination of their stimuli shows that proper 
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names were selected from the categories of famous people (predominantly two 
word names) and states of America (predominantly one word names), whereas 
the common names were selected from the categories of food and animals (both 
predominantly one word names). We conducted an analysis of variance that 
showed there were significant differences between the word categories in terms 
of word length (calculated as the number of letters; F(3,32) = 9.1, p <.01). 
Peoples names (mean = 10.4, sd = 2.4) were significantly longer than names of 
foods (mean = 6.7, sd = 1.9), names of animals (mean = 5.2, sd = 2.4) and 
names of states (mean = 7.2, sd = 1.8). Therefore differences in word length 
may contribute to Durso and O'Sullivan's finding that people's names took longer 
to produce than common names. Word length may not be such a problem for 
Durso and O'Sullivan's state names, as the mean length for state names is 
similar to the common name stimuli. However, the original data may still be 
problematic due to the large error rate and the small number of stimuli per cell. 
In view of the generic-specific hypothesis that Durso and O'Sullivan set out to 
test, it would not have been appropriate to attempt to eliminate episodic recall as 
a strategy in their experiments. The Valentine et al. (1996) model is incompatible 
with an abstractionist account of proper-name-specific facilitation between picture 
naming and word naming. However, if the facilitation in Durso and O'Sullivan's 
experiment is episodically mediated it could not be considered to provide a test of 
the model. Therefore, it is essential to establish whether proper-name-specific 
facilitation can be found in an experiment designed to reduce the role of episodic 
mediation of facilitation to a minimum. 
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The current experiments investigated the potential for a picture naming task to 
prime a subsequent word naming task when the role of episodic mediation is 
minimised. Experiment 3.1 included different categories of proper name and 
common names, in an attempt to replicate the category-specific priming reported 
by Durso and O'Sullivan (1983). Experiment 3.2 focussed exclusively on 
landmark names. In each case, a number of methodological improvements were 
made to the design of the original Durso and O'Sullivan (1983) experiment. First, 
a larger number of stimuli were employed in a mixed-factorial design. Two sets 
of stimuli were matched on word length, and the presentation of experimental and 
control sets of items were counterbalanced. Second, distracters were included to 
make recall of prime items more difficult. In accordance with the Valentine et al. 
(1996) model and the results of Valentine et al. (1995) the hypothesis for 
Experiment 3.1 was that priming from a picture naming task onto a word naming 




The experiment was a mixed factorial design. It consisted of two phases, a prime 
phase followed by a test phase. During the prime phase participants performed 
either a picture naming task or a word naming task. Prime task was therefore a 
between-participants factor. The test phase consisted of a word naming task for 
both groups. The experimental stimuli were drawn from three different 
categories. The effect of noun category was a within-participants factor (people, 
places, objects). There were two sets of thirty critical items. One of these sets 
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appeared in both the prime phase and the test phase. Responses to this set of 
items formed the data for the primed items. The other set of thirty critical items 
appeared only during the test phase. Responses to this set of items formed the 
data for the unprimed (control) condition. The effect of priming (primed, 
unprimed) was also a within-participants factor. With the exception of the 
primed items, no other stimuli were repeated between the prime phase and the 
test phase. The assignment of items to the primed and unprimed conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants for each experimental condition. 
Participants 
Forty-three people participated in the experiment. Data from forty participants 
contributed to the final analysis (five males and thirty-five females; Mean age = 
23 years, range 19 - 40). Three participants in the picture naming condition were 
replaced because their performance included errors of sixty percent or more for 
the naming of people or landmark picture items. All of the participants were 
students at Goldsmiths College, University of London and received a course 
credit for participation. 
Stimuli 
Sixty stimuli were selected as critical items. A further sixty-nine items were used 
as filler and practice items. The items were members of the following categories 
of proper names and common names: proper name stimuli were taken from 
categories of famous people (e.g. Ruby Wax, Joanna Lumley) and famous 
landmarks (e.g. Big Ben, Taj Mahal). As the experiment was to be conducted in 
the United Kingdom, States of America were not considered appropriate. The 
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common name stimuli were derived from everyday objects (e.g. coat hanger, 
filing cabinet). 
The stimuli were subdivided into two matched sets of ten critical items (see 
Appendix 1). The remaining items acted as fillers. The critical items from each 
category were matched for word length (number of letters). The word length 
(mean no. of letters with standard deviations in parentheses) of critical items 
were: people 11.5 (2.4); landmarks 11.1 (2.9); objects 10.9 (1.7); There was no 
difference in the mean word length for either set of critical items of any category 
of noun, F(2,54) < 1. A 6cm x 6 cm black and white digitised image of each item 
was produced. Written names were presented in uppercase 14pt Arial font. 
Apparatus 
The stimuli were presented on the screen of a PC. The presentation of the 
stimuli and collection of data were programmed using Micro Experimental 
Laboratory software (MEL2) giving millisecond accuracy. The naming responses 
were recorded by a throat microphone attached to a voice key. 
Procedure 
All participants carried out a prime task followed by a test task. In each task the 
experimental trials were preceded by twelve practice trials. Participants were told 
that they would see an item appear on the screen and the task was to name the 
item out loud, as quickly and as accurately as possible. Each trial consisted of a 
250 msec tone followed after 500 msec by presentation of a stimulus. Stimuli 
were presentation in a random order. The participants' response terminated the 
..,.., 
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display of the stimulus. The experimenter recorded the accuracy of the vocal 
response by entering a key press onto the keyboard. Responses were 
considered correct if the participants produced the full name of the item 
accurately. Errors included incomplete responses and occasions when the voice 
key misfired. The following trial commenced after the experimenter had logged 
the response accuracy by making a key-press on the keyboard. The prime 
phase consisted of thirty critical items to be primed (ten items from each 
category) together with thirty filler items (ten from each category), in either the 
pictorial or verbal format. The test phase consisted of the thirty primed items and 
thirty unprimed (control) items together with fifteen filler items (five items from 
each noun category). 
Results 
Responses to the critical 'primed' and 'unprimed' items made during the test 
phase were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was only included in 
the analysis if the correct name was given in both the prime phase and the test 
phase. Mean reaction times for correct responses are shown in Figure 3.1. The 
percentage error rates can be found in Table 3.1. Error rates were not subjected 
to any further analysis. 
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Figure 3.1 Mean RT for word naming during test phase as a function of prime 
task and noun category. Shown with 95% confidence interval for the within-
participants effect of priming o primed 
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Table 3.1 Error Rates and Mean RT for Experiment 3.1. 
Noun Category & People Landmarks Objects 
Condition Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed 
Picture Naming 
Mean RT (msec) 589 587 628 652 605 615 
SO (msec) 73 86 105 98 76 88 
Error % 8 1 12 3 5 4 
Word Naming 
Mean RT (msec) 550 577 580 618 573 613 
SO (msec) 70 85 73 105 76 92 
Error % 0 3 2 4 3 4 
The data were analysed by participant, with repeated measures on the priming 
and noun-category factors and taking prime task as a between-participants factor 
(identified by the suffix 1), and also by item taking priming and prime task as a 
within-items factor with noun-category as a between-items factor (identified by 
the suffix 2). 
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The mean response time in the test task following picture naming in the prime 
phase (612 msec) was slower than the mean response time following word 
naming in the prime phase (585 msec). This main effect of prime task was not 
significant for participants F1(1,38) = 1.22, p>.05 but was significant by items 
F2( 1,57) = 15.81, P <.01. There was a main effect of noun-category F1(2,76) = 
22.63, , P <.01; F2(2,57) = 3.6, p <.05. The mean response time to peoples 
names (575 msec) was faster than the mean response times to the other 
categories of noun (landmarks 619 msec; objects 601 msec). There was a main 
effect of priming F1(1,38) = 23.75, p <.05; F2(1,57) = 14.3, p <.01. Primed items 
produced faster responses (mean 587msec) than unprimed items (610 msec). 
The prime by task interaction was significant F1(1,38) = 6.7, p <.01; F2(1,57) = 
5.8, p <.01. Greater facilitation was produced following the word naming prime 
task, compared to the picture naming prime phase. No other effects were 
significant (All F's < 1.3). 
The interaction between prime and task was further explored by separate 
AN OVA's for each prime task separately. In respect of the picture naming prime 
task, neither the main effect of priming F1(1,19) = 2.34, p = .14; F2(1,57) = 2.55, p 
=.08 nor the interaction between noun-category and priming was significant 
F1(2,38) = 1.25, p =.29; F2(2,57) = 2.5, p =.08. In view of the current predictions 
and Durso and 0' Sullivan (1983, experiment 1) who had previously reported a 
noun-category by prime interaction that was significant only for the category of 
proper names, this interaction was explored using simple main effects. The 
effect of priming at specific levels of noun-category was significant only for the 
sub-category of landmarks when analysed by item F2(1,57) = 7.76, p <.01. (For 
other comparisons, F1'S < 2.56; F2'S <1.) In respect of the word naming prime 
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task there was a significant main effect of priming F1(1,19) = 31.45, p<.01; 
F2(1,57) = 20.2, p<.01. The interaction between noun by priming was not 
significant F1(2,38) < 1; F2(2,57) < 1,. 
Discussion of Experiment 3.1 
The data from common (object) names is consistent with that of Durso and 
O'Sullivan in that there was no facilitation of reading aloud an object's name from 
having previously named a picture of the object. These results differ from Durso 
and O'Sullivan's in that no evidence was found of any facilitation of reading aloud 
a celebrity's name from having named a celebrity's face. These aspects of the 
results are very clear. The data from landmarks are slightly less clear. In this 
case, there was a trend towards priming from picture naming that was statistically 
significant only in the by-items analysis. It would be incautious to conclude there 
was category-specific priming from picture naming on the basis of this result as 
the effect does not generalise across participants. This cannot be attributed to 
lack of power in the experimental design because reliable priming was found for 
all stimuli when participants read words aloud in both phases of the experiment. 
The likely explanation for this trend lies in the strategy of excluding data from 
items that were not correctly named in both phases of the experiment. Inspection 
of Table 3.1 shows that the landmarks were the most difficult pictures to name, 
yielding an error on 12% trials. The majority of these errors arise from picture 
naming errors rather than errors in the test phase (ct. 3% error rate for unprimed 
items). The effect of the relatively high error rate will be to exclude data from the 
less familiar items from calculation of mean 'primed' reaction times, thereby 
producing a trend towards a priming effect as an artefact of the data analysis. 
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This account is consistent with the effect being significant only in the by-items 
analysis. If the correct responses (considering the accuracy during the test 
phase only) to landmark stimuli are subjected to a related t-test, no significant 
facilitation is found for analysis by participant or item t1 (19) = .98 P = .1, t2( 19) = 
.42 P = .33. 
Experiment 3.2 aimed to confirm whether picture naming of landmark stimuli 
would facilitate a subsequent word naming task. Two alternative sets of critical 
items were formed that were considered to produce more reliable responses in 
the picture naming prime task. 
Experiment 3.2 
Experiment 3.2 aimed to determine whether picture naming could prime a 
subsequent word naming task. In accordance with the model by Valentine et al. 
and previous results, it is predicted that no facilitation would be found when a 
picture naming task is followed by a subsequent word naming task. In contrast, 
facilitation should occur when a word naming task is followed with a subsequent 
word naming task. 
Method 
Design 
In accordance with Experiment 3.1, this experiment consisted of two phases, a 
prime phase followed by a test phase. During the prime phase participants 
performed a picture naming task, or a word naming task. The test phase 
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consisted of a word naming task for both groups. The experiment was therefore 
a mixed factorial design. The effect of priming (primed, unprimed) was a within-
participants factors. Prime task was a between-participants factor. There were 
two sets of nine critical items. One of these sets appeared in both the prime 
phase and the test phase. Responses to this set of items formed the data for the 
primed items. The other set of nine critical items appeared only during the test 
phase. Responses to this set of items formed the data for the unprimed (control) 
condition. With the exception of the primed items, no other stimuli were repeated 
between the prime phase and the test phase. The assignment of items to the 
primed and unprimed conditions was counterbalanced across participants for 
each experimental condition. 
Participants 
Thirty two people (three males and twenty-nine females; Mean age = 37 years, 
range 28 - 50) participated in the experiment. All of the participants were 
students of the Open University attending residential school. None of the 
participants had taken part in Experiment 3.1. 
Stimuli 
For the prime phase, forty items were chosen. Eighteen pictures of famous 
places were selected as critical items. The stimuli were subdivided into two 
matched sets of nine critical items (see appendix 2). The names of the two sets 
of critical items were matched for word length (Set A mean number of letters 9.8, 
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s.d. 2.6; Set B mean number of letters 11.7, s.d. 3.0; t(16) = 1.42, P = .17). A 
further thirty-one pictures of recognisable places were selected as filler items. All 
pictures were black and white photographs measuring 6cm x 6cm. Each set of 
forty pictures was inserted into a booklet in a random order. 
For the test phase a series of written names were formed. Eighteen names 
corresponded to the critical items. A further seven familiar items were selected 
as fillers. Twenty five plausible, but unfamiliar place names (e.g. Emma's Park, 
Clumber Monument) were formed. An additional ten items (five familiar and five 
unfamiliar) served as practice items. Words were presented visually in 14 point 
Ariel Font, at the centre of the visual display. 
Apparatus 
The stimuli for the test phase of the experiment were presented on the screen of 
a Macintosh computer. The presentation of the stimuli and collection of data 
were programmed using Superlab software. The naming responses were taken 
with a microphone attached to a voice key. 
Procedure 
All participants carried out a prime task followed by a test task. Participants were 
told that they would see a series of pictures (or names) of famous places from 
around the world and they should produce the name of the place as quickly as 
possible. The prime phase consisted of nine critical items to be primed together 
with thirty one filler items. The prime phase series were presented in one of four 
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alternative pseudo-randomised orders. The test phase was then presented on 
Macintosh computer. The trials were preceded by ten practice trials. The test 
phase consisted of fifty items in total: the nine primed items, nine unprimed 
(control) items together with seven filler items, and twenty-five unfamiliar items, in 
random order. Each trial consisted of a 250 msec fixation, followed after 500 
msec by presentation of a stimulus. Participants were told that they would see an 
item appear on the screen and the task was to read the name and say it out loud, 
as quickly and as accurately as possible. The participants' response terminated 
the display of the stimulus. The experimenter recorded the accuracy of the vocal 
response by entering a key press onto the keyboard. The following trial 
commenced after the experimenter had logged the response accuracy by making 
a key-press on the keyboard. Responses were considered correct if the 
participants produced the full name of the item accurately. Errors included 
incomplete responses and occasions when the voice key misfired. 
Results 
Responses to the critical 'primed' and 'unprimed' items made during the test 
phase were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was only included in 
the analysis if the correct name was given in both the prime phase and the test 









responses. The percentage error rates can be found in Table 3.2. Error rates 
were not subjected to any further analysis. 
Figure 3.2: Mean RT during test phase as a function of prime 
condition and task (shown with 95% confidence Interval for the 
within participants effect of priming). 
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Table 3.2 Error Rates and Mean RT for Experiment 3.2. 
Noun Category & Landmarks 
Condition Primed Un primed 
Picture Naming 
Mean RT (msec) 647 676 
so (msec) 110 146 
Error % 3 1 
Word Naming 
Mean RT (msec) 611 704 
so (msec) 106 121 
Error % 3 2 
The data were analysed by participant, with repeated measures on the effect of 
priming with prime task as a between~participants factor (identified by the suffix 
1), and also by item taking priming and prime task as a within-items factor 
(identified by the suffix 2). The main effect of prime task was not significant F1 
(1,30) < 1; F2 (1,17) < 1. There was a significant main effect of priming F1 (1,30) 
= 19.40, P < .01; F2 (1,17) = 17.86, P < .01. The interaction between prime task 
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and. priming was significant in the participants analysis, and approached 
significance in the items analysis. F1 (1,30) = 4.60, P < .05; F2 (1,17) = 19.06, P = 
.06. As the hypothesis concerned differences in priming for each of the prime 
tasks, simple main effects were used to explore the interaction. The effect of 
priming was significant for the word naming prime task F1 (1,30) = 21.50, P < 
.01; F2 (1,17) = 19.06, P = .01. In contrast the effect of priming was not significant 
for the picture naming task F1 (1,30) = 2.53, P =.12; F2 (1,17) = 2.59, P = .12. 
Discussion of Experiment 3.2 
Experiment 3.2 indicated that producing the name of a landmark from a picture 
did not reliably facilitate a word naming task. The lack of facilitation cannot be 
attributed to a lack of power as significant facilitation was found following the 
word naming prime task. The error rates in the current experiment were much 
lower than those found in Experiment 3.1, and therefore the picture naming prime 
task can be considered more reliable. The present data suggest that the 
interpretation of Experiment 3.1 was indeed valid, as no significant priming 
occurred following the picture naming prime task. 
General Discussion of Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 
The experiments reported in this chapter address evidence reported by Durso 
and O'Sullivan (experiment 1, 1983). Durso and O'Sullivan found that naming a 
picture of a proper name primed a word naming task. These are important issues 
to investigate, because any cross-domain priming that is specific to proper names 
and requires an abstractionist account would undermine the Valentine et a/. 
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(1996) model. This model cannot account for any differences in cross-domain 
priming of word naming between proper names and common names. I argued 
that Durso and O'Sulivan's findings may have been an artefact of the 
experimental design, occurring due to the experimental stimuli and retrieval of an 
episode. This is very likely as Durso and O'Sullivan's later experiments found 
that the proper name stimuli were highly memorable compared to the common 
names. If Durso and O'Sullivan's study is to be taken to invalidate the model 
proposed by Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996) then episodic effects must 
first be eliminated. Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that when an experimental 
design is formed to eliminate episodic influences, there was no statistically 
significant cross-domain priming from a picture naming task onto a word naming 
task. 
Picture naming and word naming do require activation of a common link, from the 
lemma to the lexeme. As repetition priming is assumed to reflect a strengthening 
of a link from recent use, why is cross-domain priming of word naming not 
observed for all stimuli? The model by Valentine et a/. (1996) provides two routes 
by which a lexeme can be activated from a written word. A lexical route via the 
semantic lexicon and a sub-lexical route via orthography to phonology conversion 
strategies. The activation of the lexeme would be given by a summation of 
activation passed via both pathways (Hillis & Caramazza, 1991). Picture naming 
would strengthen only the lemma -Iexeme link. In contrast, participants who read 
aloud the items during the first phase of the experiment would have primed both 
pathways. Therefore, a much greater effect of repetition priming would be 
predicted from word naming than from picture naming. This prediction was 
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confirmed. Neither the model nor the data reported here, exclude the possibility 
that priming of word naming from picture naming could be found with a more 
powerful experimental design. However, we can conclude that any effect is much 
weaker than the effect of priming of word naming from the same task. The model 
predicts that if an effect could be observed it should be equivalent for common 
names and proper names. 
The results reported here are consistent with an account in terms of transfer 
appropriate training and perceptual fluency: the priming is only observed when 
the stimulus is repeated in the same modality and when the processing task is 
the same. The aim of the experimental design was to reduce the possibility that 
cross-domain priming could be mediated by retrieval of the priming episode. 
Clearly this aim has been achieved as no robust cross-domain priming was 
observed in Experiment 3.2. Nevertheless the word naming prime demonstrates 
that both of the experimental designs had sufficient power to detect repetition 
priming when it is present. 
There will always be a number of possible explanations of priming when the 
prime and test tasks are identical and the stimulus is presented in the same 
domain. However, it has been demonstrated that when an experiment is 
designed appropriately the data are consistent with an abstractionist account in 
general and with the Valentine ef al. (1996) model in particular. 
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Chapter 4 
Cross ... modal Facilitation 
As discussed in the chapter on methodology, it has been suggested that 
changing the format in which a particular stimulus is presented reduces the 
facilitation produced by repetition. Less facilitation (but significant priming) has 
been found for visually presented words in a variety of tasks such as word 
fragment, stem completion, lexical decision, degraded word identification, and if 
the prime phase has been conducted in the auditory modality (Graf, Shimmura & 
Squire 1985; Hashtroudi, Ferguson, Rappold & Chronsniak 1988; Roediger & 
Blaxton, 1987; Scarborough et aI., 1979). However, there is some disagreement 
concerning the degree to which facilitation can transfer from one modality or 
domain to another. 
A number of studies have found little or no benefit to subsequent processing if 
the modality or domain is changed between prime and test. For example, 
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) report no significant cross-modal priming from an 
identification task for brief presentations following an auditory prime compared to 
a visual prime. Morton (1979) was unable to find priming in a visual identification 
task, when the prime phase was conducted in the auditory modality followed by a 
test phase in the visual modality. However, priming (but less facilitation than 
when the same task was repeated) was found if the prime phase was a visual 
task and the test phase was an auditory task that involved the identification of 
words in background noise. Ellis (1982) found that identification of words 
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presented in noise yielded greater accuracy when prior experience of the word 
had been in the auditory modality. No facilitation occurred if the prime phase was 
conducted in the visual modality. Clarke and Morton (1983) assert there is little 
benefit from a previous encounter when the tasks at prime and test crossed 
modality. Jacoby and Dallas (1981) found that visual identification of 
tachistoscopic presentations of word stimuli, were only facilitated when prime 
and test were of the same modality. A total absence of cross modal facilitation, 
such as this, is supportive of the episodic account of priming. However, other 
studies have shown that facilitation does sometimes transfer between stimulus 
modality. For example, Jackson and Morton (1984) found less priming for the 
identification of auditory words in noise following visually presented words during 
the prime phase compared to when the prime phase was conducted in the 
auditory modality. Bassili, Smith and Macleod (1989) found similar results when 
participants were required to complete auditory word stems when the prime 
phase had been conducted as a visual presentation. Weldon (1991) asserts that 
priming occurs for the identification of a tachistoscopic presentation of a visual 
word following previous experience of that word in the auditory modality, but the 
facilitation was significantly less than when participants received both the prime 
phase and the test phase in the same modality. Kirsner and Smith (1974) and 
Kirsner, Milech and Standen (1983) investigated cross-modal priming using the 
lexical decision task, to find that cross-modal designs produced significant 
facilitation, however, this was significantly smaller than found with within-modality 
priming. They suggested that this suggested two loci of facilitation existed, a 
modality-specific facilitation which they attributed to activation at the perceptual 
stages of processing and a modality-free facilitation attributed to semantic 
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access. Hunt and Toth (1990) and Weldon (1991) found cross-modal facilitation 
occurred for a visual word fragment completion, but presenting the prime phase 
in the same modality as test produced significantly larger facilitation. 
In summary, differences in empirical findings may relate closely to the differences 
in the experimental tasks; tasks that have high processing demands (such as 
identification in noise and fragment completion) appear more likely to produce 
cross-modal facilitation. When cross-modal facilitation does occur, the magnitude 
of facilitation is much smaller than that of a comparable, within-modality 
presentation. 
One recent finding is that people's names evince a different pattern of long term 
repetition priming phenomena compared to common names (Valentine, Hollis & 
Moore, 1998). A series of experiments indicated that people's names produced 
cross-modal facilitation from an auditory name familiarity decision to a visual 
name familiarity decision. The magnitude of this cross-modal facilitation was 
similar to within-modality priming. Cross-modality priming did not occur when 
common names were presented in a lexical decision task. These findings are 
interesting as the previous discussion has indicated that changing the modality of 
presentation between training and test is usually considered to reduce or 
eliminate facilitation (e.g. Scarborough, Gerard & Cortese, 1979). However, 
these findings are perfectly in keeping with the model proposed by Valentine et 
al. (1996). Repetition priming is considered to reflect an increase in a 
connection weight between different representational levels following prior 
processing. Processing via the highly specific token marker-lemma linkage is 
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required for any tasks involving person identity (such as the name familiarity 
decision). During the name familiarity decision, activation must flow via the word 
recognition unit via the lemma to the token marker. The name familiarity decision 
tasks require access to the token marker during the prime phase and the test 
phase in order to successfully make the decision (see Figure 1, p.35). 
Consequently the model predicts facilitation in an abstractionist (item-specific) 
fashion for people's names. In contrast, for common names a lexical decision is 
made at the level of the lemma and does not require access to token marker. 
The processing during the prime and test phase does not involve the same 
processing route and so no facilitation occurs for common names during lexical 
decision. It is possible that repetition priming can occur due to the retrieval of a 
prior processing episode, found in the perceptual fluency and transfer-appropriate 
processing accounts of priming as discussed in Chapter 2 (Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). However, the experiments reported in this 
chapter were designed to minimise the influence of episodic retrieval. Hence, the 
patterns of data found are difficult to account for in terms of an episodic 
explanation. 
All of the experiments in this chapter used a cross-modal repetition priming 
paradigm. The aim of this research was to determine whether the previous 
findings of Valentine et al. (1998) could be replicated and extended to other 
classes of proper name. A contrast was made between the long term priming of 
people's names, landmark names and country names (proper names) with 
object names (common names). In the prime phase, names were presented in 
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either the visual or auditory modality. In keeping with the study by Valentine et al. 
(1998) proper name stimuli were presented as a familiarity decision task. The 
methodology and rationale were adapted from Valentine et ai's (1998) study of 
people's names. Experiment 4.1 compared a familiarity decision to people's 
names, landmark names and country names to a task in which a lexical decision 
was made to common names. The second experiment (Exp. 4.2) compared 
cross-modal facilitation for landmark names and country names, to determine 
whether the data from Experiment 4.1 was robust. Experiment 4.3 investigated 
whether the cross-modal effects related to name frequency by comparing high 
and low frequency common names that were presented for name familiarity 
decision. Experiment 4.4 investigated whether the cross-modal effects related to 
conceptual specificity by comparing a base level name with a sub-ordinate level 
name. Finally, Experiment 4.5 addressed the issue of adjectivisation using city 
names as stimuli. Similar processing for all proper names would be expected if 
all sub-categories of proper name are considered to have a similar cognitive 
architecture. Variations in the processing of sub-categories of proper name may 
indicate that differences in their representation exist. It may also provide a basis 
for choosing between theories of uniqueness, meaninglessness, and token 
reference. 
Experiment 4.1 
The model by Valentine et al. (1996) predicts that for people's names stimuli, 
cross-modal priming should occur. This prediction occurs due to the nature of 
connectivity between the token marker and the lemma for people's names. Once 
a person's name has activated the appropriate lemma, the name familiarity 
decision task requires access to the token marker. The linkage between the 
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lemma and the token marker involves the same processing pathway irrespective 
of the modality of presentation. As both the prime task and test task require 
processing from the lemma to the token marker, facilitation should be observed. 
Valentine et al. (1998) showed that repetition priming of a familiarity decision to 
people's names crossed stimulus modality. They also showed that no cross-
modality priming occurred when common names were presented in a lexical 
decision task. In this regard, common names (object names) presented for 
lexical decision were also included in the current study. Many authors have used 
the familiarity decision task as an analogue to the lexical decision task (Bruce, 
1983; Ellis et aI., 1982 ; Valentine, Ell is, Moore, Flude 1993; Bruce & Valentine, 
1985; Bruce & Valentine, 1986; Bruce & Young, 1986). However, we are not 
assuming the comparability of familiarity and lexical decision task. Rather, the 
lexical decision. to object names was included as Valentine et al. (1996) predicts 
that no cross-modal facilitation would be observed for object names presented as 
a lexical decision task. This prediction emerges as the processing from name 
recognition units to the lemma are modality specific. Lexical decisions are 
assumed to be made at the lemma level of representation and do not require 
access to a .token marker. Therefore, no processing pathways are common to 
both the prime phase and the test phase of the experiment. In this case, no 
cross-modal facilitation is expected for object names presented as a lexical 
decision task. The aim of this experiment was to replicate the cross-modal 
facilitation for people's names and determine whether the finding would 




One hundred and eleven participants (27 male and 85 female) took part in the 
experiment. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 50 years with a mean age 
of 27 years. 
Stimuli 
For each noun category, two sets of 9 critical items were constructed (see 
Appendix 3). There was no significant difference between the word length of the 
two stimuli sets. In addition, for each noun category 23 filler items, 50 unfamiliar 
items and 20 practice items were also selected. In respect of people's names, 
the critical and filler items were names of well known celebrities (e.g. Ruby Wax, 
Margaret Thatcher). The unfamiliar items were plausible unfamiliar names (e.g. 
Mark Jones). 
For the category of landmarks, the critical items were names of famous 
landmarks (e.g. Big Ben, Statue of Liberty). The names were selected from a 
pilot study in which different participants were asked to name a series of famous 
landmarks. The most reliable items were selected as critical items in the present 
study. Additional items were chosen as filler famous (e.g. Regents' Park) and 
plausible unfamiliar items (e.g. Harry's Column, Statue of Day). In respect of 
country names, the critical and filler items were names of well known countries 
(e.g. Spain, France). As before, a set of pronounceable unfamiliar names were 
formed (e.g. Nobleland, Cettius, Gallaport). 
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For the lexical decision task with common names, the critical and filler items were 
names of familiar objects (e.g. butterfly, candle). A selection of pronounceable 
non-words were produced to act as unfamiliar items (e.g. gormil, famern). 
Apparatus 
For the visual presentations, stimuli were presented on the screen of an IBM 
compatible computer. The experiment was produced using Micro Experimental 
Laboratory (MEL2) which records responses with millisecond accuracy. The 
participants' responses were recorded using key presses on the keyboard. For 
the auditory presentation of the prime task, stimuli were presented in random 
order via headphones from a cassette tape recorder. The participant made a 
response by pressing one of two keys on a hand held response box. An LED 
indicator enabled the experimenter to monitor the accuracy of the responses, 
which were recorded manually. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design with three factors: modality of the prime 
phase task (visual, auditory) and category of noun (people, landmarks, 
countries, objects) were between-participants factors. The effect of priming 
(primed, unprimed) was a within-participants factor. There were two sets of 9 
critical items for each category of noun (see appendix 3). One of these sets 
appeared in both the prime phase and the test phase. Responses to these items 
formed the data for the primed items. The other set of 9 critical items appeared 
only in the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for the 
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unprimed (control) items. With the exception of the primed items, no other items 
were repeated between prime and test. The assignment of items to the primed 
and unprimed conditions was counterbalanced across participants for each 
experimental condition. 
The experiment consisted of two phases, a prime phase and a test phase. All 
participants carried out a familiarity decision with a single category of stimuli 
during both the prime phase and the test phase. Each participant received a 
prime phase in either the visual or the auditory modality, followed by a test 
phase. Each participant received the test phase in the visual modality. There 
were 28 participants for each noun category, 14 received the visually presented 
prime task, and 14 received the auditory presented prime task. 
Procedure 
Participants were assigned to one of the four noun category groups (people, 
landmarks, countries, objects). Participants who received the peoples' names, 
landmark and country name stimuli, were required to perform a familiarity 
decision. Participants who received the object names were required to perform a 
lexical decision. In each case participants received a prime phase followed by a 
test phase, however, they were not informed that the experiment consisted of two 
stages. Prior to each phase ten practice trials were given. The prime phase 
consisted of a total of 50 stimuli: (9 primed critical items, 16 filler famous items, 
and 25 unfamiliar items). For the visual presentations, each trial consisted of a 
250 ms tone followed after 500 ms by presentation of the stimulus in upper case 
14pt Arial font in the centre of the visual display. The participant's response 
terminated the display of the stimulus. Each participant saw a different random 
96 
order of stimuli, and was required to make a decision as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. For the auditory prime phase, stimuli were presented via 
headphones from a cassette tape recorder. Two different random orders of 
stimuli were constructed for each set of primed and unprimed items. In each trial, 
a name was presented and participants were instructed to make a decision by 
pressing 'yes' or 'no' on the keyboard. Participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible. The experimenter recorded the accuracy 
of the participants' responses manually. 
The test phase consisted of 50 stimuli (9 critical items (primed), 9 control items 
(unprimed), 7 filler famous items and 25 unfamiliar items) and was presented 
visually to all participants. Only the 9 critical (primed) items were repeated 
between the prime phase and the test phase of the experiment. The procedure 
and presentation was the same as in the visually presented prime phase. 
Results 
Responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test 
phase were analysed. A response to an item was only included in the analyses 
if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test phase. The 
accuracy and timing of responses is given in Table 4.1. A proportional facilitation 
score was calculated for each data point (unprimed RT - primed RTf unprimed 
RT). The proportional facilitation scores are plotted as a function of noun type 
and prime task modality in the following figure( Figure 4.1 ). 
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Figure 4.1 Mean proportional facilitation as a function of noun category 
and prime task modality. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence 
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Table 4.1 Mean RT's and Response accuracy (out of 9) for Experiment 4.1. 
Familiarity Decision 
People's names 
Visual - Visual 
Auditory - Visual 
Landmark names 
Visual - Visual 
Auditory - Visual 
Country names 
Visual - Visual 








Lexical Decision - Object names 
Visual - Visual 












The proportional scores were subjected to an ANOVA taking participants as the 
random factor with prime task modality and noun category as a between 
participants factor (identified by the suffix 1). A separate ANOVA was carried out 
taking items as the random factor with prime task modality as a within items 
factor and noun category as a between items factor (identified with the suffix 2). 
The main effect of noun category was significant F1(3,104) = 7.70, p < .01; 
F2(3,68) = 3.27, p <.05. The main effect of prime task modality was significant 
F1(1,104) = 12.07,' p < .01; F2(1,68) = 4.17, p <.05. The interaction between 
noun category and prime task modality was not significant F1 (3,104) = 1.25, P 
=.29; F2(3,68) = 1.22, p = .30. As the experimental hypothesis concerned the 
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interaction, simple main effects were used to explore the interaction further. The 
effect of prime task modality was not significant for peoples names F 1 (1,104) = 
1.24, P = .72; F2(1,68) <1. or for landmark names F1(1,104) = 2.04, p = .15; 
F2(1,68) < 1. Significant differences emerged for the effect of prime task modality 
for country names F1(1, 1 04) = 4.75, P <.05; F2(1,68) = 3.80, P < .05 and for 
object names F1(1, 1 04) = 8.92, P < .01; F2(1 ,68) = 4.04, P < .05. 
Analyses of the raw reaction times for the auditory prime task was also carried 
out. For brevity an analysis only of the data for the auditory prime task is 
reported, taking participants as the random factor with noun category as a 
between participants comparison and the effect of priming as a within participants 
factor (identified by the suffix 1). An analysis was also carried out taking items 
as the random factor (identified by the suffix 2). The interaction between noun 
category and priming was significant F1(3,52) = 9.16, P <.01; F2(3,68) = 6.15, P < 
.01. Simple main effects were used to explore the interaction. There was a 
significant effect of priming for people's names F1(1 ,52) = 21.00, P <.01; F2(1,68) 
= 12.77, P < .01 and landmark names F1(1,52) = 18.92, P <.01; F2(1,68) = 
13.93, P < .01. However the effect of priming was not significant for country 
names or object names (All F's < 1). 
Discussion of Experiment 4.1 
Experiment 4.1 aimed to test the hypothesis that proper names would produce 
cross-modal facilitation from a name familiarity decision presented in the auditory 
modality to a name familiarity decision presented in the visual modality. A 
further prediction was that the facilitation produced in the cross-modal 
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presentation would be equivalent to the facilitation from a within modality prime 
presentation. These hypotheses were supported for the categories of people's 
names and landmark names. Further comparisons determined that cross-modal 
facilitation did not occur for common names of everyday objects when presented 
for a lexical decision. In contradiction of the experimental hypothesis, no cross-
modal facilitation was found for country names. 
To account for the lack of cross-modal priming for country names one needs to 
consider the connectivity between the lemma and the conceptual system. It is 
likely that country names are likely to have a diffuse connectivity, from the lemma 
directly to the conceptual system due to the many associations of country names. 
The fact that they can be used as adjectives as well as nouns provide evidence 
of such associations. In short, country names have sense and so are not pure 
referencing expressions. Therefore, a familiarity decision to a country name, may 
depend on access to the conceptual system rather than a token marker, with 
activation passing from the lemma to the conceptual system directly via diffuse 
links. In this case, the spread of activation could by-pass the token marker-
lemma link and hence no cross-modality facilitation would be found. This 
interpretation suggests that there are limitations for the view that all proper 
names are pure referencing expressions and are mediated by a token marker in 
memory. 
There were differences in the unprimed baseline for making familiarity decision. 
The unprimed RT for people's name and landmark name stimuli were larger than 
the RT for the country name and object stimuli. There are a number of 
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explanations for these differences. Firstly, the model predicts that items that 
require processing via the token marker would have longer processing times, 
than items that access the conceptual system directly. The reason for this is that 
access to the token marker involves an extra processing stage. Indeed 
differences in unprimed baseline condition have been found for lexical decisions 
to common names and in previous studies that have employed name familiarity 
decisions to people's names (e.g. Valentine, Moore, Flude, Young & Ellis, 1993). 
Secondly, differences in baseline can be attributed simply to an effect of word 
length. People's names and landmark names were longer than the country and 
object names (see Appendix 3). 
One potential confound that requires careful consideration is word frequency of 
the different categories of noun. I argue that it is unlikely that the cross-modality 
facilitation found with people's names and landmark names occurs as an artefact 
of name frequency. The people's names and landmark name stimuli used in 
these experiments were chosen from a selection of picture items that participants 
were able to spontaneously name. Therefore the experimental items must be 
relatively high in familiarity and frequency, in order for the participants to have 
successfully performed the task. Furthermore, it is simply not possible to equate 
the. frequency of items between the different noun groups. Firstly, people's 
names and names of landmarks are lexical compounds whose members are 
often highly familiar, frequent words (such as Tower, Bridge, Palace). In 
attempting to establish the frequency of these items one must take into account 
both members of the compound. Therefore, establishing frequency for these 
lexical entries cannot be achieved in the same way as for common names. 
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Nevertheless, the issue of frequency needs to be addressed further. Repetition 
effects have been found to be influenced by frequency for common words that 
are presented visually when the prime and test phase presentation are conducted 
within the same modality. In studies with common name stimuli, an advantage 
for low frequency words has been found (e.g. Kinoshita, 1995; Scarborough, 
Cortese & Scarborough, 1977). However, an interaction between prime modality 
and the effect of word frequency has not been demonstrated. The possibility that 
differences in word frequency were responsible for the cross-modal facilitation 
were addressed with Experiment 4.3. Firstly, an additional experiment 
(Experiment 4.2) was performed to determine whether the interaction between 
priming and noun-category (landmark and country names) was robust. 
Experiment 4.2 
Experiment 4.2 aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 4.1. If the findings 
were robust, then a replication of the cross-modal presentation for landmark and 
county name stimuli, should interact with the effect of priming. In other words, 
significant cross-modal priming should occur only for the landmark name stimuli. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty eight participants (7 male and 21 female) took part in the experiment. The 
age of participants ranged from 18 to 50 years with a mean age of 40 years. 
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Stimuli 
Two sets of 9 critical items together with practice, filler and unfamiliar items for 
both country names and landmark names were taken from Experiment 4.1. 
Apparatus 
The prime task was presented in the auditory modality to all participants. The 
procedure remained as for the auditory prime phase of Experiment 4. The test 
phase was presented in the visual modality to all participants, as in Experiment 
4.1 The stimuli were presented on the screen of a Macintosh computer. The 
experiment was produced using Superlab software (Cedrus Corporation). The 
participants' responses were recorded using key presses on the keyboard. 
Design 
The experimental design was adapted from Experiment 4.1, having a mixed 
design with two factors category of noun (landmarks, countries) was a between-
participants factors. The effect of priming (primed, unprimed) was a within-
participants factor. 
Procedure 
Participants were assigned to one of the noun category groups (landmarks, 
countries) and were required to perform a familiarity decision. The procedure 
was the same as the auditory prime condition for landmark and country name 
stimuli in Experiment 4.1. The prime phase was conducted in the auditory 
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modality and the test phase was conduced in the visual modality, as in 
Experiment 4.1. 
Results 
Responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test 
phase were analysed. A response to an item was only included in the analyses 
if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test phase. The 
mean accuracy and timing of responses is given in Table 4.2. A proportional 
facilitation score was calculated for each data point (unprimed RT - primed RTf 
unprimed RT). The proportional facilitation scores are plotted as a function of 
noun type and prime task modality in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Mean proportional facilitation as a function of noun 
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797 (8.2) 904 (8.3) 
557 (8.9) 580 (8.9) 
The proportional scores were subjected to an ANOVA taking participants as the 
random factor with noun category as a between participants factor (identified by 
the suffix 1). A separate ANOVA was carried out taking items as the random 
factor with noun category as a between items factor (identified with the suffix 2). 
Significant facilitation occurred only for the landmark name stimuli. The main 
effect of noun category was significant F1( 1,26) = 4.94 P < .05; F2(1 ,34) = 8.55 P 
< .01. 
Analyses of the raw reaction times was also carried out, taking participants as the 
random factor with noun category as a between participants comparison and the 
effect of priming as a within participants factor (identified by the suffix 1). An 
analysis was also carried out taking items as the random factor (identified by the 
suffix 2). The interaction between noun category and priming was significant 
F1(1 ,26) = 9.22, P <.01 ; F2(1 ,34) = 4.46, p < .05. Simple main effects were used 
to explore the interaction. There was a significant effect of priming for landmark 
names F1(1,26) = 29.33, p <.01; F2(1,68) = 18.15, p < 01. The effect of priming 
was not significant for country names (All F's < 1). 
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Discussion of Experiment 4.2 
Experiment 4.2 confirms that cross modal facilitation occurs for landmark names 
but not for the country name stimuli. The data from Experiment 4.1 indicated 
that there were differences in the unprimed baseline for making familiarity 
decisions. The unprimed RT for people's name and landmark name stimuli were 
longer than the RT for the country name and object stimuli. Differences in the 
unprimed baseline have also occurred in These data (Experiment 4.2). There are 
a number of explanations for these differences. Firstly, the model by Valentine et 
al (1996) predicts that items that require processing via the token marker would 
have longer processing times, than items that access the conceptual system 
directly. The reason for this is that access to the token marker involves an extra 
processing stage. Indeed differences in un primed baseline condition have been 
found for lexical decisions to common names and in previous studies that have 
employed name familiarity decisions to people's names (e.g. Valentine, Moore, 
Flude, Young & Ellis, 1993). Secondly, differences in baseline can be attributed 
simply to an effect of word length. Landmark names are longer than the country 
names (see Appendix 3). 
However, these data raise the issue of word frequency. One potential confound 
that requires careful consideration is word frequency of the different categories 
of noun. I argue that it is unlikely that the cross-modality effect occurs as an 
artefact of name frequency. The landmark name stimuli used in this experiment 
were chosen from a selection of picture items that participants were able to 
spontaneously name. Therefore the experimental items must be relatively high in 
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familiarity and frequency, in order for the participants to have successfully 
performed the task. Furthermore, it is simply not possible to equate the 
frequency of items between the different noun groups. Firstly, names of 
landmarks are lexical compounds whose members are often highly familiar, 
frequent words (such as Tower, Bridge, Palace). In attempting to establish the 
frequency of these items one must take into account both members of the 
compound. Therefore, establishing frequency for these lexical entries cannot be 
achieved in the same way as for common names. Nevertheless the issue of 
frequency needs to be addressed further. Repetition effects have been found to 
be influenced by frequency for common words that are presented visually when 
the prime and test phase presentation are conducted within the same modality. 
In studies with common name stimuli, an advantage for low frequency words has 
been found (e.g. Kinoshita, 1995, Scarborough, Cortese & Scarborough, 1977). 
However, an interaction between prime modality and the effect of word frequency 
has not been demonstrated. The possibility that differences in word frequency 
were responsible for the cross-modal facilitation were addressed with Experiment 
4.3. 
Experiment 4.3 
Experiment 4.3 investigated names derived from categories of high and low 
frequency. It might be argued that people's names and names of landmarks are 
labels of lower frequency and familiarity compared to the country names and 
object names. To test whether these differences could account for the presence 
of priming following cross-modality presentation, very low frequency names were 
compared to a set of very high frequency names using the cross-modal 
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methodology. If frequency and familiarity were responsible for the cross-modality 
priming found in Experiment 4.1, then it is likely that this could be found when 
very low and very high frequency words are directly compared. If the findings of 
Experiment 4.1 occurred due to effects of word frequency, then significant cross-
modal facilitation would be expected for the low frequency names, but not for the 
high frequency names. 
The design of the experiment was adapted from Experiment 4.1. Within-modality 
and cross-modality priming were compared between participants and the effect of 
priming was a within-participant factor. An additional within-participants factor 
was introduced, that of word frequency (low, high). 
Method 
The numbers of critical stimuli were doubled, so that there were 18 critical items 
in each primed and unprimed set. Half of these items were low frequency names 
and half were high frequency names. Both sets of names were matched for 
familiarity, concreteness and word length. The sets of low frequency names had 
a mean frequency of less than 1 occurrence per million. The sets of high 
frequency names had a mean frequency of over 500 occurrences per million 
(Kucera and Francis ratings from the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database. See 
Appendix 4 for a list of the critical stimuli). The number of filler and unfamiliar 
items were increased. In the prime phase there were 90 trials. 18 critical items to 
be primed, plus 27 filler items and 45 unfamiliar items. In the test phase of the 
experiment there were also 90 trials: 36 critical items (18, primed items, 18 
unprimed items) 9 filler items and 45 unfamiliar items. 
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Participants 
Twenty eight participants (6 male and 22 female) took part in the experiment. The 
age of participants ranged from 18 to 50 years with a mean age of 31 years. 
Procedure 
The apparatus and procedure was the same as Experiment 4.1. Each phase .of 
the experiment was preceded by ten practice trials. In order to try and equate the 
processing demands of this experiment with the name familiarity decisi.on to 
proper names, participants were instructed to make "a familiarity decisi.on to 
each item" rather than a lexical decision. 
Results 
As in Experiment 4.1 responses to the critical primed and unprimed items made 
during the test phase were analysed. A response to an item was only included in 
the analyses if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test 
phase. The accuracy and timing of responses is given in Table 4.3. A 
proporti.onal facilitati.on score was calculated for each data point (unprimed RT -
primed RTf unprimed RT). The proportional facilitation scores are plotted as a 
function of n.oun type and prime task modality in Figure 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Mean RT and Response Accuracy (out of 9) for Experiment 4.3 
Familiarity Decision 
High Frequency words 
Visual - Visual 
Auditory - Visual 
Low Frequency words 
Visual - Visual 










Figure 4.3 Mean proportional facilitation as a function of name 
frequency and prime task modality. Error bars indicate a 95% 
0.2.., confidence interval. 
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The proportional scores were subjected to an ANOVA taking participants as the 
random factor with prime task modality as a between-participants factor, and 
word frequency as a within-participants factor (identified by the suffix 1). A 
separate ANOVA was carried out taking items as the random factor with prime 
task modality as a within-items factor and word frequency as a between-items 
factor (identified with the suffix 2). 
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The main effect of prime task modality was significant F1(1,26) = 5.57, p < .01; 
F2(1,34) = 5.00, p <.01. The main effect of frequency was significant in the 
items analysis F1(1,26) = 2.31, p =.14; F2(1,34) = 6.59, p <.01. The interaction 
between prime task modality and word frequency was not significant F 1 (1,26) < 1; 
F2(1,34) <1. Simple main effects were used to explore the interaction further. 
The effect of prime task modality was marginally significant for low frequency 
words F1(1,52) = 3.79, p = .056; F2(1,34) = 3.20, p = .082 and for high frequency 
words in the by participants analysis F1(1,26) = 2.93, p = .09; F2(1,34) = 1.88, p = 
.17. 
An analysis of the raw reaction times was also carried out, taking participants as 
the random factor with prime task modality as a between-participants comparison 
and the effect of priming and word frequency as a within-participants factor 
(identified by the suffix 1), and also taking items as the random factor with the 
effects of word frequency as a between-items factor with priming and prime task 
modality as within-items factors (identified by the suffix 2). 
The interaction between prime task modality and priming was significant F1(1,26) 
= 6.00, p < .02; F2(1,34) = 4.53, p < .05.The interaction between prime task 
modality and word frequency approached significance in the by participants 
analysis and was significant in the by-items analysis F1(1,26) = 3.56, p =.07; 
F2(1,34) = 4.17, p < .05. 
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The interaction between priming and word frequency was not significant by 
participants, but was significant by-items F1(1,26) = 2.27, p =.14; F2(1,34) = 5.25, 
p < .02. The three way interaction between prime task modality, priming and 
word frequency was not significant F1(1 ,26) < 1; F2(1,34) < 1. 
Simple main effects were used to explore these interactions. The effect of priming 
for high and low frequency words was of particular interest. There was a 
significant effect of priming for low frequency words following the visually 
presented prime task F1(1,26) = 8.30, p <.01; F2(1,34) = 20.47, p < .01. There 
was a significant effect of priming for high frequency words following the visually 
presented prime task in the items analysis only F1(1,26) = 1.89, p =.18; F2(1,34) 
= 3.93, p < .05. However, the effect of priming was not significant for the 
auditory presented prime task for the high or low frequency words (All F's < 1.7, 
allp's>.19). 
Discussion of Experiment 4.3 
Experiment 4.3 tested the hypothesis that low frequency words would produce 
more cross-modal facilitation compared to high frequency words. An advantage 
for low frequency words was found for the visually presented prime task. 
However, no cross-modal facilitation occurred for high or low frequency words 
when presented as a familiarity decision task. Therefore, evidence of word 
frequency affecting cross-modal presentation was not found. It can therefore be 
concluded that word frequency was unlikely to be responsible for the cross-modal 
facilitation found in Experiment 4.1. As a familiarity decision task was used in 
Experiment 4.3 and similar results to those obtained with a lexical decision task 
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in Experiment 4.1 were obtained, differences in cross-modality priming due to 
task demands can be eliminated. 
A further consideration is the conceptual specificity of names. A number of 
authors have suggested that people's names occupy the sub-ordinate level of a 
conceptual hierarchy whereas object names occupy the base level of a hierarchy 
(e.g. Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1997; Durso & O'Sullivan, 1983). The same 
argument may be posed for differences between landmark names and country 
names. Experiment 4.4 aimed to identify whether conceptual specificity could be 
responsible for the differences in cross-modal facilitation found in Experiment 4.1 . 
Experiment 4.4 
Experiment 4.4 investigated names derived from a conceptual hierarchy. It might 
be argued that people's names and names of landmarks are sub-ordinate labels 
whereas country names are more likely to be names belonging to a base level 
hierarchy. To test whether hierarchical differences could account for differences 
in cross modal facilitation, highly specific names (dog breeds) were compared to 
a set of very general (animal) names using the cross modal methodology. If high 
degrees of specificity are responsible for cross modality priming then significant 
cross modal facilitation would be expected for the subordinate dog breed names, 
but not for the general animal breed names. 
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Method 
The design of the experiment was adapted from the previous experiments. As in 
Experiment 4.1, within modality and cross modality priming were compared 
between participants and the effect of priming was a within participants factor. 
As in the previous experiment regarding name frequency, an additional within-
participants factor was introduced, that of name (specific-dog breeds, general-
animals). The numbers of critical stimuli were doubled, so that there were 18 
critical items in each primed and unprimed set. Half of these items were dog 
breed names and half were animal names (see Appendix 5 for a list of the critical 
stimuli). The number of filler and unfamiliar items were increased accordingly 
(half of the items represented general names and half represented specific 
names). In the prime phase there were 90 trials. 18 critical items to be primed, 
plus 27 filler items and 45 unfamiliar items. In the test phase of the experiment 
there were also 90 trials: 36 critical items (18, primed items, 18 unprimed items), 
9 filler items and 45 unfamiliar items. Each phase of the experiment was 
preceded by ten practice trials. Participants made a familiarity decision in both 
phases of the experiment. Therefore the design and procedure was the same as 
Experiment 4.3, except the factor of word frequency had been replaced with 
conceptual specificity. 
PartiCipants 
Twenty eight participants (6 male and 22 female) took part in the experiment. The 
age of partiCipants ranged from 18 to 50 years with a mean age of 31 years. 
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Results 
Table 4.4 Mean Reaction Times and Response Accuracy (out of 9) for 
Experiment 4.4. 
Familiarity Decision 
Dog breed names 
Visual - Visual 
Auditory - Visual 
Animal names 
Visual - Visual 











Figure 4.4 Mean proportional facilitation as a function of type of 
name and prime task modality. Error bars indicate the 95% 
0.25..., confidence interval for the effect of prime task modality. 
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the mean proportional facilitation for animal name and dog 
breed name stimuli for within and cross modality presentation. A table of mean 
reaction times and error rates can be found in the table above. As in the previous 
experiments a proportional score was calculated, and ANOVA was performed by 
participants and by items. There was a significant main effect of modality 
F1(1,26) = 10.42, p < .01; F2(1,34) = 3.95, p = .055 The main effect of name type 
was not significant F1(1,26) < 1; F2(1,34) = 1.84, p = .18. The interaction 
between modality and stimulus was not significant F1(1,26) < 1; F2(1,34) < 1. 
An analysis of the raw reaction time data was also carried out. With ANOVA by 
participants, taking prime task modality as a between-participants factor with 
name type and priming as within-participant factors (identified with the suffix 1). 
An analysis by items was also performed taking prime task modality and priming 
as within-items comparison and taking name type as a between-items factor 
(identified with the suffix 2). The comparison pertinent to the experimental 
hypothesis concerns the interaction term. The interaction between prime task 
modality and priming was significant in the by-participants analysis F1(1,26) = 
7.01, p < .01; F2( 1,34) = 2.86, P = .09. The interaction between prime task 
modality, name type, and priming was not significant F1(1,26) <1; F2(1,34) = 2.26, 
p =.14. Simple main effects were used to explore this interaction. The effect of 
priming was significant for both types of names following the visually presented 
prime task (dog names F1(1,26) = 18.6, p < .01; F2(1,34) = 10.87, P < .02; 
animal names F1(1,26) = 4.29, p < .04; F2(1,34) < 1). The effect of priming 
following the auditorily presented prime task was not significant (80th F1S < 1; 
F2's < 1.5, All p'S> .22). 
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Discussion of Experiment 4.4 
The results clearly show that neither specific names of dog breeds or general 
names of animals produce cross modal facilitation. The lack of priming cannot be 
attributed to a lack of power as the same stimuli produced significant facilitation 
when the prime phase and the test phase were presented within the same 
modality. The interpretation of Experiment 4.4 must be that the differences in the 
cross modal effects produced for the landmark and the country name stimuli, 
cannot be attributed to an effect of conceptual specificity. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that conceptual specificity does not produce the 
differences in facilitation found with the landmark names and country names. This 
finding refutes Durso and O'Sullivan's notion of conceptual specificity of people's 
names. In spite of changes to conceptual specificity, names taken from different 
levels of a conceptual hierarchy do not produce differences in cross-modal 
priming. The data also indicate that the idea that the characteristics of proper 
name processing occur due them being highly specific concrete entities 
(Damasio et al. 1995) is unlikely. The dog breed names are highly specific and 
refer to concrete entities. These data also confirm that common names do not 
produce facilitation following cross modality presentation. 
Experiment 4.5 
Some authors have noted that some proper names (such as city names and 
country names) can be used as adjectives as well as proper names. This 
flexibility of use has been identified as a possible reason why there might be a 
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category specific sparing in proper name anomia. The next hypothesis to explore 
was that of "adjectivisation" which can be translated directly into experimental 
study. Bredart (1999, personal communication) has conducted two experimental 
studies of concerning adjectivisation. The first experiment showed that people 
were more prone to tip-of-the-tongue states when naming people with non-
adjectivizable names than when naming people with adjectivizable names. The 
adjectivized and non-adjectivized names were matched with respect to a number 
of factors such as person familiarity, AOA, number of phonemes etc. However, 
Bredart indicates that frequency of use is difficult to control for with this kind of 
stimulus set. Bredart has also acknowledged that for adjectivized names, one 
should take into account the frequency of use of the name itself but also of the 
derived adjective. The frequency of use of the derived adjective is presumably 
zero for non-adjectivised names, but not for adjectivised names. It is possible that 
the Tip-of-the-Tongue phenomena that were found may have occurred due to 
adjectivisation itself or to a difference in the frequency of use. Bredart conducted 
an additional experiment with the people's names presented in the cross-modality 
priming paradigm. The two manipulated factors were the modality of 
presentation and the kind of names (adjectivised vs. non-adjectivised). Cross-
modality priming was found in the name recognition task, but the effect occurred 
for both types of names (both the adjectivised names and the non-adjectivised 
names). In summary, evidence to support the notion that adjectivisation and 
flexible use are the reasons why there is no cross-modal facilitation. A more 
pertinent explanation may be found when one considers the nature of identity. 
Unlike proper names that label an individual identity, words (such as country 
names) that could be used as adjectives would not necessarily require 
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processing via the token marker. Words that can be used as adjectives as well 
as proper names, would require much more general links between the semantic 
system and the lemma cross modal facilitation would not be expected for these 
stimuli. 
A direct comparison was not possible for country names, as all country names 
could be used as adjectives. Making a direct comparison between country 
names and a different category of proper name would lead to confounding. 
Therefore the most suitable stimuli for this investigation were city names. Many 
city names are readily known and used as adjectives (e.g. Venice-
Venetian, Canton-Cantonese). In contrast, there are some city names that do not 
readily form adjectives (Vancouver, Amsterdam). 
Method 
The design and procedure was the same as Experiment 4.4, except that the 
animal and dog name stimuli were replaced with city names. One set of country 
names also had a commonly known adjectival form, and the other set were not 
well known as adjectives. See Appendix 6 for a list of the experimental stimuli. 
Participants 
Twenty eight participants (3 male and 25 female) took part in the experiment. The 
age of participants ranged from 18 to 50 years with a mean age of 32 years. 
Results 
As in the previous experiments a proportional score was calculated, and ANOVA 
was performed by participants and by items. Figure 4.5 illustrates the mean 
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proportional facilitation for city names in both the within and cross modality 
presentation. Mean reaction times and error rates can be found in Table 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 Mean proportional facilitation for city names as a function of 
adjectivisation and prime task modality. Error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence interval for the effect of prime task modality. 
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Table 4.4 Mean RT and Response Accuracy (out of 9) for Experiment 4.4 
Familiarity Decision 
City - Adjective names 
Visual - Visual 
Auditory - Visual 
City Non-adjective names 
Visual - Visual 










There was a significant main effect of modality F1(1 ,26) = 4.75, p< .05; F2(1 ,34) = 
20.78, P < .01 indicating that within-modality presentation produced greater 
priming. The effect of stimulus type was not significant F1(1,26) < 1; F2(1,34) < 
1. This indicated that there were no differences in processing for the two stimuli 
types. The interaction between modality and stimulus was not significant 
F1(1 ,26) <1; F2(1 ,34) <1. 
An analysis of the raw reaction times was also carried out. The interaction 
between modality and priming was significant F1(1 ,26) = 4.2, P < .05; F2(1,34) = 
15.63, P < .01. Interactions involving the factor of stimulus type were not 
significant (All F's > 2.6, All p's <.1). Simple main effects were used to explore 
the interactions. The effect of priming following the auditorily presented prime 
task is of particular interest in the current experiment. No significant priming 
occurred following the auditory prime task for any type of city names 
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(Adjectivisable: F(1,26) < 1; F(1,34) < 1; Non Adjectivisable: F(1,26) = 2.86, 
P < .1; F(1 ,26) <1). 
Discussion of Experiment 4.5 
The present experiment found no reliable cross modal priming for city names, 
and there were no differences in facilitation between city names that could form 
well known adjectives compared to those known only in their proper name form. 
General Discussion of Cross-modal Experiments 
Experiments 4.1 - 4.5 were all concerned with cross modal facilitation. 
Experiment 4.1 found cross-modal facilitation for people's names and landmark 
names but not for country names. Cross-modal facilitation was not found when 
object names were presented for lexical decision. All three types of proper 
names that were tested are unique - and portray a single entity. This suggests 
that the notion of proper names processing being attributed solely to uniqueness 
is not adequate. The differences in processing cannot be accounted for in terms 
of meaninglessness, as landmark names often contain information about the 
nature of the place (for example Tower Bridge is a bridge etc.). In this case 
cross-modal facilitation would not be expected for the landmark stimuli. 
Therefore meaningfulness alone cannot account for these data. Experiment 4.2 
indicated that the differences in cross-modal facilitation for landmark names and 
country names were robust. Experiment 4.3 found no evidence that the presence 
of cross-modal facilitation could be attributed to name frequency. 
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Experiment 4.4 identified that the differences in cross-modal facilitation could not 
be attributed simply to the hierarchical structure of a conceptual category. 
Neither general names or highly specific animal names produced cross-modal 
facilitation. Finally, Experiment 4.5 investigated whether the lack of cross-modal 
facilitation found for country names, could be related to their ability to be used as 
adjectives. Two different classes of city names were compared using the cross-
modal presentation. No differences were found between city names that were 
known as both proper names and adjectives, compared to a set known only as 
proper names. No cross-modal facilitation was found for any of the city names. 
Data therefore indicated that the way in which names can be used was unlikely to 
account for the lack of priming found for the country name stimuli. However, an 
interesting follow on to these cross-modal experiments would be to present 
country names in their adjectivised form (e.g. Italian, Mancunian etc). In line with 
the data from Experiment 4.5 no cross-modal priming would be expected, as a 
name familiarity decision to such items would be taken at the level of the lemma, 
and would not require access to the token marker. 
The data contained in this chapter indicate that not all proper names produce 
consistent processing. The data may indicate that it is not proper names per se, 
but pure referencing expressions that require processing via a token marker in 
memory. However one must consider how to form a test of whether an item is 
truly a pure referencing expression. 
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Chapter 5 
Facilitation following Name Production 
The experiments in the previous chapter indicated that there may be differences 
in the processing characteristics of different categories of proper name. If there 
are indeed differences in the representation of different categories of proper 
noun, these differences should also be apparent in other paradigms. Valentine, 
Hollis and Moore (1998) provided evidence that producing someone's name in 
response to seeing their face facilitated a subsequent name familiarity decision to 
the same person's written name. As a familiar face is encountered, the 
appropriate token recognition unit that codes for the visual image would become 
active (see Figure 1). In turn, the corresponding token marker would become 
active and pass activation onto the appropriate lemma. Following lemma 
selection, the phonology of the name would be retrieved and passed for 
articulation. A subsequent name familiarity decision task requires activation to 
pass between the lemma and the identity information represented at the token 
marker. As both of these tasks require processing between the token marker 
and lemma, it is predicted that naming the face of a celebrity would produce an 
effect of repetition on a subsequent name familiarity decision to the same 
person's name. 
Facilitation is not produced if the prime task involved a face familiarity decision, 
rather than name production. A familiarity decision to a face does not require the 
lemma to become activated. Therefore, a face familiarity decision is not expected 
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to prime a subsequent name familiarity decision. In this case the prime task only 
requires processing between the token recognition unit and the token marker, 
whereas the task during the test phase requires processing between the token 
marker and the lemma. 
Similarly, if the test phase task required name production task rather than a 
name familiarity decision, the locus of priming would be placed at the lexeme. 
Consequently, a different set of predictions emerge when the test phase requires 
name production, rather than the name familiarity decision task. Studies that are 
based on these predictions were reported in Chapter 3. 
Valentine et al. (1998) did not report any new evidence on facilitation from 
picture naming as a prime task for common nouns. Evidence reveals mixed 
findings regarding repetition following name production. Production of an 
everyday object name does not prime a subsequent lexical decision to the same 
item's name (e.g. Morton, 1979; Winnick & Daniel, 1970; Scarborough, Gerard & 
Cortese, 1979). In contrast, name production has been found to benefit explicit 
recognition of the same item's name (e. g. Park et aI., 1998). 
Similar processing for all proper names could be expected if all the sub-
categories of proper name are considered to have a similar cognitive 
architecture. Variations in the processing of sub-categories of proper name may 
indicate that differences in their representation exist. It may also provide a basis 




Experiment 5.1 aimed to replicate the original findings of Valentine et al. (1998) 
using people's faces and names as stimuli. In addition the study was extended to 
investigate the facilitation produced when other categories of proper names 
served as stimuli (pictures and names of famous people and landmarks, images 
of maps and names of countries). The experiment also included pictures of 
objects and their names as stimuli. In line with the original hypothesis, it was 
predicted that a face naming task would prime a subsequent name familiarity 
decision when people's names were used as stimuli. The facilitation occurs as 
both face naming and name familiarity decision to people's names are tasks that 
require processing between the token marker and the lemma. Thus, any 
facilitation produced following the name production prime task would be 
comparable to that observed when the same item was repeated for a name 
familiarity decision during the prime and test phase. In contrast, the face 
familiarity decision does not require processing between the token marker and 
the lemma, and therefore no priming is expected. 
Object picture naming followed by lexical decision does not involve processing 
via a token marker. Although picture naming involves processing via the 
conceptual system, it operates via diffuse links, and not via a token marker. A 
lexical decision to a common name can be made on the basis of activation of the 
lemma alone, and does not require access to the conceptual system. Therefore 
no comparable facilitation was expected when an object naming task was 
followed with a lexical decision task to the same items name. 
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Given the findings of the cross-modality experiments reported in Chapter 4, the 
processing characteristics of country names are uncertain. If the lack of cross-
modality priming in Chapter 4 occurred due to differences in cognitive 
architecture, then it is follows that analogous findings would be apparent in the 
name production experiments; the production of a country name would not prime 
a familiarity decision to a visually presented country name. 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and forty people (54 male and 186 female) participated in the 
experiment. The age of the participants ranged between 19 and 45 years with an 
average of 21 years. 
Stimuli I Apparatus 
Two sets of 9 critical items were formed for each noun category, as for 
Experiment 4.1 (see Appendix 3). The pictorial stimuli were formed by selecting 
a black and white digitised image for each item. The image was 6cm by 6cm in 
the centre of the visual display. An additional selection of 41 images (for each 
noun category) were selected as familiar filler items for the picture naming task. 
A further selection of 25 unfamiliar images for the picture familiarity prime task 
were also found as stimuli in the picture familiarity decision task. For the 
category of people, images were simply faces of celebrities and unknown 
people. For the category of landmarks, images were of famous and unfamiliar 
buildings, monuments etc. Equal proportions of buildings, bridges, monuments, 
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natural landmarks were assigned to serve as critical, filler and unfamiliar items. 
For the category of countries a selection of blank map outlines were employed 
as stimuli (names of cities, towns etc. were removed). On each map, an arrow 
indicated which country was "to be named". Maps were made "unfamiliar" for use 
in the picture familiarity decision, by distorting coastline and positioning the arrow 
so that the countries in question were no longer recognisable. For the everyday 
object stimuli a series of line drawing were selected. The unfamiliar picture 
items were non-objects, taken from a study by Kroll and Potter (1984). For 
the test phase, a selection of filler and unfamiliar names were formed as in 
Experiment 4.1. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design with three factors: noun category (people, 
landmarks, countries, objects) and prime task (picture naming, picture familiarity 
decision and name familiarity decision or lexical decision) were between-
participants factors. Priming (primed vs. unprimed) was a within- participants 
factor. 
For each noun category, there were two sets of 9 critical items. One of these 
sets appeared in both the prime phase and the test phase. Responses to these 
items formed the data for the primed items. The other set of 9 critical items 
appeared only in the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for 
the unprimed items. With the exception of the primed items, no other items were 
repeated between prime and test . The assignment of items to the primed and 
unprimed conditions was counterbalanced across participants for each 
combination of prime phase task. 
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The experiment consisted of two phases, a prime phase and a test phase. 
For the prime phase, participants who received proper name stimuli, carried out 
either a picture familiarity decision, a picture naming task, or a name familiarity 
task. Participants who received the object names performed a picture familiarity 
decision, a picture naming task or a lexical decision. The prime phase for the 
picture naming conditions consisted of a total of 50 images (9 primed critical 
items and the remaining items as familiar filler items). The prime phase for the 
picture familiarity decision consisted of 9 images of the critical items (primed) 
16 filler (familiar) items and 25 unfamiliar items. The prime phase for the name 
familiarity and lexical decision consisted of the name of each item presented in 
upper case 14 point, Arial font in the centre of the computer screen. In keeping 
with the other two prime tasks the presentation consisted of 50 items: 9 critical 
items (primed) 16 filler familiar names and 25 unfamiliar names. 
The test phase was presented visually to all participants as a name familiarity 
decision for the proper name groups and as a lexical decision for the object name 
group. The test phase took the same format for all of the noun groups. The 
written names were presented in upper case 14 point, Arial font on a PC screen 
as in Experiment 4.1. The participants' responses were recorded using key 
presses on the keyboard. The experiment was programmed using Micro-
Experimental Laboratory (MEL2). Reaction times were recorded with millisecond 
accuracy. 
Procedure 
Participants were allocated to one of the noun categories and took part in a prime 
phase followed by a test phase. Each phase was preceded by ten practice trials. 
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During the prime phase participants either carried out the picture naming task, 
the picture familiarity task, or the name familiarity task (lexical decision in the 
case of the object stimuli). All stimuli were presented on the computer screen in 
a random order. In the picture naming condition, participants were asked to 
articulate the name of the item, as quickly as possible. If the participant was 
found to be in a tip-of-the-tongue state, the first phoneme was given as a prompt. 
Once the participant had given their vocal response, the experimenter recorded 
the accuracy of the response by key press. For the picture familiarity decision, 
participants saw the series of stimuli, and were asked to make a familiarity 
decision to each item by key press as quickly as possible. In the name familiarity 
decision, participants were shown the selection of famous and unfamiliar names 
and asked make a familiarity decision by key press as quickly as possible. The 
group of participants who received the object stimuli, were asked to make a 
lexical decision by key press as quickly and accurately as possible. 
The prime phase was followed by the test phase which involved a name 
familiarity decision (or lexical decision) presented on computer. As in the previous 
experiments, partiCipants were not informed of this additional task. Each of the 
experimental trials consisted of a 250msec tone followed after 500msec by 
presentation of the stimulus. In each trial, a name was presented and participants 
were instructed to make a familiarity decision (or lexical decision) by pressing 
'yes' or 'no' using the keys provided. Participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible. The participants response terminated the 
display of the stimulus. 
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Results 
Responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test 
phase were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was only included in 
the analyses if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test 
phase. The minimum number of critical primed items contributing to each cell of 
the analysis was 5. The mean RT and accuracy of responses to the critical items 
are given in Table 5.1. A proportional facilitation score was calculated for each 
data point (unprimed RT - primed RT I unprimed RT). The proportional facilitation 

















Figure 5.1 Mean proportional facilitation as a function of prime task and 
noun type. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the effect 
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Face Familiarity 714 (8.4) 715 (8.2) 
Face Naming 679 (8.5) 744 (8.2) 
Name Familiarity 617 (7.9) 692 (7.7) 
Landmark names 
Picture Familiarity 707 (8.1 ) 716 (7.5) 
Picture Naming 830 (8.2) 940 (7.9) 
Name Familiarity 689 (8.4) 798 (7.8) 
Country names 
Picture Familiarity 543 (7.1) 537 (8.4) 
Picture Naming 527 (8.0) 536 (8.9) 
Name Familiarity 498 (8.1) 539 (8.4) 
Lexical Decision - Object Names 
Picture Familiarity 567 (8.3) 588 (8.2) 
Picture Naming 609 (8.6) 608 (8.8) 
Lexical Decision 519 (8.2) 573 (8.8) 
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The proportional scores were subjected to ANOVA taking participants as the 
random factor with prime task and noun category as a between-participants 
factor (identified by the suffix 1). A separate ANOVA was carried out taking items 
as the random factor with prime task as a within-items factor and noun category 
as a between-items factor (identified with the suffix 2). The main effect of noun 
category was significant for participants only Fl(3,228) = 3.37, p < .01; F2(3,68), < 
1. The main effect of prime task was significant F1(2,228) = 12.43, p < .01; 
F2(2,136) = 8.37, p < .01. The interaction between prime task and noun 
category was marginally significant Fl(6,228) = 1.97, p = .07; F2(6,136) = 1.93, 
p = .07. 
As the test of the experimental hypothesis concerned particular aspects of the 
interaction, simple main effects were used to determine whether the effect of 
prime task differed for the categories of noun. The effect of prime task was 
significant for the category of people's names in the by-participants analysis and 
marginally significant in the by-items analysis Fl(2,228) = 5.92, p < .01; F2(2, 136) 
= 2.80, P = .06. The effect of prime task for landmark names was significant 
Fl(2,228) = 5.56, p < .01; F2(2, 136) = 3.43, P < .05. The effect of prime task was 
not significant for country names analysis F1(2,228) = 2.40, p = .09; F2(2,136)< 1. 
The effect of prime task for object names was significant only in the participant 
analysis F1(2,228) = 4.69, p < .01; F2(2,136) < 1. 
A further comparison was carried out which included data only from the picture 
naming and picture familiarity prime tasks. The interaction between prime task 
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and priming was significant F1(3,152) = 2.82, p < .05; F2(3,68) = 3.23, p < .05. 
Simple main effects indicated that the interaction between prime task and priming 
was significant for the people's name stimuli F1(1, 152) = 6.64, P < .01; F2(1,68) = 
3.79 P < .05. and landmark names F1(1, 152) = 4.17, P < .05; F2(1,68) = 9.31 p < 
.01. The interaction was not significant for country names F1(1, 152) < 1; 
F2(1,68) < 1, or object names F1(1,152) = 1.46, p = .22; F2(1,68) = 1.13, p = .29. 
An analysis of the raw reaction times was also carried out. For brevity, data for 
the name production prime task was analysed taking partiCipants as the random 
factor with noun category as a between- participants comparison and the effect of 
priming as a within-participants factor (identified by the suffix 1). An analysis 
was also carried out taking items as the random factor with noun category as a 
between-items comparison and the effect of priming as a within-items factor 
(identified by the suffix 2). The interaction between noun category and priming 
was significant F1(3,76) = 4.65, p <.01; F2(3,68) = 4.80, p < .01. Simple main 
effects were used to explore the interaction. There was a significant effect of 
priming for people's names F1(1,76) = 6.72, p <.01; F2(1,68) = 9.73, p < .01 and 
landmark names F1(1,76) = 21.33, p <.01; F2(1,68) = 22.47, p < .01. However, 
the effect of priming was not significant for country names or object names (All 
F's < 1). 
The patterns of facilitation produced following the face naming prime task and the 
landmark naming prime task were similar. When country name stimuli were 
produced, no priming occurred and processing was similar to that observed 
when the naming of object pictures was followed by a lexical decision. 
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Discussion of Experiment 5.1 
Experiment 5.1 has shown that naming a famous face or landmark facilitates a 
subsequent familiarity decision to that same item's name. In contrast, producing 
a country name did not provide similar facilitation. Furthermore, naming a picture 
of an everyday object did not facilitate a lexical decision to the same item's name. 
These findings are consistent with those found with the cross-modality 
presentations reported in Chapter 4. Once again there were differences in the 
unprimed baseline for the different categories of noun. As discussed previously, 
these differences can be derived from the model but may also be attributable to 
differences in word length across the various noun categories. In view of the 
results of Experiments regarding word frequency (Chapter 4) it is unlikely that 
the pattern of facilitation observed could be accounted for by word frequency 
when there are changes in the presentation domain between prime and test. 
Although recent research has produced evidence to suggest that facilitation can 
cross-domain between words and pictures for common names, support for this 
has not been found in the present data. Park et al. (1998) used a recognition 
task (have you seen this item previously? yes/no) following a naming task and a 
word stem completion task. In contrast the experiments reported here employed 
a name familiarity decision (is this a name of a familiar item? yes/no). The 
recognition task requires explicit recall whereas the name familiarity decision is a 
test of implicit memory. These data support the view based on earlier research 
that naming a picture of a common object does not facilitate subsequent 
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recognition (lexical decision) of the same items name (e.g. Morton, 1979; 
Winnick & Daniel, 1970; Scarborough et a/. 1979). 
In both Experiments 4.1 and 5.1, country names show processing characteristics 
that are more akin to common names than with the other proper name stimuli that 
have been used in these experiments. This finding can be explained by the 
model proposed by Valentine et al. (1996) if it is assumed that country names 
have a diffuse connectivity between the lemma and the conceptual system. If this 
is the case, the lemma rather than the token marker is the node that first allows 
access to the conceptual system. Therefore, under the processing assumptions 
made, a familiarity decision to a country name can be based on the activity of its 
lemma. Consequently, no priming following name production is found for 
country name stimuli presented in a name familiarity decision task, as there are 
no processing pathways in common to the prime and test task 
It might be argued that the images of maps and landmarks were not as 
memorable as the landmark pictures in terms of visual familiarity or complexity. 
These facets of the visual image may have made the landmark stimuli prone to 
an episodic influence compared to the country name stimuli (although note that 
the images were not presented during the test task). In order to determine 
whether such a factor could account for the differences in the processing of 
landmark and country names an additional experiment was performed. 
Experiment 5.2 required participants to produce landmark or country names from 
the same pictorial stimulus. If differences in facilitation from production of the 
landmarks and country names were still apparent, these data would provide 
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further support for the idea that processing of names of landmarks and countries 
do indeed differ in their underlying cognitive architecture. 
Experiment 5.2 
The aim of Experiment 5.2 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 5.1 for 
country names and landmark names. The experimental design was adapted so 
that the participants produced either a country name or a landmark name to the 
same picture. This would identify whether the differences between the images 
used in Experiment 5.1 were responsible for the pattern of facilitation observed 
for country and landmark names. The requirement for participants to be able to 
produce both types of response reduced the number of suitable items that were 
available. Therefore an intervening task was performed between the prime 
phase and the test phase in an attempt to reduce the possibility of episodic 
mediation of any facilitation attributable to repetition. In light of the results of 
Experiment 5.1, it was predicted that a landmark naming task would prime a 
subsequent name familiarity decision when landmark names were used as 
stimuli. The facilitation would occur as both the landmark naming and name 
familiarity decision tasks require processing via the token marker-lemma link. In 
contrast, familiarity decision to a country is now assumed only to require 
processing as far as the lemma. Therefore no comparable facilitation was 
expected following the production of country names. Differences in facilitation for 
the landmark and country names would provide further support for the idea that 





Twenty eight participants were tested. Data from four participants were 
discarded as these participants were unable to perform the naming prime task 
successfully. Data from 24 (5 male and 19 female) people contributed to the 
analysis. The age of these participants ranged between 19 and 48 years with an 
average of 32 years. 
Stimuli I Apparatus 
Two sets of 9 critical items were formed, by selecting a black and white digitised 
image of a famous landmark from different countries around the world (for 
example - the Eiffel Tower - France, Buckingham Palace - England, Statue of 
Uberty - United States). Each item was selected from a different country so that 
no two stimuli (critical or filler item) depicted places from the same country (See 
Appendix 7). In addition to the critical items, a selection of 6 images of the 
same dimensions were selected as familiar filler items for naming. The 
dimensions of the images were the same as in Experiment 5.1 . 
A selection of 50 unfamiliar images were chosen for the intervening task. Half 
of these images depicted natural landscapes (such as mountains, forests and 
seascapes) and the other half depicted 'man-made' structures (statues buildings 
and bridges). None of the unfamiliar pictures was identifiable, neither could they 
be attributed to any particular country. A further ten picture items were used for 
practice. 
140 
For the test phase, a selection of filler familiar and unfamiliar country and 
landmark names were formed as in Experiment 5.1. Eighteen stimuli 
corresponded to the two sets of critical items, together with 7 filler familiar items 
not presented in any other part of the experiment. Twenty five unfamiliar items 
were formed as in Experiment 5.1. A further ten names were used for practice. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design with two factors: prime task (landmark 
naming, country naming) was a between-participants factors. The effect of 
priming (primed, unprimed) was a within-participants factor. 
For each prime task, there were two sets of 9 critical items. One of these sets 
appeared in both the prime phase and the test phase. Responses to these items 
formed the data for the primed items. The other set of 9 critical items appeared 
only in the test phase. Responses to these items formed the data for the 
unprimed items. With the exception of the primed items, no other items were 
repeated between prime and test. The assignment of items to the primed and 
unprimed conditions was counterbalanced across participants for each 
combination of prime phase task. 
The experiment consisted of three phases, a prime phase, an intervening task 
and a test phase. For the prime phase, participants received either the 
landmark naming task or the country naming task. In each case the prime 
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consisted of a total of 15 images (9 primed critical items and the remaining items 
as famous filler items). 
Following the naming trials, all participants received the series of unfamiliar items 
and were asked to perform a man-made/natural decision by key press as quickly 
as possible. 
The test phase was presented visually to all participants as a name familiarity 
decision. Participants who produced landmark names, received landmark 
names during the test phase, and vice-versa. The written names were presented 
in upper case 14 point, Arial font on the PC screen as in Experiment 5.1. The 
participants' responses were recorded using key presses on the keyboard. The 
experiment was programmed using Micro-Experimental Laboratory (MEL2). 
Reaction times were recorded with millisecond accuracy. 
Procedure 
Participants were allocated to either the landmark name or the country name 
group and took part in a prime phase followed by the intervening task and the 
test phase. In the landmark naming condition, participants were asked to 
articulate the specific name of the landmark, as quickly as possible. If the 
participant was found to be in a tip-of-the-tongue state, the first phoneme was 
given as a prompt. Once the participant had given their vocal response, the 
experimenter recorded the accuracy of the response by key press. The country 
naming condition was conducted in the same way, however, participants were 
asked to produce the name of the country where the place could be found. 
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The prime phase was followed by the intervening task. All participants received 
the series of unfamiliar items and were asked to perform a "man-made"f'natural" 
decision by key press as quickly as possible. The 50 items appeared in random 
order. 
Finally the test phase was presented which involved a name familiarity decision. 
The timing and procedure for the prime and test phase was the same as in 
Experiment 5.1 except that participants who produced landmark names 
performed the familiarity decision with landmark names and conversely 
participants who had produced country names performed the familiarity decision 
with the country name stimuli. Once again participants were not informed given 
prior warning of this additional task. The test phase was preceded by ten 
practice trials. All stimuli were presented on the computer screen in a random 
order. 
Results 
Responses to the nine critical primed and unprimed items made during the test 
phase were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was only included in 
the analyses if the correct response was given in both the prime and the test 
phase. The mean RT and accuracy of responses to the target items are given in 
the Table 5.2. 
As before a proportional facilitation score was calculated for each data point 
(unprimed RT - primed RT/unprimed RT). The mean proportional facilitation is 

























Figure 5.2 Mean proportional facilitation as a function of prime task. 
Error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the effect of prime 
0.15 ., task. 





Table 5.2 Mean RT and Response Accuracy (out of 9) for Experiment 5.2. 
Primed Unprimed 
Landmark names 727 (6.8) 805 (6.7) 
Country names 556 (7.8) 565 (8.0) 
The proportional scores were subjected to ANOVA taking participants as the 
random factor with prime task as a between participants factor (identified by the 
suffix 1). A separate ANOVA was carried out taking items as the random factor 
with prime task as a between items factor (identified with the suffix 2). The main 
effect of prime task was significant F1(1 ,22) = 7.67, P < .01; F2(1,34) = 4.43, P 
<.05. indicating that the proportional facilitation that followed the production of 
country names was significantly different from that found after the production of 
landmark names. The 95% confidence interval in Figure 5.2 indicates that 
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facilitation following name production occurred only when landmark names were 
produced. 
An analysis of the raw reaction times was also carried out, taking participants as 
the random factor with noun category as a between-participants comparison and 
the effect of priming as a within-participants factor (identified by the suffix 1), and 
also taking items as the random factor (identified by the suffix 2). The interaction 
between noun category and priming was significant F1(1,22) = 9.77, p <.01; 
F2(1,34) = 5.50, p < .02. Simple main effects were used to explore the 
interaction. There was a significant effect of priming for landmark names F1(1 ,22) 
= 24.79, P <.01; F2(1,34) = 10.90, p < .01. However, the effect of priming was 
not significant for country names (Both F's < 1). 
Discussion of Experiment 5.2 
The results clearly indicate that producing the name of a landmark facilitates the 
subsequent familiarity decision to the same item's name. This finding contrasts 
with producing country names, where no comparable facilitation was found. In 
this experiment the verbal responses made during the prime phase were 
produced in response to seeing the same picture. Thus, it is unlikely that 
differences in the quality of the pictorial images (for the landmark and country 
stimuli) that were used in Experiment 5.1 were responsible for the lack of 
facilitation observed for country names in that experiment. Similarly, the findings 
of the current experiment cannot be attributed to one class of image being more 
memorable than the other. The vocal responses were made to the same stimuli 
with noun category manipulated as a within-participant factor. Therefore 
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differences in performance between groups of participants cannot account for the 
differences in priming observed. 
The intervening task was used to minimise the influence of episodic retrieval, 
making episodic explanations untenable. The results of this experiment therefore 
support the interpretations made in Chapter 4 and following Experiment 5.1. 
General Discussion of Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 
Experiment 5.1 found that producing the name of a person or a landmark 
facilitated a subsequent name familiarity decision to the same item's name. 
These findings contrasted with those found when the same tasks were presented 
with country name stimuli. Country names did not produce priming following 
name production. Production of a common name (object name) did not prime a 
subsequent lexical decision to the same item's name. Experiment 5.2 replicated 
the findings for the landmark and country names, and indicated that the lack of 
priming found for the country name stimuli could not be attributed to differences 
in the images used for naming in the prime phase of Experiment 5.1 . 
What implications do these data have for theories of proper name processing? 
These findings are difficult to reconcile with an explanation of uniqueness, as 
peoples, names, landmark names and country names are all unique (for 
example, there is only one Bill Clinton, one Statue of Liberty and one United 
States of America. In spite of their uniqueness these stimuli produce different 
cognitive phenomena. 
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Another theory regarding proper names is that that they differ from common 
names with respect of meaningfulness. However, landmark names often contain 
a greater degree of meaning compared with people's names and country names 
which can be considered arbitrary. For example, The Eiffel Tower is a tower and 
Tower Bridge is a bridge, next to the Tower of London). In spite of varying 
degrees of meaninglessness, landmark names and people's names produce 
similar cognitive phenomena. 
However, if the key to proper name processing is the fact that they are pure 
referencing expressions, then one would expect that only sub-categories of 
proper name that have pure reference would produce phenomena that we usually 
associate with proper names. Both landmark names and people's names can be 
deemed to be pure referencing expressions, whereas country names can be 
used in a variety of different ways, act as adjectives and can be considered far 
more like concepts than the other classes of proper names that have been 
considered. So what appears to differ between the categories of proper name, is 
the nature of identity - the part of meaning that psycho-linguists term "sense" 
rather than simply "meaningfulness". 
The names of people and landmarks are both pure referencing expressions; they 
also produce similar priming phenomena. The data suggest that it is pure 
reference that may be captured in a model such as that proposed by Valentine et 
al. (1996). According to this premise, country names do not appear to produce 
cross-domain facilitation as their linkages are diffuse and indirect, due to their 
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conceptual nature. Accordingly, due to the generality of their links between the 
conceptual system and the lemma, access would not require mediation via a 
token marker. The data therefore comply with the model proposed by Valentine, 
Brennen and Bredart (1996) extending the role of the token marker to some 
classes of proper name other than people's names (i.e. landmarks). The data 
also demonstrate that the role of a token marker is not universal for all categories 
of proper name (i.e. not country names). 
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Chapter 6 
Picture-word Interference and Lexicalisation 
One issue that has consequences for the model by Valentine et al. is the nature 
of organisation within the semantic lexicon. Is the lexicon categorically 
organised, and if so to what extent? In the diagrammatic model of the cognitive 
architecture proposed by Valentine and colleagues, the semantic lexicon (lemma) 
is portrayed with categorical organisation; one part of the lemma is involved with 
the representation of people's names, whereas another part of the lexicon is 
involved with the representation of common names (note the dotted line which 
represents the division in Figure 6.1 below). 














lommas lor I~ 
people's names 
Figure 6.1. The Organisation of the Lexicon (lemmas). The dotted 
line reflects the categorical organisation. 
This organisation may generally relate to the notion that there are reports of 
selective sparing or deficit in these categories of words in neuropsychological 
impairment. Further support of this can be found in models of speech production 
that assume that the lexicon is organised in terms of syntactic and semantic 
properties of words (e.g. Levelt, 1989). Nevertheless, the status of names in the 
lexicon is unclear, and the lemma is under-specified in two respects: 
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Firstly, the nature of connectivity at the lemma has been characterised in a 
number of different ways. According to models based on the lAC architecture 
(Bredart et a!. ,1995; Burton & Bruce, 1992) both excitatory and inhibitory 
connections exist. Each level of representation is portrayed as a separate 
module or pools of units. Excitatory connections project to and from the lemma 
pool, joining the lexical representations found in the lemma with related 
representations in other domains. These are the connections concerned with 
spreading activation. In order for competition to occur, inhibitory connections 
exist between all nodes within the same pool of units. Thus, names within the 
lexical pool of units inhibit one another (e.g. Valentine, Hollis & Moore, 1999). 
Models of speech production are also based on spreading activation. However, 
each theory holds different views regarding the nature of lexical selection. Only 
the model of speech production proposed by Harley (1993) includes inhibitory 
connections within the lemma itself. Roelofs (1999) and Levelt et a!. (1999) 
have successfully shown that lexical selection can be explained in terms of a 
changing threshold. According to these explanations, proportions between 
active compared to inactive lemmas determine a threshold for lexical selection. 
In contrast Dell's (1986) model employs no inhibitory mechanism or threshold. 
A further reason why the lemma is under-specified concerns the way that lexical 
items belong to a single syntactic class. People's names are often a lexical 
compound of a first (Christian) name, followed by a surname. It is not 
uncommon to find people whose surname is also known as a common word 
(such as George Bush, Roy Castle etc). At the lemma stage of processing, are 
these words influenced more by their semantic or syntactic properties? Clearly in 
respect of proper names that are a compound the lemma is under specified. 
Valentine et a!. (1996) has characterised the internal structure of the lexicon; the 
proposed organisation being based on empirical research. In respect of 
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familiarity decision task, peoples names that are composed of a word (Such as 
Barbara Castle) were found to prime a lexical decision to the same word 
presented later as a common word (Castle) and vice versa. However, when a 
similar experiment involved speech production the effect was not observed 
(Valentine, Moore & Bredart, 1995). The results were interpreted as evidence that 
early in processing all entries in the lexicon were activated, but once an entry 
had been fully specified only specific routes remained active. 
Valentine et al. (1996) have proposed a lexicon in which lemmas code a name 
















Figure 6.2: The internal structure of the lexicon, showing the 
organisation of the lemmas. Adapted from Valentine, Brennen and 
Bredart (1996). 
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In a series of unpublished studies by Valentine (ESRC: End of Award report, 
1995) the structure of the lexicon was addressed using a semantic priming 
paradigm. If entries within the lexicon are shared one would expect semantic 
priming between a particular word presented as a proper name to a common 
word associated with it. (For example Ruby Wax - Candle). Would seeing the 
written name "Kenneth Baker" activate the meaning for the word baker over a 
short interval? Data suggested that priming may occur between proper names 
and common names. Unfortunately, the results of these studies were unclear 
and of low reliability. It is clear, however, that the lexicon must encompass 
lemmas for all elements of a lexical compound. Furthermore if priming does 
occur between proper names and common names, the internal structure of the 
lexicon may need to be amended. If responses to proper names (a compound 
of a first name and a surname that is also known as a common word) are able to 
prime a common word, then a direct connection must exist between the surname 
lemma, and the lemma for common names. No direct connection exists in the 
diagram provided by Valentine et al (1996). An alternative would be to postulate 
that surnames that are also common words are represented in the common 
name lemma. 
Another way to explore the connectivity at the level of the semantic lexicon would 
be to look at competition rather than priming between two entities with the 
picture-word interference paradigm. Picture-word interference is well established 
as a methodology and is described in Chapter 2. Picture-word interference has 
recently been used to investigate processing during lexicalisation (Cutting & 
Ferreiria, 1999; Damian & Martin, 1999). Shriefers, Meyer & Levelt (expriment 2, 
1990) used a picture-word interference paradigm to investigate lexicalisation and 
name production. This study was a detailed analysis of name retrieval based on 
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the assumption that lexical access involves two distinct stages. First the lemma 
stage provides access to an abstract code that is predominantly influenced by 
semantic and syntactic properties. This is followed by the lexeme stage when 
phonological information is retrieved. Shriefers et al. used a picture-word 
paradigm with the distracter words (related, neutral and unrelated) presented in 
the auditory modality. An initial experiment (Shriefers et al. , experiment 1) was 
used to determine what kind of item should be used to provide an appropriate 
"neutral". They compared silence, white noise and the word "blank". Results 
indicated that white noise did not produce any difference in responses compared 
to silence. In contrast the word "blank" produced interference but this was 
significantly less than that found in the unrelated presentations. They concluded 
that the word "blank" would act as the most appropriate neutral stimulus. In line 
with previous studies, a second experiment established that picture-word 
interference was dependent on the time course of the presentation. With an 
SOA of -150 ms (distracter words commenced presentation 150ms before 
picture) words that had a semantic relationship with the target picture interfered 
with naming. In contrast distracter words that were phonologically related to the 
target picture were found to produce facilitation when the SOA was extended to 
+150 ms. They concluded that there was an initial stage of lexical access (the 
lemma) where only meaning was activated, following by a stage that was mostly 
influenced by phonology. These results supported the two-stage lexical access 
accounts of speech production. They also indicate further support for the locus of 
interference in picture-name paradigm being at the level of the name retrieval. 
One important difference between the study by Shriefers et al. and the other 
studies that have been described is that Shriefers et al. presented the distracter 
word in the auditory modality. One might argue that auditory presentation is 
problematic due to timing. In the classic picture-word interference experiments, 
the distracter and the stimulus appear at exactly the same time. In contrast, 
auditory information has a temporal quality, and determining the point at which 
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the auditory stimulus is first recognised, may be difficult to establish accurately, 
unless a uniqueness point for each stimulus is calculated. However, visual 
presentations of picture-word pairs are also subject to criticism; words have to 
superimposed over the picture, or the placement of the words needs to be 
carefully randomised. Participants may try to use strategies such as a shift in 
visual attention in order to try to avoid reading the words. Although potential 
problems exist for each type of presentation, there appears to be a consensus in 
empirical findings. Semantic relationships affect processing; they have the 
potential to facilitate or interfere with processing. 
Recently, Humphreys, Lloyd-Jones and Fias (1995) have developed a variation 
of the picture-word paradigm, that has been termed post-cued picture naming. 
In this paradigm, participants see two object pictures and after a short interval 
(between 500-1000ms) they are provided with a cue to name only one of them. 
Naming is slower when the two stimuli are semantically related. The effect is 
robust for picture-picture pairs and is also found for picture-word pairs. The 
interference effect is eliminated when the pairing occurs with two words alone, 
and also when the experimental task involves categorisation rather than name 
production. These results were analogous to those found in the classic picture 
word interference paradigm (Underwood, 1976; Rosinski, 1977). The locus of 
interference is attributed to the process of mapping semantic information onto 
names. 
The experiments in this series aim to use picture-word interference to provide 
data from which one is able to infer organisation within the lemma. Initial 
experiments in this chapter, validate the experimental procedure. Then the same 
experimental procedure is used to determine whether the lexicon is organised 
into separate areas for proper names and common names. 
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Relationships 
between proper names and common names were manipulated using people's 
names that were a compound of a first name and a surname that also occurs as 
a common name. The issue that was being addressed was, whether the 
presentation of the related word Bungalow interfered with the naming of Roy 
Castle's face compared to an unrelated word such as Spaghetti. In this example 
a semantic relationship exists between Bungalow and Castle. If interference of 
this nature exists then it would suggest that links between the two 
representations in the lexicon do exist. However, a lack of interference would 
suggest that these representations reside in separate areas of the lexicon. As 
the interference effect depends on the relation between the distracter word and 
the target picture, these relationships can be manipulated and response times 
can be used to determine the nature of connectivity. The basic premise is that 
distracters that share a relationship with the target are highly connected and 
therefore produce more interference than unrelated distracters (Underwood, 
1976; Rosinski, 1977). 
Experiment 6.1 
Experiment 6.1 and 6.2 aimed to use the post-cue picture naming (PCPN) 
procedure to study the competition between two names in the lexicon. 
Humphreys et al. have shown that PCPN occurs in naming tasks when both 
stimuli are presented in pictorial format and also when one stimulus is pictorial 
and the other verbal. Interference in these experiments is attributed to the link 
between the semantic system and the semantic lexicon (lemma). In contrast, no 
such effects are found when both of the stimuli are presented in the verbal 
format. This is consistent with previous research, and indicates that word naming 
can operate via a direct non-semantic route. 
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An initial experiment aimed to validate the PCPN procedure. The experimental 
stimuli were selected exclusively from common name stimuli; pictures and names 
were chosen from everyday objects. 
The original studies of Humphreys et al. manipulated the relation between 
targets and distracters as a between-participants comparison. However, due to 
the small number of proper name stimuli that are viable targets, the effect of 
relation was more viable as a within-participants manipulation. In order to 
validate the within participant's design, Experiment 6.1 conducted the post-cue 
naming solely with object pictures and names. In line with the findings of 
Humphreys et al. it was predicted that slower responses would occur for the 
related pairings compared to the unrelated pairings. 
Method 
Participants 
Twelve participants (one male and eleven females) volunteered to take part in 
this experiment. Ages ranged from 30-55 years. All of the people were 
nationals of the United Kingdom, and were attending an Open University 
Residential School. 
Design 
The experiment was a within-participants factorial design. The first factor was the 
format of the "to be named" target stimulus. Target stimuli were presented in 
either pictorial or verbal format. The relationship between the "to be named" 
stimuli and the item with which they were paired, was also manipulated. In all 
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cases one picture and one word were presented on each trial. There were two 
levels of relation (related, unrelated). The dependent variables were the 
response time (in msec) and accuracy of the verbal responses. 
Materials 
Two sets of picture-word pairs of stimuli were formed. The stimuli pairings were 
made on the basis that the picture and the word could be clearly related or 
unrelated. (for example, related pairings: Ambulance-Helicopter, Elephant-
Kangaroo. Unrelated pairings: Ambulance-Kangaroo, Helicopter-Elephant). 
Each set comprised of ten picture-word pairs. For the related pairings, ten 
pictures (line drawings of 256 x 256 pixels) of everyday objects were paired with 
the name of a semantically related (categorically related but not associated) 
object, to form pairs of picture-word stimuli. An additional ten pairs of related 
pairings were produced by exchanging the pictures with words and vice versa. 
Therefore in total, twenty picture-name pairings formed the "related" type 
presentations. A list of the related stimuli pairs can be found in Appendix 8). 
Twenty "unrelated" pairings were formed by reorganising the pairs of stimuli 
once again, so that there was no longer a relationship between the picture and 
the word. The stimuli were prepared so that each picture-word presented side 
by side in the centre of the screen. All verbal stimuli (names) were presented in 
upper case 14pt Ariel font, and the distance between the word and the edge of 
the picture was 4cm on the visual display. The image of an arrow (pointing left or 
right) was used as a cue for naming. 
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Apparatus 
The experiment was presented on the screen of an IBM compatible PC using 
Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL2) software. Vocal responses were 
recorded using a voice key, attached to a throat microphone. The experimenter 
recorded the accuracy of the vocal response by key press. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were going to take part in an experiment about 
object names. All participants received a series of presentations to familiarise 
them with the stimuli pictures. Pictures of the practice and experimental stimuli 
were presented one by one in a random order for naming. If participants made 
an error, indicated that they were in a TOT state, or said that the image was 
unknown to them, they were given the correct name by the experimenter and 
asked to repeat it out loud. Each item was repeated until participants could 
produce the names successfully. 
Once the participant had completed the familiarisation stage they were presented 
with a block of ten practice trials followed by the block of 80 experimental trials. 
Each of these trials consisted of a pair of stimuli that appeared on the computer 
screen for 900 ms. The stimulus pairing disappeared and a postcue interval of 
600 ms occurred. Then an arrow appeared that pointed either right or left, 
indicating an item to name. The cue arrow remained on the screen until the 
participant made a vocal response. A single trial is portrayed in Figure 6.3 
overleaf. 
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Figure 6.3. The time course of an experimental trial in the postcued 
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After the participant had responded, the experimenter recorded the accuracy of 
the response by key press and then the next trial commenced. Responses were 
recorded as correct or incorrect (naming error/hesitation, misfire). The position of 
the picture/word stimuli (left or right position) and the direction of the arrow cue 
(left or right) pointing was randomised and there was an equal probability that 
the "to be named stimulus" was a picture or a word and that the cue would point 
left or right. There was therefore a total of 80 experimental trials. 40 trials (20 
related, 20 unrelated) where the participant was cued to produce the name from 
a picture of object. Similarly 40 trials where the participant was cued to read the 
name of the object. 
Results 
Correct responses between 300 ms and 5000 ms were subjected to analysis. 
Response times outside of this range were treated as errors. The mean response 
times are plotted in Figure 6.4 overleaf. The mean accuracy of responses by 
participant can be found in Table 6.1. 
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Figure 6.4: Mean RT for postcue naming of picture and word targets, as a 
function of target-distracter relationship. Error bars show the 95% 
confidence interval for the effect of relation. 
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Mean Response Accuracy (out of 10) for Experiment 6.1. 
Naming Picture Targets 
Related 9.0 
Unrelated 8.1 
Naming Word Targets 
Related 8.4 
Unrelated 8.8 
Responses to the picture stimuli in the 'related' presentation were 130 ms slower 
than during the 'unrelated' presentation. A similar trend was found for the word 
stimuli, names produced during the 'related' presentation were 94 ms slower 
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than during the 'unrelated' presentation. The data was analysed by participant 
(identified by the suffix 1) and by item (identified by the suffix 2) using two 
separate ANOVAs, one for the picture naming responses and one for the word 
naming responses. 
For the picture naming responses, the main effect of relation was significant in 
the participants analysis only F1(1,11) = 12.51, p < .01; F2(1,19) <1. For the 
word naming responses, there was a main effect of relation in both analyses 
Fl(1,11) = 17.95, p < .01; F2(1,19) = 12.67, p< .01 
All of the original studies by Humphreys et al. manipulated the effect of relation 
as a between participants factor. In order to identify whether the PCPN is 
sensitive to repetition, and to determine whether the design would have adequate 
power if a further factor was introduced (as in the next experiment with common 
names and proper names), an additional analysis was carried out. 
Two separate ANOVAs were carried out by participants and by items with 
repeated measures on the factor of stimulus (set A verses set 8) and relation 
(related, unrelated). The response times for the stimuli from set A (761 ms) and 
set 8 (739 ms) were similar and the main effect of stimulUS set was not 
significant Fl( 1,11) < 1; F2(1,9) = 1.01, P = .33. Pictures in the related 
presentation were named more slowly (815 ms) than the pictures in the unrelated 
presentation (685 ms). The effect of relation was significant in the participant's 
analysis Fl(1,11) 12.51 p<.01; F2(1,9) < 1. The interaction between relation and 
stimulus set was not significant F 1 (1,11) < 1; F2( 1,9) <1. 
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The responses to word stimuli were analysed with a separate ANOV A. 
Response times for stimuli for set A (740 ms) and set B (753 ms) were similar 
and the main effect of stimulus was not significant F1( 1,11) < 1; F2(1 ,9) = 1.01, P 
= .33. Words in the related presentation were named more slowly than the same 
words in the unrelated presentation (805 ms vs. 675 ms). The main effect of 
relation was significant F1(1, 11) 17.95 p<.01; F2(1,9) = 17.66 p <.01 The 
interaction between relation and stimulus was not significant F1(1, 11) =1.4, P = 
.25; F2(1 ,9) <1 
Discussion of Experiment 6.1 
The results indicate that PCPN occurs when picture and name stimuli are 
presented in a within-participants design. The results are in accordance with the 
findings of Humphreys et al. and indicate that the post cue procedure affects 
both picture naming and word naming when picture and word stimuli are 
presented simultaneously. Repetition is not considered problematic, as the 
number of repetitions of each stimulus remains constant in each cell. Although 
the effect of relation for picture naming was not significant in the items analysis, it 
is possible that this was due to the nature of the relationship between some of the 
experimental items. The second analysis indicated that the experiment had 
sufficient power for a second factor to be considered. 
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Expefiment 6.2 
Experiment 6.2 used the same design as Experiment 6.1 to explore whether 
there would be interference or competition between proper names and common 
names that could be viewed as having a conceptual relationship in terms of their 
name. It was predicted that if the lemmas are specified predominantly by 
conceptual classification then interference would be apparent between common 
name distracters and people's names that were a compound containing a word 
that was semantically associated to the common name distracter. If however, 
the organisation of the lemma is predominantly determined by syntax then it is 
likely that proper names and common names would not interfere with one 
another as they would be represented in distant locations in the semantic lexicon. 
Method 
Participants 
Twelve participants (two males and ten females) volunteered to take part in this 
experiment. Ages ranged from 21-48 years. All of the subjects were nationals of 
the United Kingdom. 
Design 
The experiment was a within-participants factorial design. There were three 
independent variables. The first factor manipulated the format of the "to be 
named" stimulus. Stimuli were presented in either pictorial or verbal format. A 
second factor of noun category. Stimuli were either exemplars of famous people 
or everyday objects (proper nouns or common nouns). Finally, a third factor 
manipulated the relationship between the "to be named" stimuli. There were two 
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levels (related, unrelated). The dependent variables were the speed (in msec) 
and accuracy of the verbal responses. 
Materials 
Ten celebrity faces were matched with ten everyday objects to form pairs of 
stimuli. For each item a black and white digitised image of 256 x 256 pixels was 
formed. A selection of additional items served as practice stimuli. Each 
celebrity name could be considered a lexical compound of a first name and a 
common (object) word. The stimuli pairings were made on the basis that the 
celebrity name contained a word that could be clearly related or unrelated to the 
everyday objects. (for example related pairings: Edwina Curry-spaghetti, Tom 
Cruise-lighthouse. Unrelated parings Edwina Curry-lighthouse, Tom Cruise-
curry). Twenty picture-name pairings of this kind formed the "related" type 
presentations (ten pairings where the picture was a celebrity face and ten where 
the picture was of an everyday object. A list of the related stimuli pairs can be 
found in Appendix 9.). A further twenty "unrelated" pairings were formed, where 
there was no obvious relationship between the celebrity item and the object item. 
An example of the stimuli pairings is given in Figure 6.5 overleaf. 
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SPAGHETTI (related) 
ELEPHANT (unrelated) 
EDWINA CURRY (related) 
JOHN MAJOR (unrelated) 
Figure 6.5 An example of the stimuli pairings used in Experiment 6.2 
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An additional selection of ten pairings, which were not found in the experimental 
set, were produced to serve as practice stimuli. The stimuli were paired so that 
each picture-word presented side by side in the centre of the screen. All verbal 
stimuli (names) were presented in upper case 14pt Ariel font. The image of an 
arrow (pointing left or right) was used as a cue for naming. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was presented on the screen of an IBM compatible PC using 
Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL2) software. Vocal responses were 
recorded using a voice key, attached to a throat microphone. The experimenter 
recorded the accuracy of the vocal response by key press. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were going to take part in an experiment about 
naming famous people and everyday objects. All participants received a series 
of presentations to familiarise them with the stimuli pictures. Pictures of the 
practice and experimental stimuli were presented one by one in a random order 
for naming. If participants made an error, indicated that they were in a TOT 
state or said that the image was unknown to them, they were given the correct 
name by the experimenter and asked to repeat it out loud. Each item was 
repeated until participants could produce the names successfully. 
Once the participant had completed the familiarisation stage they were 
presented with a block of ten practice trials followed by the block of experimental 
trials. 
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Each of these trials consisted of a pair of stimuli that appeared on the computer 
screen for 900 msec. The stimulus pairing disappeared and after a postcue 
interval of 600 msec, a cue appeared in the centre of the screen. The cue 
remained on the screen until the participant had made their response. The time 
course of a single experimental trial is portrayed in Figure 6.6 overleaf. The 
experimenter then recorded the accuracy of the response by key press and then 
the next trial commenced. Responses were recorded as correct or incorrect 
(naming error/hesitation, misfire). The position of the picture/word stimuli (left or 
right position) and the direction of the arrow cue (left or right) pointing was 
randomised and there was an equal probability that the "to be named stimulus" 
was a picture or a word and that the cue would pOint left or right. There were 
therefore a total of 80 experimental trials. 20 trials (10 related, 10 unrelated) 
where the participant was cued to produce the name from a picture of the famous 
person. 20 where the participant was cued to produce the name from the picture 
of an everyday object, 20 trials where the participant was cued to read the name 
of the celebrity, and 20 trials where the participant was required to read the name 
of the object. 
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Correct responses between 300 and 5000 ms were subjected to analysis. 
Response times outside of this range were treated as errors. Errors accounted 
for 9% of the total number data points. This was made up of 5 % errors from 
incorrect responses, 1 % from responses under 300 ms and 3% from errors over 
5000 ms. The mean accuracy of responses by participant is given in the Table 
6.2. The mean RT is plotted in Figure 6.7. 
Figure 6.7: Mean response times for postcue naming of picture and word 
targets, as a function of target-distracter relationship. Error bars show the 
1100 95% confidence interval for the effect of relation. 
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Table 6.2 Mean Response Accuracy (out of 10) for Person-Object pairs 
from Experiment 6.2. 














People related 8.2 
People unrelated 8.8 
Objects related 8.2 
Objects unrelated 8.0 
The data for the picture naming and word naming were subjected to analysis by 
two separate ANOVA's (considering picture and word naming separately) taking 
noun (proper name, common name) and relation (related, unrelated) as within-
participants factors (identified with the suffix 1) and also by item (identified with 
the suffix 2). 
F or picture naming: The main effect of noun was significant F 1 (1,12) = 12.79 P = 
.01; F2 ( 1,9) = 5.1 P = .04. The main effect of relation was significant F1(1, 11) = 
7.77 P = .01; F2 ( 1,9) = 6.07 P = .03. The interaction between noun and relation 
was not significant F1(1,11) = 2.4. p= .14; F2 (1,9) = 4.49 P < .06. Simple main 
effects indicated that the relationship had a significant effect for naming people's 
faces [Relation for peoples faces F1(1, 11) = 4.49 P = .05; F2 (1,9) = 11.22 P = 
.009]. This suggested that relationship particularly affected the naming of the face 
stimuli. No other comparisons reached significance (All F's < 2.6, all p's > .13). 
In respect of the ANOVA for word naming, there were no significant differences 
for any of the main effects or interaction (all F's < 2.02 all p's >.67). 
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Discussion of Experiment 6.2 
The data indicated that naming a face was much slower when there was a 
related common word presented as a distracter, compared to an unrelated 
common word. Whilst this interference effect was found for naming pictures of 
faces, the reverse was not found. Naming a picture of an object was not 
impaired by the presentation of a related person's name. No interference effect 
was found in the word naming trials. 
General Discussion of Experiments 6.1 and 6.2 
Experiments 6.1 and 6.2 have indicated that the lemmas for proper names and 
common names are connected in some way. Whilst, the postcue picture naming 
procedure is an interesting method, the presentation of the stimulus may be 
prone to error. The participants may be able to use strategies to predict which 
side to the screen to focus, or may anticipate the cue leading to speeded 
response times. This can be checked for by excluding response times faster 
than a predetermined cut-off. Humphreys et al. considered picture-word pairs to 
evoke word reading via a semantic route. However, it is possible that the words 
were processed via a direct route omitting the semantic lexicon or lemma stage. 
Therefore it may be more appropriate to repeat the experiment using pairs of 
pictures for naming rather than picture-word pairs to ensure that both stimuli 
evoke semantic processing via the lemma stage. The stimulus set also has the 
potential to be problematic; it is difficult to find categorical pairs of stimuli that are 
not associated to some degree. The stimuli pairs must be selected with care. 
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However, if the interference effects are robust, and not an artefact of the post-
cue procedure or repetition, then it should be apparent in an alternative picture-
word interference paradigm. Early experiments used a word superimposed over 
the picture, however, with face stimuli, this presentation was not considered to 
be appropriate. The study by Young et al. (1986) placed distracters in a speech 
bubble, but this also has the same draw backs as with the postcued 
presentation: there is more than one stimulus on the screen at the same time, 
and this may elicit divided attention. The most appropriate way of presenting the 
stimuli was considered to be that used by Shriefers et al. (1990) where 
participants see a single pictorial stimulus, and the distracter word is presented 
in the auditory modality. 
Experiments 6.3 - 6.5 aim to establish whether the interference that occurred with 
the postcue procedure was robust. In line with the post-cued experiments, the 
first experiment used object stimuli only and the second experiment mixed proper 
names and common name distracters. 
Experiment 6.3 
The original experiment by Shriefers et al. included a number of different 
manipulations. However, as the focus of interest is access to the lemma stage of 
processing, it is only necessary to consider their SEMANTIC condition at a single 
SOA of -150 ms. In this presentation, the word is presented 150ms before the 
picture stimulus appears. As auditory recognition has a temporal quality, the 
point at which interference occurs must be leading up to the point at which the 
participant is preparing to name the visual stimulus. In other words the 
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methodology should indicate that early during lexical selection, picture-word 
interference should be apparent from semantically related pairings. Experiment 
6.3 aimed to replicate the findings of Shriefers et al. (1990). Results would 
validate the procedure by considering common words alone, where both the 
distracter word and the target picture would be classed as common names. The 
relationship between the distracter and the target picture was manipulated so that 
the pairing could be classed as related, neutral or unrelated. In line with the 
original experiments by Shriefers et al. it was predicted that early during lexical 
selection, picture-word interference should be apparent from semantically related 
pairings; that the related condition would produce slower response times than the 
neutral and the unrelated conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
Twelve participants took part in the experiment, (4 male, 8 female). Ages 
ranged from 21 - 50 years. All of the participant's were students of the Open 
University attending a day workshop. 
Design 
A one factor within-participants factorial design was used. The factor of relation, 
had three levels (the word-picture pairings could be classed as related, neutral or 
unrelated). The dependent variable was the response time to produce the name 
of the picture in milliseconds. In contrast to the study by Shriefers et al. (1990), 
the interfering stimuli were presented at a single SOA of -150. In other words the 
distracter preceded the picture onset by 150 ms. Each picture was presented 
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under three conditions (related, neutral, unrelated). In the neutral condition the 
interfering stimulus word "Blank" was presented with each stimulus picture. This 
was chosen in preference to a tone or white noise, as Shriefers et al (experiment 
1) indicated that tones or white noise were not an appropriate for use as a neutral 
condition. In the related condition the distracter word had a semantic 
(categorical) relationship with the picture stimuli. Highly associated pairings were 
avoided. In the unrelated condition the distracter words were re-paired so that 
they no longer had any obvious relationship with the pictures. 
Materials and Apparatus 
Sixteen line drawings were selected as experimental pictures for naming (see 
Appendix 10). Another 4 pairings were used as practice items. Sixteen auditory 
distracter words were digitised at 22 kHz using Sounded it software. The 
duration of the distracter words ranged from 500-900ms. A further auditory file 
of the word "Blank" was prepared for use as a neutral stimulus. Another 3 
auditory files were used as practice items. The experiment was presented on 
Macintosh computer using Superlab software. Reaction times were taken with a 
microphone attached to a voicekey. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. In order to determine that the images were 
equally familiar participants were shown each of the pictorial stimuli accompanied 
by the desired name. The participants were asked to use these names to refer 
to the pictures. Once the participants had familiarised themselves with the stimuli 
8 practice trials commenced, followed by the experimental trials. Participants 
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were told to produce the name of each picture out loud, as quickly as possible. A 
single trial consisted of the presentation of one of the experimental stimuli. The 
interfering stimuli word preceded the picture onset by 150ms. Once the 
participant had produced the name of the picture, the experimenter recorded the 
accuracy of the vocal response by key press. Each experimental picture was 
presented three times, once in each of the three (related, neutral and unrelated) 
conditions. Thus, the participant received 48 experimental trials in random order. 
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Results 
Figure 6.8: Mean response times for naming of picture targets, as a 
function of target-distracter relationship. Error bars show the 95% 
confidence interval for the effect of relation. 
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Responses to the experimental items in the related, neutral and unrelated 
conditions were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was only included if 
the correct response was given and the reaction time was within a range of 300 -
5000 ms. The mean timing is given in Figure 6.8 above and response accuracy 
(mean number correct of 16) can be found in Table 6.3. Repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted taking participants as the random factor (identified by 
the suffix 1) and also taking items as the random factor (identified by the suffix 
2). 
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There was a significant main effect of relation. F1 (2,11) = 3.96, P < .05; F2 (2,15) 
= 4.20, P < .05. A comparison of the means indicated that the related response 
times were significantly slower than the neutral t1(1) = 2.54, p < .05; h(1) = 2.63, 
P < .05 and unrelated t1(1) = 2.32, p < .05; h(1) = 2.42, P < .05 response times. 
There was no significant difference between the neutral and unrelated response 
time t1 (1) <1; t2(1) <1. 
Discussion of Experiment 6.3 
Experiment 6.3 confirms that interference occurs for object names presented as 
per the study by Shriefers et al. The related presentation produced slower 
reaction times than the neutral and unrelated presentations. Therefore the 
semantic relation between the distracter word and the target picture slowed 
picture naming. The neural condition yields a baseline for naming the picture 
stimuli. As there were no significant differences between the unrelated and 
neutral conditions, one can maintain that differences between the related and 
unrelated stimuli are not occurring due to a speeding of the unrelated response 
time. The data indicate that the use of an auditory presented distracter is valid 
method with which to study the interference at the lemma stage of name retrieval. 
Experiment 6.4 
Experiment 6.4 concerned the connectivity between common names and proper 
names. As in Experiment 6.3 the semantic relationship between word and 
picture were of interest. However, this time the stimuli pictures were celebrity 
faces. All of the celebrities had names that contained word that was also known 
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as a common name. For example, Cilia Black and Edwina Curry. The distracter 
words were all common names and were selected so that there was a 
relationship between the common names contained in the celebrity name and the 
distracter word. For example, Edwina Curry - Salad (Curry and Salad are both 
types of food). The relationship between the distracter and the target picture was 
manipulated in the three ways (related, neutral and unrelated) as in Experiment 
6.3. 
The aim of this experiment was to determine the nature of connectivity at the 
lemma. Some authors have suggested that the lemma is organised by syntactic 
class (e.g. Levelt 1989). The methodology aimed to indicate whether proper 
names that contain words also known in a common name form would activate 
these common name representations during lexical selection. If so, picture-word 
interference should be apparent from semantically related pairings; the related 




Twelve participants took part in the experiment, (6 male, 6 female). Ages 
ranged from 21 - 50 years. 
Design 
A one factor within-participants factorial design was used as in Experiment 6.3. 
The apparatus, and presentation of the experimental stimuli were the same as in 
Experiment 6.3. In the related condition the distracter word had a semantic 
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(categorical) relationship with the celebrity name. Highly associated pairings 
were avoided. In the unrelated condition the distracter words were re-paired so 
that they no longer had any obvious relationship with the celebrity names. 
Materials and Apparatus 
Sixteen black and white images of famous peoples faces were selected as 
experimental pictures for naming (see Appendix 11). Another 4 images were 
used as practice items. Sixteen auditory distracter words were digitised at 22 
kHz using Soundedit software the duration of the distracter words ranged from 
500-900ms. A further auditory file of the word "Blank" was prepared for use as a 
neutral stimulus. Another 3 auditory files were used as practice items. A list of 
the related stimuli pairings can be found in Appendix 12. The experiment was 
presented on Macintosh computer using Superlab software. Reaction times were 
taken with a microphone attached to a voice key. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same as that described in Experiment 6.3. 
Participants were familiarised with all of the experimental stimuli followed by a 
series of 8 practice trials. The 48 experimental trials commenced. Each 
stimulus picture was presented three times, once in each of the three (related, 








Figure 6.9 Mean response time for face naming as a function of 
target-distracter relation. Error bars give the 95% confidence interval 
for the effect of relation. 
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Responses to the experimental items in the related, neutral and unrelated 
conditions were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was only included if 
the correct response was given and the reaction time was within a range of 300-
5000 ms. The mean RT is plotted in Figure 6.9 above and accuracy of responses 
by participants (mean number correct of 16) can be found in Table 6.4. 
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Repeated Measures ANOVAs were conducted taking participants as the random 
factor (identified by the suffix 1) and also taking items as the random factor 
(identified by the suffix 2). 
There was a significant main effect of relation F1 (2,11) = 8.78, P < .01; F2 (2,15) 
= 5.67, P < .01 A comparison of the means indicated that the related response 
times were significantly slower than the neutral t1(1) = 3.86, p < .01; t2(1) = 3.32, 
p < .01 and unrelated t1(1) = 3.34, p < .01; t2(1) = 2.47, p < .05 response times. 
There was no significant difference between the neutral and unrelated response 
time t1 (1) <1; h(1) <1. 
Discussion of Experiment 6.4 
Experiment 6.4 identified that a common name distracter word interferes with 
naming famous faces when the name of the famous person is a compound, and 
there is a relationship between one of the names in the compound and the 
distracter. In other words, interference occurred between proper names and 
common names. This finding supports the data for naming faces in the post-cue 
naming paradigm used in Experiment 6.2. However, what remains unclear is 
whether the reverse would be found. Would the naming of a common name, be 
slowed by the presentation of a proper name distracter? This became the 
motivation for Experiment 6.5. More general implications of the interference 
effects are presented in the general discussion to Chapter 6. 
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Experiment 6.5 
Experiment 6.2 used a post-cued naming procedure to investigate the pathways 
to the lemma stage of representation. Although common name distracters were 
found to interfere with the naming of a face, evidence for the reverse; that proper 
name distracters would interfere with the production of a common name was 
weak. Experiment 6.S adopted the Shreifer's style procedure to determine 
whether this finding was robust. 
Method 
PartiCipants 
Twelve partiCipants took part in the experiment, (9 male, 3 female). Ages 
ranged from 30 - SO years. 
Design 
Once again, a one factor repeated-measures factorial design was used as in 
Experiment 6.4. The apparatus, manipulation and presentation of the 
experimental stimuli were the same as in Experiment 6.4. 
Materials and Apparatus 
The selection of experimental items were re-formed so that a picture for each 
common name could be found. Sixteen black and white images of everyday 
objects were selected as experimental pictures for naming (see Appendix 12). 
Another 4 images were used as practice items. Sixteen auditory distracter words 
(people's names) were digitised at 22 kHz using Soundedit software the duration 
of the distracter words ranged from SOO-900ms. As in the previous experiment, 
an auditory file of the word "Blank" was prepared for use as a neutral stimulus. 






pairings can be found in Appendix 12. The experiment was presented on 
Macintosh computer using Superlab software. Reaction times were taken with a 
microphone attached to a voice key. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 6.4. Participants 
were familiarised with the experimental stimuli followed by a series of practice 
trials. The experimental trials commenced and each stimulus picture was 
presented three times, once in each of the three (related, neutral and unrelated) 
conditions. 
Results 
Figure 6.10 Mean response time for picture naming as a function of 
target-distracter relation. Error bars give the 95% confidence interval 
for the effect of relation. 
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Target - Distracter Relationship 
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Table 6.5 




Responses to the experimental items in the related, neutral and unrelated 
conditions were subjected to analysis. A response to an item was only included if 
the correct response was given. The reaction time must have been within the 
range of 300 - 5000 ms to be included in the analysis. The mean RT is given in 
Figure 6.10 and the accuracy of responses by participants (mean number correct 
of 16) can be found in Table 6.5 above. 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted taking participants as the random 
factor (identified by the suffix 1) and also taking items as the random factor 
(identified by the suffix 2). There was a significant main effect of relation F1 
(2,11) = 50.37, P < .01; F2 (2,15) = 45.52, P < .01. A comparison of the means 
indicated that the related response times were significantly slower than the 
neutral responses t1(1) = 8.49, p < .01; t2(1) = 7.96, p < .01. The unrelated 
responses were slower than the neutral responses t1 (1) = 8.88, P < .01; b( 1) = 
8.54, P < .01 response times. There was no significant difference between the 
related and unrelated response time t1 (1) <1; t2(1) <1. 
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Discussion of Experiment 6.5 
Data from Experiment 6.5 indicates that proper name distracters do not interfere 
with the production of common names, as the reaction times for the related and 
unrelated presentations were similar. The significant differences between the 
related/unrelated and neutral responses indicate that participants were much 
faster to name the pictures when the word "blank" was presented compared to 
the proper name distracters. This is easily attributed to the length of the stimulus; 
people's names being much longer than the word "blank". A more appropriate 
neutral stimulus for this experiment would have been a word of similar length to 
the people's names. This could have been achieved by repeating the word 
"blank" twice in succession. Nevertheless, the crucial comparison is that of the 
related and unrelated responses. These indicate that proper name distracters did 
not interfere with the production of proper names. 
General Discussion of Experiments 6.1 - 6.5 
Experiments 6.1 and 6.2 used a post-cued naming procedure to investigate the 
pathways to the lemma stage of representation. The experiment produced 
significant effects for relation in the participants analysis, however, the effect of 
relation was not robust by items. The reason for this may have been due to the 
relationship between the items themselves or in the presentation (repetition, and 
attention to both stimuli). The procedure may also be prone to anticipatory 
responses. Nevertheless, the effect of relation in the participants analysis of 
Experiment 6.2 suggested that common names and proper names may be 
influenced and organised predominantly by semantic coding, in preference to the 
syntactic class of the names. Experiment 6.3 and 6.4 found similar interference 
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effects using an alternative picture-word presentation, that overcame some of the 
possible problems associated with the post-cue naming procedure. Experiment 
6.5 confirmed that unlike the naming of people's faces with the common name 
distracters, proper name distracters did not interfere with the production of 
common names. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these findings. Firstly, these 
experiments suggest that common names and proper names may be influenced 
and organised predominantly by semantic coding, in preference to the syntactic 
class of the lexical items. Although these experiments do not exclude the 
possibility that syntactic coding occurs at the lemma stage, there was as much 
interference between the syntactic classes of proper name and common names, 
as there was within the same class (i.e. in the experiments the exclusively 
involved common names). Therefore, the interpretation of these data appear to 
indicate that the lemma stage is highly influenced by the semantic stage of 
processing. This premise complies with theories of speech production and the 
previous research by Shriefers et al. Semantic relations produce interference 
due to access at the lemma stage of processing, when the distracter is presented 
during the early stages of lexicalisation. The findings also support the model of 
proper name processing by Valentine, Brennen and Bradart (1996), indicating 
that it is useful for models of face naming to adopt a two-stage lexical access 
account of name retrieval. 
Although common name distracters were found to interfere with the production of 
proper name targets, the reverse was not found. These differences in 
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interference may have occurred for a number of reasons. However, the most 
likely explanation is that the pictures of objects were easier to process than the 
people's names that were presented as distracters. The people's names were 
longer than the common names, and so this would have the effect of altering the 
relative timing of processing the two stimuli. Although this would not affect the 
within-participant comparison, directly comparing Experiments 6.4 and 6.5 with 
the same SOA may not be viable. One solution may be to use an SOA based on 
the mean uniqueness point of each stimulus set. 
Further research is necessary to establish a more detailed understanding of the 
lemma and its organisation. Valentine et al. (1996) have characterised the 
internal structure of the lemma as depicted in Figure 6.2 at the start of this 
chapter. However, what is not clear is whether the surname lemmas that are also 
known as common words would have dual representations - as both surnames 
and common names. According to this diagram this would be the case. 
However, an interpretation of the experiments in this chapter may indicate that 
there may only be a single entry in the lexicon for these types of names. These 
lexical entries would be accessed via the semantic system, but also from a 
proper name phrase lemma. One possible solution is depicted in Figure 6.11 
overleaf. 
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Figure 6.11. The "adapted" organisation of the lexicon. Both proper names 
and common names have a noun phrase lemma. 
In this diagram the structure of the lexicon is as follows: any name that is a 
lexical compound shares its representations with a proper name and common 
name phrase lemma that codes for the complete compound. An extra pool of 
lemmas are required for proper names that do not occur as common names. 
Access to the initial name phrase lemma, and the way that this node is attached 
to other elements in the compound may account for the reason why interference 
between proper names and common names occurs in a particular direction. 
Alternatively, the asymmetry between proper name and common name target-
distracter pairings, found in the interference experiments may simply reflect that 
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object pictures are faster to recognise than people's faces. Therefore a different 
time course of interference would be expected. 
Further experiments using the Shriefer's style of presentation could establish 
whether different SOA's affect different classes of names and how long the 
interference effects persist. One could also investigate the time course of 
semantic vs. phonological interference. Furthermore, lAC style simulation may 
help to identify which style of lemma organisation is most appropriate. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary, Discussion and Conclusion 
Summary of Main Results 
The experiments reported in Chapter 3 address evidence reported by Durso and 
O'Sullivan (experiment 1, 1983). These are important issues to investigate, 
because any cross-domain priming that is specific to proper names and requires 
an abstractionist account would undermine the Valentine et al. (1996) model. I 
argued that Durso and O'Sullivan's findings may have been an artefact of their 
experimental design. Cross-domain repetition priming (from a picture naming task 
to a word naming task) that was specific to proper names may be attributed to the 
nature of their experimental stimuli and retrieval of a processing episode. 
Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that in when an experimental design is formed 
to eliminate episodic influences, no reliable cross-domain priming from a picture 
naming task onto a word naming task was found. Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 
demonstrated that when an experiment is designed appropriately the data are 
consistent with an abstractionist account in general and with the Valentine et a/. 
(1996) model in particular. 
Cross-modality Priming 
The experiments reported in Chapter 4 all used a cross-modality priming 
paradigm. Experiment 4.1 aimed to test the hypothesis that proper names would 
produce cross-modal facilitation from a name familiarity decision presented in the 
auditory modality to a name familiarity decision presented in the visual modality. 
These hypotheses were supported for the categories of people's names and 
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landmark names. Further comparisons determined that cross-modal facilitation 
did not occur for common names of everyday objects when presented for a 
lexical decision. In contradiction of the experimental hypothesis, no cross-modal 
facilitation was found for country names. The presence of cross-modality 
priming for landmark names, and the absence of cross-modality priming for 
country names was confirmed in Experiment 4.2. To account for the lack of 
cross-modal priming for country names one needs to consider the connectivity 
between the lemma and the conceptual system. It is likely that country names 
have a diffuse connectivity, from the lemma directly to the conceptual system due 
to the many associations of country names. The fact that they can be used as 
adjectives as well as nouns provide evidence of such associations. In short, 
country names have sense and so are not pure referencing expressions. 
Therefore, a familiarity decision to a country name, may be made to the basis of 
activity of a lemma, rather than a token marker, with activation passing from the 
lemma to the conceptual system directly via diffuse links. In this case, the spread 
of activation could by-pass the token marker-lemma link and hence no cross-
modality facilitation would be found. This interpretation suggests that there are 
limitations for the view that all proper names are pure referencing expressions 
and are mediated by a token marker in memory. 
One potential confound that required careful consideration was word frequency of 
the different categories of noun. I argued that it was unlikely that the cross-
modality facilitation found with people's names and landmark names occurs as 
an artefact of name frequency. The people's names and landmark name stimuli 
used in these experiments were chosen from a selection of picture items that 
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participants were able to spontaneously name. For common name stimuli, an 
advantage for low frequency words has been found (e.g. Kinoshita, 1995, 
Scarborough, Cortese & Scarborough, 1977). However, an interaction between 
prime modality and the effect of word frequency has not been demonstrated. The 
possibility that differences in word frequency were responsible for the cross-
modal facilitation were addressed with Experiment 4.3. 
Experiment 4.3 investigated names derived from categories of high and low 
frequency. It might be argued that people's names and names of landmarks are 
labels of lower frequency and familiarity compared to the country names and 
object names. To test whether these differences could account for the presence 
of priming following cross-modality presentation, very low frequency names were 
compared to a set of very high frequency names using the cross-modal 
methodology. If frequency and familiarity were responsible for the cross-modality 
priming found in Experiment 4.1 and 4.2, then it is likely that this could be found 
when very low and very high frequency words are directly compared. If the 
findings of Experiment 4.1 and 4.2 occurred due to effects of word frequency, 
then significant cross-modal facilitation would be expected for the low frequency 
names, but not for the high frequency names. 
A significantly greater effect of repetition was found for low frequency words was 
found for the visually presented prime task. However, no cross-modal facilitation 
occurred for high or low frequency words when presented as a familiarity decision 
task. Therefore, evidence of word frequency affecting cross-modal presentation 
was not found. As a familiarity decision task was used in Experiment 4.3 and 
similar results to those obtained with a lexical decision task in Experiment 4.1 
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were obtained, differences in cross-modality priming due to task demands also 
can be eliminated. 
Experiment 4.4 investigated the conceptual specificity of names, as a number of 
authors have suggested that people's names occupy the sub-ordinate level of a 
conceptual hierarchy whereas object names occupy the base level of a hierarchy 
(e.g. Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1997; Durso & O'Sullivan, 1983). 
To test whether conceptual differences could account for differences in cross-
modal facilitation found in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, highly specific dog breed 
names were compared to a set of very general animal names using the cross-
modal methodology. If a high degree of conceptual specificity is responsible for 
cross-modality priming then significant cross-modal facilitation would be expected 
for the subordinate dog breed names, but not for the general animal names. 
The results clearly showed that neither specific names of dog breeds or general 
names of animals produce cross-modal facilitation. The lack of priming could not 
be attributed to a lack of power as the same stimuli produced significant 
facilitation when the prime phase and the test phase were presented within the 
same modality. The interpretation of Experiment 4.4 must be that differences in 
the cross-modal effects observed for the landmark and the country name stimuli, 
cannot be attributed simply to differences in specificity at a conceptual level. This 
finding refutes Durso and O'Sullivan's (1983) claim that the characteristics of 
proper name processing emerged as a function of their conceptual specificity. 
These data also confirm that common names do not produce cross-modality 
facilitation following a familiarity decision. This finding suggests that when the 
experimental task requires activation to pass from a lemma directly to the 
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conceptual system, no cross-modal facilitation occurs in a familiarity decision 
task. Furthermore, the dog breed names must be of a lower frequency than the 
more general animal names. Therefore these data confirm the findings of 
Experiment 4.3 providing further evidence that facilitation occurring in the cross-
modal priming paradigm is unlikely to be influenced by an effect of word 
frequency. 
Some proper names (such as city names and country names) can be used as 
adjectives as well as proper names. This flexibility of use has been identified as a 
possible reason why there might be a category specific sparing in proper name 
anomia. The next hypothesis that was explored was "adjectivisation" which was 
translated directly into a cross-modality experimental study (Experiment 4.5). A 
direct comparison was not possible for country names, as all country names 
could be used as adjectives. Making a direct comparison between country 
names and a different category of proper name would have led to confounding. 
Therefore the most suitable stimuli for this investigation was city names. Many 
city names are readily known and used as adjectives (e.g. Venice-Venetian, 
Canton-Cantonese). In contrast, there are some city names that do not readily 
form adjectives (Vancouver, Amsterdam). Experiment 4.5 found no reliable 
cross modal priming for city names, and there were no differences in facilitation 
between city names that could form well known adjectives compared to those 
known only in their proper name form. 
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Priming following Name Production 
The experiments in Chapter 5 investigated facilitation of a name familiarity 
decision, from a prime task that required name production. Experiment 5.1 
compared the facilitation of a name familiarity decision task from a prime task 
involving either name production, a picture familiarity decision or a name 
familiarity or lexical decision task. The methodology and rationale were adapted 
from Valentine et ai's (1998) study of people's names. The aim was to determine 
whether name production would facilitate the visual recognition of the same items 
name, for people's names, landmark names and country names. 
Experiment 5.1 found that naming a famous face or landmark facilitated a 
subsequent familiarity decision to that same item's name. In contrast, producing 
a country name did not provide similar facilitation. Similarly, naming a picture of 
an everyday object did not facilitate a lexical decision to the same items name. 
These patterns of facilitation were consistent with those found for the cross-
modality facilitation. 
Although recent research suggests that facilitation can cross stimulus domain 
between words and pictures for common names, support for this was not found 
in the present data. Park et al. (1998) used a recognition task at test (have you 
seen this item previously? yes/no) following a prime task involving naming and a 
word stem completion task. In contrast the experiments reported in this thesis 
employed a name familiarity decision (is this a name of a familiar item? yes/no). 
Park et al.'s recognition task required explicit recall whereas the name familiarity 
decision does not require recall of the priming episode. The data in Chapter 5 
supports the view based on earlier research that naming a picture of a common 
object does not facilitate subsequent recognition (lexical decision) of the same 
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items name (e.g. Morton, 1979; Winnick & Daniel, 1970; Scarborough et al. 
1979). 
It might be argued that the images of maps and landmarks were not as 
memorable as the pictures of landmarks and faces in terms of visual familiarity or 
complexity. These facets of the visual image may have made the landmark 
stimuli prone to an episodic influence compared to the country name stimuli 
(although note that the images were not presented during the test task). In order 
to determine whether such a factor could account for the differences in the 
processing of landmark and country names, Experiment 5.2 was conducted. 
Participants produced landmark or country names from the same pictorial 
stimulus. Differences in facilitation from production of the landmarks and country 
names were still apparent, and therefore these data provided further support for 
the idea that processing of names of landmarks and countries differed in their 
underlying cognitive architecture. 
Picture-word Interference 
In the final experimental chapter (6) five experiments employed variations of the 
picture-word interference paradigm to investigate access to the lemma stage of 
representation. The first two experiments used a post-cued naming paradigm. It 
was found that seeing a common name was found to interfere with the production 
of a proper name when there was a conceptual relationship between the proper 
name target and a common name distracter. The reverse pattern of interference 
was not found. Seeing a proper name was not found to interfere with the 
production of a common name. Experiment 6.3 and 6.4 found similar 
interference effects using an alternative picture-word presentation, that 
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overcame some of the possible problems associated with the post cue naming 
procedure. Hearing a common name was found to interfere with the production 
of a proper name when there was a semantic relationship between the proper 
name target and a common name distracter. Experiment 6.5 confirmed that 
interference in the reverse direction was not found. Hearing a proper name was 
not found to interfere with the production of a common name. 
Theoretical Analysis of Empirical Findings 
Previous theoretical accounts have claimed that uniqueness, meaninglessness or 
conceptual specificity can account for the characteristics of proper name 
processing. These theories were introduced in Chapter 1. This discussion will 
address each theory, in light of the data reported in Chapters 3-6. It may be 
argued that there is a problem of differentiating between these different 
theoretical claims. This problem is inherited from previous publications which 
make large and unsupported generalisations from studies of people's names. 
However, with care, direct quotations can be used to disambiguate each 
theoretical position in turn. 
Uniqueness of Names 
According to Burton and Bruce (1992) the characteristics of proper name 
processing occur as a function of their uniqueness. People's names are difficult 
to retrieve from memory as they are unique pieces of semantic information. 
Names receive less activation from the token marker (PIN) than other semantic 
information that is shared by any number of identities. Accordingly, Burton and 
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Bruce's account assumes that people's names and unique semantic information 
has the same status and would predict that a) all unique names would produce 
consistent phenomena and b) impairments in processing would affect people's 
names and other kinds of unique semantic information. The current series of 
experiments are difficult to reconcile with an explanation in terms of uniqueness, 
as people's, names, landmark names and country names are all unique. For 
example, there is only one Bill Clinton, one Statue of Uberty and one United 
States of America. In spite of their uniqueness these stimuli produce different 
cognitive phenomena. 
Other authors have also challenged the idea that the characteristics of proper 
name processing can be simply attributed to uniqueness (e.g. Hanley, 1995; 
Harris and Kay 1995). Harris and Kay (1995) provided a neuropsychological 
study of patient BG whom could access "unique" semantic information for 
familiar people who she was no longer able to name. This case remains difficult 
to explain in terms of the Burton and Bruce lAC architecture, unless changes to 
connectivity within the semantic pool of units is proposed. In response to Harris 
and Kay's criticism, Bruce, Burton and Walker (1994) point out that the lAC 
architecture: is not incompatible with accounts of naming difficulty couched in 
terms of relative meaningfulness, imageability, frequency or any other properties 
which would be expected to affect ease of learning, or retrieval, from memory. 
However, the categories of proper name that are used in this study involved 
unconscious retrieval from memory. The experiments demonstrate that the same 
experimental paradigm does not produce effects due to factors such as 
imageability and name frequency. Therefore, these data provide an additional 
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source of evidence that challenges Burton and Bruce's lAC architecture and 
explanations of uniqueness. 
Meaninglessness of Names 
According to Cohen (1990) meaninglessness is the critical factor that influences 
the retrieval of proper names. People's names are meaningless labels that lack 
semantic associations. A meaninglessness hypothesis has also been proposed 
by Bredart (1993). According to Bredart, labels themselves can provide meaning 
(e.g. Daffy Duck is a duck). 
Differences between the categories of proper name found in the cross-modality 
and cross-domain repetition priming experiments, cannot be accounted for in 
terms of meaninglessness. Landmark names often contain information about the 
nature of the place (for example Tower Bridge is a bridge etc.). In this respect, 
landmark names are meaningful and often contain a greater degree of sense 
compared to people's names that can be considered arbitrary and meaningless. 
Despite landmark names being relatively meaningful labels, they appear to be 
processed in a similar way to arbitrary labels such as people's names. 
It could be maintained that it is not the sense of the label, but their semantic 
associations that are the key factor in the meaningless proposal. 
One similarity between the names of cities, landmarks and countries is that they 
all have many semantic attributes. Therefore, the presence of cross-modal and 
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cross-domain facilitation in the landmark names must be attributed to the 
mediation by a token marker, rather than to connectivity between the conceptual 
system and the output lexicon directly. If diffuse, direct connections between the 
conceptual system and the output lexicon were being utilised, cross-modal and 
cross-domain facilitation would not be expected (or at least be reduced) for the 
landmark stimuli. 
The same interpretation could be applied to the fact that both country names and 
city names can be used as adjectives. This flexibility would require diffuse 
connectivity directly between the conceptual system and the lexicon (lemma). It 
might be argued that this connectivity (rather than that of the token marker -
lemma) is responsible for the lack of priming following name-production and 
presentation in a different modality. However, if this were the case, cross-modal 
and cross-domain priming would be expected for the city names that were not 
readily known in an adjective form. The reason for this is that these city names 
would have a low level of connectivity between the conceptual system and the 
lexicon (lemma). Therefore, priming similar to that found for the other kinds of 
meaningless labels would be expected. 
Cohen (1996) maintains "there is a gradient of difficulty that runs from names of 
acquaintances, to famous names, to geographical names. Famous names (like 
Napoleon) or place names (like the Taj Mahal) tend to have more semantic 
associations than names like Ann or Michael" (Cohen, 1996 p.134). There is little 
indication from the repetition priming experiments contained in this thesis, to 
support the idea of a gradient of difficulty. However, other experiments could be 
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conducted to test the idea of a gradient of difficulty directly (see later discussion 
headed "future directions"). 
What appears to differ in these classes of stimuli, is the nature of reference for 
these names. The landmark names and the people's names differ from city 
names and country names as they are pure referencing expressions; landmarks 
and people are both unique referents with only an individual identity requiring 
processing via a token marker. 
Proper Names as Pure Referencing Expressions 
If the key to proper name processing is the fact that they are pure referencing 
expressions, then one would expect that only sub-categories of proper name that 
have pure reference would produce phenomena that we usually associate with 
proper names. People's names can be deemed to be pure referencing 
expressions, whereas country names have sense and so cannot be pure 
referring expressions. In respect of landmark names, the case is unclear. 
Some landmark names are clearly pure referencing expressions: For example, 
the name "Taj Mahar' clearly offers no information about its conceptual properties 
(unless of course you speak Punjabi or Urdu). In contrast, other landmark names 
may have limited sense. For example, Tower Bridge, is a bridge. However, in 
names such as this the sense may not be appropriate (For example, Tower could 
relate to the building next to the bridge (The Tower of London) or to the bridge 
construction (comprises of two towers). For this reason one may conclude that 
the sense contained in landmark names is limited or false, and therefore 
landmarks can be classed as pure referencing expressions. Finally, city names 
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require careful consideration. In their noun form, city names do not convey sense 
in the same way as country names. However, in their adjectival form, cities do 
have sense. Therefore, city names cannot be easily classified as pure 
referencing expressions. 
The model by Valentine et al. (1996) can explain the cross-modality and cross-
domain priming found with people's names and landmark names, if one assumes 
that it is pure reference (and identity) that is captured by the model. Country 
names and city names do not produce facilitation of this nature as their linkages 
between representations are more diffuse and direct. Due to the generality of 
their links between the conceptual system and the lemma, access would not 
require mediation via a token marker. The data therefore comply with the model 
proposed by Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996) extending the role of the 
token marker to classes of proper name other than peoples names (i.e. 
landmarks). The data also demonstrate that the role of a token marker is not 
universal for all categories of proper name (i.e. not country names or city 
names). Token markers provide a means of implementing pure reference in the 
theoretical model proposed by Valentine et al. (1996). 
Organisation of the lexicon 
The data presented in this thesis yields some general indications for models of 
speech production and face recognition. Firstly, the conclusion of the 
experiments contained in Chapter 6 is that common names and proper names 
may be influenced and organised predominantly by semantic coding, in 
preference to the syntactic class of the names. Although these experiments do 
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not exclude syntactic coding occurring at the lemma stage, there was as much 
interference between the syntactic classes of proper name and common names, 
as there was within the same class of names (Le. in the experiments that 
exclusively involved common names). Therefore, these data appear to indicate 
that the lemma stage is highly influenced by the semantic stage of processing. 
This is consistent with theories of speech production, and with the model of 
proper name processing by Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996). 
Nevertheless, the data may indicate that it may not be necessary to fractionate 
the lemma stage of processing into separate areas for the processing of proper 
names (People's names) and common names such as proposed in the 
architecture by Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996). 
In respect of models of face recognition, such as the lAC model (Burton, Bruce 
and Johnston, 1990) it has often been assumed that the lAC architecture can 
account for object processing. Although lAC may produce a viable account of 
early visual processing and of semantic priming, this thesis has identified 
differences between categories of stimuli at the level of the lexicon. The 
interference effects reported in Chapter 6 may present problems for the lAC style 
account. Whilst lAC has the potential to simulate semantic priming of people's 
faces, its utility to account for selective inhibitory mechanisms is doubtful. Each 
pool of units has a uniform strength of inhibition. What emerges from Chapter 6 
is that inhibitory mechanisms exist between different categories of stimuli. 
Furthermore, this inhibitory mechanism does not appear to have a bi-directional 
strength. Therefore it is not viable to generalise with lAC in its present from, 
unless one hand-wires each connection strength individually. 
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To account fully for the process of lexicalisation, a more elaborate architecture is 
necessary. In the development of theoretical models such as the one proposed 
by Valentine, Brennen and Bredart (1996) lexical information has been 
represented separately from conceptual information, in line with models of 
speech production. 
Whilst models of face recognition and proper name processing have detailed 
excitatory connections, relatively little concern has been placed on the nature of 
inhibition between different representations. Chapter 6 indicates that the time 
has now come to specify these inhibitory connections more accurately. 
Future Directions 
Attempts to differentiate between the theoretical positions of uniqueness, 
meaninglessness and pure reference may be compromised due to the 
ambiguities of the hypotheses that were inherited from the original sources. 
There is a danger of a circular argument. One future aim would be to 
operationalise a test of whether an item is a pure referencing expression. 
Cross-modality and cross-domain priming could be used to explore different 
classes of proper names, such as mountains, rivers, oceans, counties and towns. 
Potential experiments may include investigations of what would happen if the 
adjectival form of a city name (e.g. Italian) was presented in a cross-modal 
priming paradigm. This may help to clarify how lexical access occurs for words 
with multiple uses. 
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Comparing different categories of proper name with a factorial design may 
provide a more direct test of the gradient of difficulty hypothesis. For 
investigation of this hypothesis comparisons of small differences in the magnitude 
of facilitation may be problematic. A useful alternative, may be to see whether 
regression of a meaningfulness rating can be used to predict the magnitude of 
facilitation. Regression may be useful as problematic factors (such as familiarity 
and frequency) have the potential to be partialed out of the model. 
Other viable questions emerge when one considers the case of trade names. 
Trade names start as product names, but as they become well known they have 
the potential to act as concepts or categories (for example, the name Hoover). 
Can differences such as these be identified with cross-modal and cross-domain 
repetition priming? One prediction might be that cross-modal and cross-domain 
repetition priming occur whilst a product name remains a pure referencing 
expression. It would be predicted that as a name changes into a common noun 
or generic form that is more conceptual, the connectivity between the lexicon and 
the conceptual system would become more diffuse. Hence, cross-modal and 
cross-domain effects would be reduced or eliminated. 
Another area of interest is the organisation of lemmas involved in lexical access. 
This is currently receiving great research interest (e.g. Damian & Martin, 1999; 
Kempen & Huijbers, 1983; Cutting & Ferreira, 1999; Miozzo & Caramazza, 1999). 
Valentine et al. (1996) described the internal structure of the lexicon, where a 
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lemma exists for each lexical entry, including lexical compounds. Whilst a large 
volume of work exists regarding semantic and phonological processes involved in 
speech production, less emphasis has been placed on words from different sub-
categories and classes. Proper names such as people's names and names of 
landmarks are interesting as they are lexical compounds. Further research using 
lexical compounds would help to specify the organisation of the lemma. A 
comparison of different nouns, may also help to enhance our general 
understanding of lexicalisation. Further experiments using the Shriefer's style of 
presentation or Postcued picture naming could establish whether different 
syntactic classes of words are affected in the same way. Manipulation of the 
SOA's may further our understanding of the time course of lexicalisation. 
In addition, would compounds from different classes of name be organised by a 
name phrase lemma as proposed in Chapter 6? If so, interference would be 
expected for other classes of lexical compounds (e.g. landmark names and 
common names such as Lighthouse). 
Finally, connectionist style simulations could be used to identify potential 
hypotheses and indicate the adequacy of any number of potential alternatives to 
lexical organisation. Valentine, Hollis and Moore (1999) have already used an 
lAC style architecture to identify new experimental hypotheses. lAC simulation 
suggested that a) people should be slower to produce the names of famous 
people for whom two names are available, than they would be to name an 
equally familiar person for whom only one name is known; b) Naming should only 
slowed by a competing name, but not by a conceptual property. This was termed 
"the nominal competitor effect". This effect was contrasted with the semantic 
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competitor effect. These effects were confirmed with empirical investigation. A 
similar architecture could be formed to provide a simulation of the lemma stage, 
to provide new hypothesis for picture-word interference experiments. Valentine, 
Hollis and Moore (1999) assert that, in contrast to semantic competitor effects 
(such as in classic picture-word interference studies), nominal competitor effects 
are long lasting. Connectionist style simulation and empirical research could be 
used to compare semantic and lexical competitor effects, to clarify the precise 
nature of differences in the processing common names and classes of proper 
names. 
Conclusions 
The data reported in this thesis indicate that it is pure reference that is captured 
in a model such as that proposed by Valentine et al. (1996) in terms of the token 
marker-lemma linkage. The observed cognitive phenomena of cross-modal and 
cross-domain priming appear to reflect the processing of purely referring 
expressions. 
In summary, the data reported in these experiments support the model proposed 
by Valentine, Brennen and Bradart (1996) being extended to some classes of 
proper name other than peoples names (i.e. landmarks). The data also 
demonstrate that the role of a token marker is not universal for all categories of 
proper name (i.e. not country names). 
It has been argued that the model by Valentine et al (1996) provides the most 
comprehensive account of proper name processing available to date. However, 
further research is now required to specify inhibitory mechanisms, and to specify 
the organisation and connectivity at the lemma. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Experimental Stimuli used in Experiment 3.1 
Critical Items 
People Landmarks Objects 
SET A Items 
Ruby Wax Eiffel Tower Ironing Board 
Margaret Thatcher Ayers Rock Spinning Wheel 
Ken Dodd Empire State Pin Cushion 
Terry Wogan Statue of Liberty Coat Hanger 
Les Dawson Notre Dame Ice Cream 
Marilyn Monroe St. Pauls Roller Skate 
Bruce Forsyth Acropolis Frying Pan 
Joanna Lumley Niagara Falls Record Player 
Cilia Black Brandenberg Gate Cotton Reel 
Tina Turner Tower Bridge Sea Horse 
SET B Items 
Victoria Wood Arc de Triomphe Sewing Machine 
John Major White House Light Bulb 
Rowan Atkinson Golden Gate Clothes Peg 
Tommy Cooper Buckingham Palace Fire Engine 
Jimmy Saville Tower of Pisa Filing Cabinet 
Bette Davis Taj Mahal StopWatch 
Johnathon Ross Mount Rushmore Rocking Chair 
Ben Elton Piccadilly Circus Tennis Racket 
Julie Walters Big Ben Traffic Lights 
Michael Caine Stonehenge Rolling Pin 
Note: In all experiments the assignment of Set A or B as primed or unprimed 
stimuli was counterbalanced between participants. 
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Appendix 3: Experimental Stimuli in Experiment 4.1 and 5.1 
Set A followed by Set B 






























































STATUE OF LIBERTY 
NIAGARA FALLS 














Critical Stimuli for Experiment 4.3 
Letters K-F Fam. Con Letters K-F Frq. Fam. Con 
Frq. 
Low Frequency High Frequency 
SetA SetA 
BEETLE 6 0 503 619 CHURCH 6 384 560 587 
BLEACH 6 0 549 544 WORLD 5 787 607 532 
BURNER 6 0 518 500 WATER 5 442 641 616 
CINNAMON 8 0 515 599 GOVERNMENT 10 417 594 426 
PIMPLE 6 0 557 579 PEOPLE 6 847 628 540 
PUDDING 7 0 510 593 STATE 5 808 560 440 
BRACELET 8 1 547 602 NIGHT 5 411 636 469 
COOKIE 6 1 585 634 HOUSE 5 591 600 608 
MOSQUITO 8 1 512 595 PERSONAL 8 196 311 408 
Mean Ratings 6.7 0.3 532.88 585.0 Mean Ratings 6.13 562.3 572.1 504.8 
Low Frequency High Frequency 
SetB SetB 
GORILLA 7 0 554 620 FAMILY 6 331 607 525 
LETTUCE 7 0 565 579 LITTLE 6 871 594 378 
DOUGHNUT 8 0 566 606 PLACE 5 571 612 427 
SAUCER 6 0 533 606 CHILDREN 8 355 608 582 
SPARROW 7 0 523 629 UNIVERSITY 10 214 622 533 
TOASTER 7 0 520 579 GENERAL 7 494 568 408 
SLEIGH 6 0 531 613 UNDER 5 707 544 319 
BLOUSE 6 1 562 640 SMALL 5 542 616 402 
PARCEL 6 1 503 525 SCHOOL 6 492 582 573 
Mean Ratings 6.81 0.31 537.2 593.1 Mean Ratings 6.50 530.7 593.2 452.7 
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Appendix 5: 
Critical Stimuli for Experiment 4.4 
SETA 
BULLDOG, ROTTWEILER, IRISH SETTER, GREY HOUND, GREAT DANE, 
DALMATION,BOXER, POODLE, ALSATIAN 
ELEPHANT, SHEEP, KANGAROO, SHARK, ALLIGATOR, DONKEY, PENGUIN, 
SEA HORSE, BUTTERFLY 
SETB 
WHIPPET, KING CHARLES, DOBERMANN, BEAGLE, DACHSHUND, 
PEKINGESE, CORGIS, AFGAN HOUND, LABRADOR 
GIRAFFE, PEACOCK, FROG, GOAT, LEOPARD, SPIDER, BEAR, GORILLA, 
SQUIRREL 
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"'Note: Cuba is not classed as a city name, but is a country name that is also 
commonly used in an adjectival form. 
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Appendix 7: Experimental Stimuli used in Experiment 5.2 







































Appendix 8: Experiment 6.1 Stimuli ( Related - Object only pairs) 
WINDMILL - LIGHTHOUSE 
SCREWDRIVER - CHISEL 
SCISSORS - THIMBLE 
PINEAPPLE - GRAPES 
HELICOPTER - AMBULANCE 
SKUNK - OSTRICH 
CHERRY - PUMPKIN 
KANGAROO - ELEPHANT 
SEA HORSE - TORTOISE 
TRUMPET - ACCORDION 
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Appendix 9: Experimental Stimuli used in Experiment 6.2 (Related 
Person-Object pairs) 
DAVID SOUL - COFFIN 
TOM CRUISE - LIGHTHOUSE 
QUENTIN CRISP - POTATO 
CILLA BLACK - ORANGE 
CARY GRANT - MONEY 
JOHNATHON KING - JUDGE 
WAYNE SLEEP - PILLOW 
ROY CASTLE - BUNGALOW 
RUSS ABBOT - PRIEST 
EDWINA CURRY - SPAGHETTI 
Appendix 10: Experimental Stimuli used in Experiment 6.3 
CLARINET - PIANO 
MOSQUITO - SPIDER 
PIN CUSHION - THIMBLE 
BRACELET- WATCH 
LADLE - KNIFE 
SCARF-TROUSERS 
NOSE - FINGER 
PEAR - STRAWBERRY 
CANOE - TRAIN 
TOMATO - GRAPES 
POTATO - ONION 
GIRAFFE- KANGAROO 
AEROPLANE - MOTORBIKE 
SNAIL - TORTOISE 
TRUMPET - GUITAR 
WORM - BUTTERFLY 
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Appendix 11: Related Stimuli pairings for Experiment 6.4 
HAMBURGER -ANNEKA RICE 
BUNGALOW - ROY CASTLE 
NIGHT - WAYNE SLEEP 
LIGHTENING - DAVID FROST 
ELBOW - MICHAEL FOOT 
OCTOPUS - MICHAEL FISH 
SPAGHETTI - EDWINA CURRY 
PLASTIC - RUBY WAX 
GHOST - DAVID SOUL 
PRESIDENT - JONATHON KING 
LIGHTHOUSE - TOM CRUISE 
SANDWICH - QUENTIN CRISP 
MONEY - CARY GRANT 
SHRUB -GEORGE BUSH 
PRIEST - RUSS ABBOT 
ORANGE - CILLA BLACK 
Appendix 12: Related Stimuli pairings for Experiment 6.5 
HAMBURGER - ANNEKA RICE 
BUNGALOW - ROY CASTLE 
*MOON - WAYNE SLEEP 
LIGHTENING - DAVID FROST 
ELBOW - MICHAEL FOOT 
OCTOPUS - MICHAEL FISH 
SPAGHETTI - EDWINA CURRY 
*IRON - RUBY WAX 
GHOST - DAVID SOUL 
*JUDGE - JONATHON KING 
LIGHTHOUSE - TOM CRUISE 
SANDWICH - QUENTIN CRISP 
MONEY - CARY GRANT 
*TREE - GEORGE BUSH 
PRIEST - RUSS ABBOT 
ORANGE - CILLA BLACK 
Object stimuli are the same as in Exp. 6.4 except those marked * which were 
changed so that line drawings could depict the required names. 
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Appendix 13: 
Figure 2: The Original Version of the model of Proper Name Processing by 
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